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Summary
In economics, researchers use a wide variety of strategies for attempting to draw
causal inference from observational data. New developments in the causal in-
ference literature focus on the combination of predictive methods and causal
questions. These methods allow researchers to answer new research questions
as well as provide new opportunities to address older research question in the
literature. This dissertation entails empirical work in the fields of (i) environ-
mental economics: I evaluate waste pricing policies using synthetic controls
and machine learning methods; (ii) labor and migration economics: I identify
and quantify unreported farm labor induced by a sudden migrant inflow; (iii)
conflict economics: I evaluate the economic costs of an hybrid war, namely,
the Donbass war in Ukraine. The contribution of this dissertation is threefold.
First, I combine novel data sources and provide unique datasets. Second, I ap-
ply and tailor modern evaluation methods to the estimation of policy-relevant
causal parameters in various fields of economics. Third, I compare recent ver-
sus traditional econometric approaches previously employed by the literature.
My dissertation shows that modern econometric techniques hold great promise
for improving the accuracy and credibility of causal inference and policy eval-
uation.
Deutsche Zusammenfassung
In der ökonomischen Forschung wird eine Vielzahl von Strategien verwen-
det, um zu versuchen kausale Schlussfolgerungen aus Beobachtungsdaten zu
ziehen. Neue Strömungen in der Literatur zu kausaler Inferenz konzentri-
eren sich auf die Kombination von Methoden zur Vorhersage und kausalen
Fragestellungen. Diese neuen Methoden ermöglichen es neue Forschungsfra-
gen zu beantworten und bieten die Möglichkeit bestehende Forschungsfragen
in der Literatur neu zu adressieren. Diese Dissertation umfasst empirische
Arbeiten in den Bereichen (i) Umweltökonomie: Ich evaluiere die Preispoli-
tik für Abfälle mithilfe der “synthetic control” Methode und Methoden des
maschinellen Lernens; (ii) Arbeits- und Migrationsökonomie: Ich identifiziere
und quantifiziere nicht gemeldete landwirtschaftliche Arbeitsleistung, die durch
einen plötzlichen Migrationszustrom verursacht wird; (iii) Konfliktökonomie:
Ich analysiere die wirtschaftlichen Kosten eines hybriden Krieges, des Donbass-
Krieges in der Ukraine. Der Beitrag dieser Dissertation zur bestehenden Lit-
eratur ist dreifach. Erstens kombiniere ich neuartige Datenquellen und stelle
neue Datensätze bereit. Zweitens verwende ich moderne Evaluierungsmetho-
den und passe sie an, um politisch relevante kausale Parameter in verschiedenen
Bereichen der ökonomischen Forschung abzuschätzen. Drittens vergleiche ich
neuere mit traditionellen ökonometrischen Ansätzen, die zuvor in der Literatur
verwendet wurden. Meine Dissertation zeigt, dass moderne ökonometrische
Techniken vielversprechend sind, um die Genauigkeit und Glaubwürdigkeit von
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This thesis addresses various economic problems in the field of environmental
economics, conflict economics, labor economics, and migration. It applies state-
of-the-art econometrics and machine learning algorithms, and it shows how
these techniques could improve over traditional methods of causal inference.
Chapter 1.–“The effects of price wasting generation: a synthetic control
approach” is coauthored with Matheus Bueno, Ph.D. student of the Toulouse
School of Economics, and published in the Journal of Environmental Economics
and Management. We evaluate the causal effects of unit pricing policies on mu-
nicipal solid waste. Using a unique panel dataset of Italian municipalities and
the case study of Trento, we show that the policy was effective, decreasing
total waste and promoting recycling. Importantly, we show how using the syn-
thetic control method could improve over traditional difference-in-differences
approaches when unobservables (such as environmental awareness) have time-
varying effects on waste generation.
Chapter 2.–“Heterogeneous effects of waste pricing policies” builds on the
first paper and studies the heterogeneous effects of unit prices on waste de-
mands and social welfare. The topic is highly non-trivial, especially because
of the large dimensionality of the characteristics which are bound to affect the
effects of waste policies, the consequent heterogeneity, and the data collection
and preparation. I employ machine learning techniques on a unique panel of
Italian municipalities with large variation in prices and observables. I show
that prices as well as socio-economic attributes matter, and trigger different
policy responses. Despite the large effect heterogeneity, I estimate overall wel-
fare benefits after three years of adoption, when waste prices cause significant
waste avoidance. This implies that even low prices can change waste behaviors
and improve welfare.
Chapter 3.–“The Arab Spring migrant wave and illegal labor on vineyards:
Counting the uncountable” is written with Stefan Seifert, Post-doc of the Uni-
versity of Bonn, and published in the DIW Discussion Papers. We provide a
framework to detect illegal labor from official statistics. We exploit an exoge-
7
nous shock on vineyards, in particular, the 2011 Arab Spring migration wave.
We show that illegal labor can be identified and quantified using observed farm
data and a dynamic panel model. This article is one of the few academic
study of labor practices that are pervasive not just in winemaking, but in all
of agriculture.
Chapter 4.–“The economic costs of hybrid wars: The case of Ukraine” is
co-authored with Julia Bluszcz, Master student at the Humboldt University
of Berlin, and published in Defense and Peace Economics. We analyze the
economic costs of the Ukrainian conflict in the Donbass region, using again
the synthetic control method. Between 2013 and 2017, we estimate an average
GDP loss of 15% due to the war. However, starting from 2016, the Ukrainian
economy showed signs of recovery, a growth that slowly continues driven by
external and internal factors, such as world raw material prices, the implemen-
tation of macroeconomic and structural reforms, and the improved political
situation.
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The effects of pricing waste generation:
A synthetic control approach
with Matheus Bueno∗
Published in the Journal of Environmental Economics and Management here.
Abstract To internalize pollution externalities into household waste genera-
tion, Unit Pricing Systems (UPS) have been adopted worldwide. This paper
evaluates the causal effects of a UPS on the disposal of municipal solid waste
in Trento, Italy. Using a unique panel dataset of monthly waste generation
in Italian municipalities, we employ the synthetic control method, which
allows us to account for possible time-varying effects of unobservables. Our
results show that the policy was effective, with a significant decrease of
the priced waste stream, unsorted waste, by 37.5%. This effect seems to be
largely driven by behavioral changes towards waste avoidance (−8.6%) and
possibly by a smaller increase in recycling (+6.1%). By comparing these
results to those obtained by a difference-in-differences approach, we show
that failing to account for time-varying effects of unobservables may lead to
a mismeasurement of policy effects.
Keywords: Waste generation, Unit pricing, Synthetic controls, Policy endogene-
ity, Selection on unobservables
JEL Codes: D01, C21, Q53
∗Toulouse School of Economics, Toulouse, France. Email: matheus.bueno@tse-fr.eu.
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Introduction
The process involving generation, collection and disposal of Municipal Solid
Waste (MSW) characterizes a classic example of a negative externality, as
there are environmental and treatment costs associated with MSW that
add to the individual’s private costs. Standard flat fees on MSW collection,
however, do not usually suffice for internalizing the cost difference into in-
dividuals’ waste generation behavior. Therefore, pricing waste per collected
unit, a form of Pigouvian fee (Pigou, 1932), has been increasingly used as
a policy instrument, known as Unit Pricing Systems (UPSs) or pay-as-you-
throw programs. Existing empirical evaluations of such policies generally
find them to be effective, when controlling for selection bias due to unob-
served determinants of their adoption with time-invariant effects on waste
generation.1
Nevertheless, despite their growing popularity, there is an empirical gap
on UPSs’ effectiveness when the effects of unobservables on waste genera-
tion vary over time, and on the behavioral mechanisms behind UPSs’ effects.
Using a unique data on monthly waste generation for nineteen municipal-
ities in Italy between 2008 and 2016, this paper attempts to fill this gap
by evaluating the causal effects of a UPS implemented on the disposal of
unsorted MSW in the municipality of Trento in 2013.
The first contribution of this paper is to address the endogeneity associ-
ated with UPS adoption due to selection on unobservables with time-varying
effects. Waste generation in municipalities adopting this policy may have
unobserved determinants that spawn diverging waste generation trends with
respect to municipalities not adopting it. For example, while environmental
consciousness may be fixed over time, the growing concern over the negative
environmental and health impacts of waste may lead individuals to increase
recycling or curb waste generation (see, for instance, EU’s awareness-raising
reports by O’Leary et al. 2017 and European Commission 2010). The im-
pacts of unobservables on waste generation may cause non-parallel trends
in outcomes, invalidating the identification assumption of standard policy
evaluations based on differencing out fixed individual characteristics with
time-invariant effects, such as with fixed effects and difference-in-differences
(DID) estimation (Gobillon and Magnac, 2016).
To account for time-varying effects of unobservables, we implement the
1See, e.g., the survey in Huang et al. (2011), and the literature review in Section 1.
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Synthetic Control Method (SCM) (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie
et al., 2010). This method reconstructs the counterfactual outcomes using
a combination of untreated municipalities with similar outcome trajectories
that did not select into treatment, hence replicating the unobserved het-
erogeneity and allowing it to have time-varying effects. Several empirical
applications in other areas of study have been implementing the SCM2, but,
in the authors’ best knowledge, this is the first paper doing so to evaluate
waste pricing policies.
Secondly, this paper adds to the literature by studying the behavioral
mechanisms behind the partial effects on the priced waste stream. When the
relative price of unsorted waste increases, individuals may shift away from
generating unsorted waste either by recycling more or by avoiding waste
generation of any sort, e.g., by using less packaging.3 Thereby, this pa-
per looks at which behavioral response prevails by evaluating policy causal
effects separately for total, recycling and unsorted waste.
Our results indicate policy effects of sizable magnitude, and changes in
waste generation behavior. Unsorted waste generation fell immediately af-
ter UPS implementation and levelled off after around two years, with an
average decrease of 37.5% in the post-treatment period. This partial ef-
fect seems to have been largely driven by waste avoidance and a relatively
smaller increase in recycling, with total waste decreasing by 8.6% and recy-
cling waste increasing by 6.1%. Placebo tests show that the unsorted waste
reduction is strongly significant, while weaker and no significance is found
for the causal effects on total and recycling waste, respectively. Finally, we
show that the use of the SCM rather than a DID approach is justified in
this application because the parallel trend assumption needed for the valid-
ity of the latter is violated. The successful reconstruction of the unobserved
heterogeneity by the SCM, on the other hand, allowed to control for its
time-varying effects.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 provides
a brief review of the related literature on UPS, and discusses potential
methodological shortcomings. Section 2 outlines the SCM used to estimate
the policy causal effects under study. Background and data are described
2See, e.g., Reimer and Haynie (2018), Corral and Schling (2017), Almer and Winkler
(2017), Acemoglu et al. (2016), Abadie et al. (2015), Kirkpatrick and Bennear (2014),
Billmeier and Nannicini (2013), Cavallo et al. (2013), and Pinotti (2015).
3Note that a potential policy response is also to dump waste illegally. We discuss this
possibility in Section 4.
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in Section 3. Section 4 provides the results, and Section 5 concludes and
discusses implications of this study.
1 Literature
Starting in the 1970s, UPSs have been broadly implemented both in Asia
and the United States, e.g., in municipalities of Japan, Korea, California,
and Michigan (Sakai et al., 2008; Miranda and Bauer, 1996). By the mid-
2000s, UPSs have been used in 30 of the 100 largest municipalities in the
country as, e.g., Seattle and San José (Skumatz, 2008). Afterwards, UPS
was adopted in many European countries, particularly Switzerland, the
Netherlands, the northeastern area of Germany, Denmark and Italy (for
a review, see, e.g., Reichenbach, 2008).
Since the 1990s, following their implementation, UPSs’ effects have been
extensively studied in the literature. Evaluations in the United States re-
spond for a large chunk of the early and current literature (Fullerton and
Kinnaman, 1996, 2000; Hong et al., 1993; Huang et al., 2011; Miranda
and Bauer, 1996; Podolsky and Nestor, 1998; Reschovsky and Stone, 1994;
Van Houtven and Morris, 1999; Wright et al., 2018). Studies for other
regions have followed through for, e.g., Korea (Hong and Adams, 1999;
Kim et al., 2008), Japan (Usui, 2009; Usui and Takeuchi, 2014; Yamakawa
et al., 2002), and the Netherlands (Allers and Hoeben, 2010; Dijkgraaf and
Gradus, 2009, 2004; Linderhof et al., 2001). However, to the authors’ knowl-
edge this is one of the first UPS policies to be evaluated in Italy and Europe,
except from the Dutch case, another study on Italy (Bucciol et al., 2015)
and Switzerland (Carattini et al., 2018). The scarce empirical evidence on
the effects of European UPSs lingers despite its increasing use in the region,
and the EU mandate targeting both waste avoidance and diversion (EEA,
2009, 2013; EU, 2008).
Moreover, results on UPSs’ effectiveness differ across studies and geo-
graphic areas, suggesting a general lack of external validity. A potential
reason for this is that policy effectiveness is likely to vary across different
social environments (see, e.g., Kipperberg, 2007; Reschovsky and Stone,
1994, for a thorough analysis). Based on economic theory, one would ex-
pect that households respond to economic incentives in a similar way, i.e., by
decreasing (increasing) priced (unpriced) waste generation. Empirically, in-
stead, some studies estimate small, often insignificant substitution between
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priced and unpriced waste generation, as well as unclear prevention efforts,
i.e., waste reductions possibly due to reuse and adjustments in purchasing
habits (see, e.g., Allers and Hoeben, 2010; Fullerton and Kinnaman, 2000,
1996; Jenkins et al., 2003).
A challenge that the literature faces is to address the endogeneity of
UPS adoption (see, e.g., a discussion in Dijkgraaf and Gradus, 2009). As
mentioned earlier, a UPS may be implemented in municipalities where en-
vironmental awareness has dynamic effects on waste generation through,
e.g., learning effects from additional information provision, and recycling
and waste reduction promotion. On the contrary, UPS may also be adopted
where low learning effects and environmental awareness result in high waste
levels requiring local governments to consider policy alternatives to standard
flat fees. Hence, policy adoption is likely not orthogonal to municipalities’
observed and unobserved waste generation determinants. To the best of
our knowledge, the existing literature only considers selection bias due to
observables and/or fixed unobservables with time-invariant effects.
To account for unobserved heterogeneity, various approaches have been
used. A part of the literature that controls for observed determinants within
a regression framework to estimate price elasticities of waste demand finds
them to be mostly inelastic (see Huang et al., 2011, for a discussion of these
studies). Among this literature, a number of studies explicitly take into
account selection biases with instrumental variable approaches (see, e.g.,
Fullerton and Kinnaman, 2000; Usui, 2008; Huang et al., 2011). Most of
these evaluations are based on cross-sectional data and on a large number
of UPS municipalities with different price levels which are instrumented in
2SLS regression (for a review, see Bel and Gradus, 2016). Findings from this
literature generally vary, depending on the method, data and municipalities
under study.
Other investigations account for unobserved heterogeneity with time-
invariant effects in DID and fixed effects estimations, concluding that UPSs
are mostly effective in reducing unsorted waste and increasing recycling (Di-
jkgraaf and Gradus, 2004, Van Houtven and Morris, 1999, Linderhof et al.,
2001, Allers and Hoeben, 2010, and Usui and Takeuchi, 2014,4 Carattini
et al., 2018). While controlling for time-invariant unobservables can be an
improvement over previous analyses, DID (fixed effects) methods do not
4Note that Allers and Hoeben (2010) and Usui and Takeuchi (2014) also tested the use
of instruments to correct for the endogeneity of the price.
13
allow the impacts of unobservables on waste generation to vary over time.
In fact, although DID allows for different outcome levels between units, it
assumes that outcome differences between UPS and non-UPS municipalities
do not change over time.
However, in some applications, it can be the case that unobserved de-
terminants of waste generation do not only lead to level differences in waste
generation, but have also time-varying effects (as discussed in, e.g., Usui and
Takeuchi, 2014). Miranda and Bauer (1996) report that UPS municipalities
often engage in citizen education efforts to strengthen environmental aware-
ness, informing households on the excess waste problem with informative
campaigns. This seems also the case for the municipality of Trento, where,
over the years, citizens and retailers were involved in education and infor-
mation programs promoting recycling and waste avoidance (ComuneTrento,
2012).5
Therefore, waste generation in UPS municipalities may vary over time
depending not only on the above-mentioned learning effects but also on
the target and the intensity of such awareness-raising programs. Indeed,
pro-environmental behavior seems to be affected by the ability of local gov-
ernments in motivating civic mindedness, i.e., the sense of voluntary public
good provision through a shared sense of obligation (Alesina et al., 2017;
Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2011). Further, also the availability of time and
space may impact waste generation of UPS municipalities differently over
time, altering the opportunity costs of waste reduction and recycling.6
Hence, if determinants of selection bias have time-varying effects on
waste generation, failing to account for them would return biased estimates
of UPS’ true impacts. In this direction, the SCM allows for time-varying
effects of the unobserved determinants by recreating them in the treated
municipality with a combination of untreated municipalities. This general-
izes the DID estimation, as shown by Gobillon and Magnac (2016).
Finally, the literature provides scant empirical evidence on the behav-
ioral mechanisms behind the reduced-form estimated effects of UPS im-
plementations. Theoretical studies point towards both monetary and non-
monetary incentives as important determinants of household waste genera-
5As a result, in some years, the National Institute of Statistics ranked Trento as one
of the most environmental-friendly municipalities for, e.g., recycling rates, green spaces,
air pollution, energy consumption, and public transport (ISTAT, 2011; La Repubblica,
2006).
6For example, time (space) opportunity costs of recycling refer to the time spent (space
needed) to sort and transport (store) recycling materials.
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tion behavior: While recycling waste or avoiding its generation are associ-
ated with opportunity costs in terms of time and effort spent, its benefits
involve not only saving eventual fees on waste disposal but also the psycho-
logical reward, aka “warm-glow”, associated with environmentally friendly
attitudes (see, e.g., Bénabou and Tirole, 2003; Brekke et al., 2004; Jenk-
ins et al., 2003; Kahn, 2007; Morris and Holthausen Jr., 1994; Thøgersen,
2006). Thus, the direction and relative strength of UPSs’ effects likely varies
with levels of intrinsic motivation, recycling and avoidance habits as well
as socio-economic characteristics such as education, income, and age. On
the one hand, pricing waste per unit could lead to increased recycling and
waste avoidance. On the other hand, waste generation may stagnate or
even increase due to the crowd out of intrinsic motivations (Abbott et al.,
2013; Bruvoll and Nyborg, 2003). This paper analyzes these behavioral re-
sponses empirically by estimating causal effects of UPS on all waste streams:
unsorted, recycling, and total.
2 Methodology
Instead of differencing out fixed unobserved heterogeneity, the synthetic
control method, introduced by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), attempts
to replicate the unobserved heterogeneity by matching the observable char-
acteristics predicting post-treatment outcomes of the treated unit to those
of a convex combination of untreated units, denoted as a synthetic con-
trol. Abadie et al. (2010) argue, using a linear factor model, that matching
on observed confounders and on a long set of pre-treatment outcomes is
possible as long as unobserved and observed confounders are also matched.
It remains to be verified for any particular application, however, to which
extent this matching is achieved. Importantly, the proposed linear factor
model allows individual effects (factor loadings) to have time-varying effects
(factors) on the outcome, which generalizes the DID approach that restricts
the latter to be constant over time, as discussed in Gobillon and Magnac
(2016).
In this specific application, for i = 1, . . . , J + 1 municipalities and t =
1, . . . , T time periods with T0, 1 ≤ T0 < T , pre-UPS treatment periods, let
Y Nit be the waste generation of municipality i in time t in the absence of
the UPS policy and Y UPSit be its waste generation if exposed to the policy.
Without loss of generality, let the first municipality, i = 1, be exposed to
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the policy intervention while the remaining J municipalities are not. The
policy causal effect to be estimated is given by the Treatment effect on the
Treated, TTt = Y
UPS
1t − Y N1t for t > T0, and the empirical challenge is to
reconstruct the counterfactual Y N1t , i.e., the waste generation outcome of the
treated municipality after the intervention had it not been treated.7 Once
the counterfactual outcome, Ŷ N1t , is estimated, the average causal effect of
the policy over the periods after treatment, i.e., the Average Treatment




(Y1t − Ŷ N1t ).
The synthetic control method recreates this counterfactual with a con-






by choosing a vector of weights W ∗ = {w∗i }i 6=1 through an optimization
program. More specifically, let H = (η1, ..., ηT0) be a set of weights that
generates a linear combination of pre-treatment waste generation outcomes
Y Hi = Σ
T0
t=1ηtYit of a municipality i, and take M of such combinations. Now,
let X1 be a (L+M)× 1 predictor vector composed by all M selected linear
combinations of pre-treatment outcomes and L observed waste generation
determinants of the treated municipality, i.e., L covariates. Finally, take X0
to be a matrix of dimensions (L+M)×J , in which each column is the equiv-
alent of the X1 vector for an untreated municipality.
8 Then, for the treated
municipality, W is chosen to minimize
√
(X1 −X0W )′V (X1 −X0W ) sub-
ject to wi ≥ 0, ∀i untreated municipalities, and Σi 6=1wi = 1, where V is a
(L + M) × (L + M) diagonal weighting matrix for each predictor variable
in the matrices X.
Different specifications of the estimator are possible by changing which
M combinations of pre-treatment outcomes are used and how they are
weighted, along with the L observed covariates, in the matrix V . In this
paper, as in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), we select a sole combination of
pre-treatment outcomes, i.e. M = 1, corresponding to their unweighted av-
erage, i.e. Y Hi =
1
T0
ΣT0t=1Yit. The predictors weighting matrix V , in turn, is
chosen, also as in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010),
among positive definite and diagonal matrices such that the Mean Squared
Error (MSE) of the outcome is minimized for the pre-treatment periods.
Since this comparative case study setting is not suitable for large sample
7Note that, as usual, it is assumed that the intervention has no anticipation effects on
the waste generation before its implementation in any of the J+1 cities, i.e. Y UPSit = Y
N
it ,
∀i and t, 1 ≤ t ≤ T0; and that there are no spillovers from the intervention on waste
outcomes of untreated municipalities, i.e. Y UPSit = Y
N
it ∀t and i > 1.
8In order to avoid interpolation biases the control group is limited to municipalities
with similar observed covariates and pre-treatment outcomes.
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inferential techniques, placebo tests are performed by applying the SCM to
each control municipality in the sample.9 If the estimated treatment effect
in the treated municipality is large relative to the one estimated for a control
municipality chosen at random, it is possible to conclude that the UPS pol-
icy had a significant impact on waste generation in the treated municipality.
Placebo tests are also performed in a restricted sample of control units for
which the estimated synthetic controls provide a better pre-treatment fit, in
the form of a lower MSE than the actual treated unit. Finally, the probabil-














Lastly, in order to illustrate the methodological innovation with respect
to the previous UPS literature, the SCM results are compared to the ones
obtained through the conventional difference-in-differences approach. For
this, the same L covariates specified in the matrices X above are used to
estimate the ATT. Finally, the bias of the DID estimator is evidenced by
showing that the parallel trend assumption fails in the pre-treatment period.
3 Background and Data
We analyze the UPS policy implemented in Trento, Italy, in January 2013.
Trento’s implementation of UPS consists of adding, on top of the already
existing flat fee for MSW collection,10 a unit price of e 0.09 per liter of
unsorted waste. Therefore, UPS was introduced without changing any other
ongoing baseline policy. In particular, recycling waste remains unpriced
and collected at the curb. Starting from January 2013, each household
was mandated to discard its unsorted waste either in 30 liter distinctively
marked waste bags that cost e 2.69 each or, in buildings with a maximum
of four flats and single houses, in 120 liter waste bins equipped with a coded
microchip that is activated at every emptying of the bin at the price of e
10.8. To avoid free riding problems, every building’s bin is locked. If non-
compliant bags are found, the whole building is charged for the offense to
guarantee self-enforcing and mutual monitoring among residents (see, e.g.,
Reschovsky and Stone, 1994, for a discussion).
9As importantly suggested by one referee, other authors also implement bootstrap meth-
ods to estimate confidence intervals around the synthetic’s estimate (see, e.g., Corral and
Schling, 2017; Sills et al., 2015; Kirkpatrick and Bennear, 2014).
10This flat fee is paid by all Italian municipalities, and depends on factors such as the
floor area of the house and the number of inhabitants, and not on the actual amount of
waste produced.
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We collected monthly data on waste generation, Y , between January
2008 and December 2016 for nineteen Italian municipalities in different re-
gions: Trento – the treated city –, Bari, Benevento, Bergamo, Brindisi,
Chivasso, Ciriè, Collegno, Milano, Moncalieri, Novara, Pesaro, Pinerolo,
Rivoli, Salerno, Settimo Torinese, Taranto, Torino, and Venaria Reale.
MSW data for the region of Piedmont, Apulia, and Campania are collected
from the respective regional observatory on municipal waste,11 while MSW
data for Trento come from the official website of the municipality12. For the
other municipalities, MSW data was provided upon request either by the
regional environmental protection agency (ARPA - Pesaro) or by the waste
collection company (A2A Bergamo, AMSA Milano, and ASSA Novara).13
The municipalities under analysis are all those with observed waste gen-
eration determinants reasonably close to those of Trento’s, for which the
authors could access detailed data.14 Following one of the seminal papers
on the SCM by Abadie et al. (2010), we restrict our control group to units
with similar observed determinants to those of the treated unit in order
to decrease possible interpolation biases. Thus, the control group includes
units without UPS and with baseline policies akin to Trento including re-
cycling programs such as curbside collection of recycling.15
The outcome variables of interest are the three waste streams measured
as log per capita kilograms of unsorted waste (lnUW ), recycling waste
(lnRW ), and total waste (lnTW ). The amount of total waste is computed
as the sum of recycling and unsorted waste, with recycling being recyclable
items (e.g., glass, paper, textiles) that arrive to the recycling facility for
treatment, and unsorted waste being the residual fraction that goes to
landfill and incineration.16 The covariates determining waste generation
were chosen by literature review, and represent socio-economic predictors
of waste generation and recycling habits.17 These are: average household
11Respectively, www.cittametropolitana.torino.it, www.sit.puglia.it, www.mysir.it.
12www.comune.trento.it.
13The control group includes municipalities with available data that approximate
Trento’s waste generation determinants including, e.g., curbside recycling.
14Since, in Italy, reporting monthly-level MSW data is not required by law, monthly
time series are unavailable for most municipalities.
15Curbside collection was introduced in Trento in 2006 and in the control cities of Berg-
amo in 2000, Cirie’ in 2005, Chivasso and Pesaro in 2006, Moncalieri and Novara in 2004,
and Torino in 2003. We do not possess records of collection calendars and bin sizes, yet,
these are relatively standard across cities according to anecdotal evidence provided by
the Regional Environmental Protection Agency (ARPA).
16Note that in the aggregation of recycling amounts we did not correct for the seasonality
of sub-streams (e.g., green waste), as this seasonality is common to all cities.
17See, e.g., Grossmann et al. (1974); Jenkins et al. (2003); Miranda and Bauer (1996);
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size (hhSize); log per capita income in thousand euros (lnIncome); income
inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient (Gini); educational attain-
ment, measured as the share of the population with a graduate degree or
higher (college); tourism intensity, measured as the nights spent by tourists
divided by the local population (tourism); and age structure, decomposed
into citizens under 15 (age<15 ) and over 65 years old (age>65 ). This data
was obtained from the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat), as well
as Comuni-Italiani.it and Tuttitalia.it.
Importantly for the SCM, the values of waste generation outcomes and
predictors of the treated municipality have to lie within the convex hull
spanned by the control municipalities’ values, such that a convex combina-
tion of control municipalities can fit the actual treated municipality. Figure
1 provides evidence for the validity of this common support assumption by
showing boxplots of mean-corrected variables for treated (grey) and control
units (white).
In addition, Figure 1 gives indication of possible reasons for policy endo-
geneity.18 In terms of waste generation, Trento has on average higher (lower)
levels of recycling (unsorted) waste than other control municipalities, and
higher total waste, while, in terms of socio-economic characteristics, Trento
has, for instance, higher average education levels and per capita income.
In this respect, previous studies suggest that low unsorted waste, high re-
cycling as well as high education and income levels are likely associated to
high environmental awareness and selection bias due to an environmental
activism effect (Dijkgraaf and Gradus, 2004). On the other hand, this could
also point to lower opportunity costs of recycling due to, e.g, time and space.
Additionally, relatively high total waste may point to selection bias due to
excess overall waste and social costs.
Richardson and Havlicek (1978); Van Houtven and Morris (1999), and Wertz (1976).
18Note that pre-policy data for treated and control units have similar distributions to
the full data plotted in Figure 1.
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Using the SCM, we estimate the counterfactual, aka synthetic Trento, as
a linear combination of outcomes of the J control municipalities. Thereby,
we estimate optimal weights, {w∗i }i 6=1, for each waste stream separately.
Table 1: Synthetic Trento: Estimated Weights for Control Units
Control Units UW RW TW Control Units UW RW TW
Bari 0 0 0 Novara 0.645 0.559 0.006
Benevento 0.058 0 0.001 Pinerolo 0 0 0
Bergamo 0 0.217 0.536 Pesaro 0.291 0.224 0.073
Brindisi 0 0 0 Rivoli 0 0 0.001
Collegno 0 0 0.002 Salerno 0 0 0
Chivasso 0.001 0 0.363 Settimo Torinese 0 0 0.001
Ciriè 0 0 0.012 Taranto 0 0 0
Milano 0 0 0 Torino 0 0 0.001
Moncalieri 0 0 0.001 Venaria Reale 0.005 0 0.003
Table 1 reports the estimated weights. The control cities of Novara and
Pesaro best resemble Trento in terms of unsorted waste (UW); Novara,
Pesaro, and Bergamo in terms of recycling (RW); Bergamo and Chivasso
in terms of total waste (TW). The SCM provides unbiased counterfactual
estimates if predictor variables as well as outcomes of the treated unit are
sufficiently close to those of the synthetic unit pre-treatment. Table 2 shows
that, compared to the sample average assigning equal weights to all control
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units, synthetic Trento is most similar to Trento in terms of outcomes and
predictor averages, and it has a lower MSE for each waste type.
Table 2: Outcome and Predictor Means (2008-2012)
Y : lnUW Treated Synthetic Sample
lnUW 2.735 2.741 3.049
lnRW 3.270 3.257 2.811
hhSize 2.892 2.770 2.709
lnIncome 2.847 2.734 2.664
Gini 0.274 0.299 0.309
tourism 4.736 4.245 2.237
age<15 0.144 0.128 0.129
age>65 0.197 0.218 0.213
college 0.117 0.115 0.101
MSE 0.029 0.732
Y : lnRW Treated Synthetic Sample
lnRW 3.310 3.293 2.848
lnUW 2.819 2.820 3.088
hhSize 2.243 2.198 2.280
lnIncome 2.892 2.840 2.709
Gini 0.274 0.296 0.309
tourism 4.736 4.173 2.237
age<15 0.144 0.129 0.129
age>65 0.197 0.224 0.213
college 0.117 0.117 0.101
MSE 0.036 0.730
Y : lnTW Treated Synthetic Sample
lnTW 3.758 3.759 3.721
hhSize 2.243 2.146 2.280
lnIncome 2.892 2.876 2.709
Gini 0.274 0.296 0.309
tourism 4.736 3.465 2.237
age<15 0.144 0.117 0.129
age>65 0.197 0.205 0.213
college 0.117 0.112 0.101
MSE 0.203 0.785
To show the outcome fit in each time period, Figure 2 plots waste time series
for Trento (solid) and synthetic Trento (dotted), and a vertical dotted line
that separates pre- from post-treatment periods in time zero (January 2013).
21
Figure 2: UW, TW, RW Time Series for Trento (solid) and Synthetic Trento
(dotted)


































































Months count from policy
The behavior of the treated outcome and its counterfactual are very simi-
lar in the pre-treatment period. This suggests that counterfactuals capture
treated-specific unobserved heterogeneity in waste generation, which indi-
cates unbiasedness of the synthetic control estimators. As for the post-
treatment period, Figure 2 displays the waste paths and gaps between
treated and synthetic unit.19
For UW, we observe a large and persistent divergence between Trento’s
UW path and its counterfactual. While the latter remains fairly stable
over time, the former drops immediately after policy, and levels off in the
long-run. The ATT, computed as the average post-treatment percent gap,
amounts to 37.5%. For TW, post-treatment gaps are negative, and of mod-
erate magnitude at first, but then increasing in the longer-run. In particular,
the treated outcome decreases to a lower level after about one year from pol-
19The sum of the counterfactual UW and RW should approximately equal the counterfac-
tual TW. This is indeed the case, with a negligible overestimation of TW post-treatment
by 0.4% on average.
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icy implementation, while the counterfactual level stays constant over time.
The negative ATT amounts to 8.6%. For RW, we observe mostly positive
post-treatment gaps, though of very small magnitude, and increasing only
after about two years from the policy. Further, both the treated outcome
and its counterfactual follow a positive trend, indicating overall increasing
trends in recycling habits. The ATT of 6.1% for RW, therefore, may not be
such a sizable post-policy gap for the treated unit as it was for the other
waste streams.
To assess the statistical significance of the gaps, we perform placebo
tests by applying the synthetic control method to each control municipality
in the sample.20 This means to consider control units as treated one at
a time, to estimate their respective synthetic control, and to compute the
treatment effect given by the post-policy differences between control unit
outcomes and their counterfactuals. If the estimated treatment effect for
the actually treated unit, Trento, is large relative to the ones estimated
for the control municipalities, the significance of the estimated effects is
ascertained. Figure 3 plots gaps for the treated unit (black) and placebo
control units (grey) against their respective synthetic estimate (x-axis).21
20All results are robust to leave-one-out estimations of the synthetic control (Abadie
et al., 2015). These are available upon request.
21We exclude the treated unit from placebo counterfactual estimation because it self-
selected into the policy. Additionally, counterfactuals with a pre-treatment MSE five
times higher than the treated unit’s MSE are discarded to safeguard against out-of-
support estimations (Abadie et al., 2010).
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Months count from policy
For UW and TW, the estimated ATT for the treated unit is the largest
in absolute terms over the other 16 placebo ATT estimates, however, this
does not hold for RW. Thereby, placebo tests indicate that the policy has
a statistically significant impact on UW and TW, but not on RW.
A second way to account for pre-treatment goodness of fit is to compare
the distribution of the ratio of post- and pre-treatment MSE for treated and
placebo units (Abadie et al., 2010). Finally, since the MSE criterion over-
weights large discrepancies, the ATT of each unit is also plotted, for robust-
ness, against its pre-treatment Mean relative Absolute Deviation (MAD),
the pre-treatment average percent gap between treated and synthetic out-
comes (Seifert and Valente, 2018).
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Table 4 plots the MSE ratio test and the ATT-MAD test for UW and TW.
MSE ratio tests show that the treated unit has the largest, and second
largest MSE ratio for UW and TW, respectively. The policy effect, hence,
seems to be significant on UW and not largely on TW. Nevertheless, since
no control unit shows a higher ATT as well as a smaller MAD than the
treated unit, ATT-MAD tests suggest statistical significant causal effects
for both UW and TW.
The statistically significant effect of the policy, stronger on UW, and
weaker on TW, may be explained by changes in waste generation behaviors
of households due to the policy. As intended by the policy, households de-
creased priced waste generation. Furthermore, reductions in TW occurring
especially in the long-run suggest behavioral adjustments towards waste
avoidance. This behavioral response can be also explained by increased
reuse opportunities as, e.g., many supermarkets started providing facilities
for refilling of beverages and detergents. On the other hand, causal ef-
fects on RW are not significant, which might be due to two reasons: First,
households may further adjust their purchasing behavior by, e.g., increasing
the use of lightweight packaging while also recycling more items. Because
our outcome is measured in kilograms, we are not able to observe such an
increase in recycling, which would lead to the underestimation (overesti-
mation) of households’ substitution (prevention) behaviors. Second, due to
decreasing marginal returns to recycling efforts, further increases in recy-
cling are less likely in municipalities with already high recycling levels such
as Trento.
In conclusion, the SCM estimates suggest that the policy was effective on
the priced waste, and further caused households to avoid waste generation,
likely as a consequence of pro-environmental changes in waste generation
behavior. However, the policy did not cause households to significantly
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substitute priced waste with recycling. Concerning negative side effects
of the policy, illegal dumping of waste could have happened. Yet, official
statistics provided by Trento’s municipal police indicate that this was not
the case.22
Finally, in order to compare our empirical strategy with the previous
literature, we estimate policy effects using the conventional DID approach.
The DID estimator (ATT ) is defined as the coefficient of the interaction
between a dummy for the treated unit (treated), i.e., a unit fixed effect
equal to one for Trento in all time periods, and a time fixed effect for the
post-policy periods (Post) equal to one only from 2013 onward. Table 3
reports estimates accounting for possible dependence in the residuals using
Driscoll and Kraay (1994) adjustment.23
22As reported by the National Institute of Statistics and by official statistics of Trento’s
municipal police, the illegal dumping of MSW follows a rather constant, linearly de-
creasing path, with five (twelve) cases on average in the four years after (before) policy
(ISTAT, 2018; Police, 2018).
23Note that while waste outcomes are measured monthly, covariates are measured an-
nually, which is consistent with SCM application. For DID, however, we measure all
dependent and independent variables annually. Further, hhSize is excluded to decrease
the noise generated by the linear dependence of the covariates (based on diagnostics in
Fox and Monette, 1992).
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Table 3: DID Regression Estimates (2008-2016) for UW, RW and TW
(lnKg)
lnUW lnRW lnTW
lnIncome −0.233 −0.443∗∗ −0.416∗∗∗
(0.308) (0.210) (0.099)
Gini −7.169∗∗∗ 2.408 −3.638∗∗∗
(1.165) (1.749) (0.194)
tourism 0.046∗∗∗ 0.003 0.029∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.006) (0.006)
age<15 0.057∗∗∗ −0.184∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗
(0.021) (0.018) (0.008)
age>65 0.008 0.079∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.013) (0.006)
college −0.189∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗
(0.025) (0.015) (0.016)
treated −0.316∗∗∗ 0.687∗∗∗ 0.055
(0.120) (0.071) (0.040)
post 0.216∗ −0.543∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗
(0.117) (0.106) (0.046)
ATT −0.555∗∗∗ 0.012 −0.076∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.061) (0.024)
Constant 9.348∗∗∗ 4.583∗∗∗ 8.413∗∗∗
(0.504) (0.594) (0.114)
Obs. 171 171 171
Time effects Yes Yes Yes
F Statistic 29.90*** 12.81*** 16.56***
Adjusted R2 0.478 0.464 0.559
Notes: ***p=.01; **p=.05; *p=.1
Control variable estimates present overall plausible signs and magni-
tudes. In particular, we find that higher income municipalities produce
less total and recycling waste, with wealthier households potentially having
higher opportunity costs of recycling and being overall less incline to public
good provision (Magnani, 2000). In addition, the income inequality mea-
sure (Gini) negatively correlates with unsorted and total waste, possibly
because income inequality is increasing in most cities, and at country-level,
while waste streams are progressively diminishing. In addition, cities with
more nights spent by tourists per inhabitant (tourism) produce more UW
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and TW, likely because tourists have less incentives to avoid waste and re-
cycle. We also find that older cities (age>65 ) recycle more and produce
more waste in total, while cities with on average larger families (age<15 )
generates less total waste, likely because they buy in bulk; they also re-
cycle less and produce more unsorted waste as a possible consequence of
more stringent time constraints, and higher opportunity costs of recycling.
Then, higher-educated cities (college) produce less waste and recycle more,
suggesting that higher education could correlate with higher environmental
awareness levels.
Concerning the estimates of the policy average causal effect, we obtain
a statistically significant negative ATT of about 55% for UW, and 7.6%
for TW, and, as with SCM estimates, no statistically significant ATT for
RW. 24 For a more precise comparison of the DID and SCM estimates, we
compute annual averages of the synthetic control monthly effects. After
doing so, ATTs obtained by DID can be compared to SCM estimates that
amount to −27%, 4.2%, −4.1% for UW, RW, and TW, respectively. Since
the two estimators take substantially different approaches, this comparison
is the most informative and accurate possible.
However, as previously discussed, the DID estimation is likely biased
due to a violation of its Parallel Trend Assumption (PTA). We show this by
performing in-time placebo tests for UW and TW (Autor, 2003). Figure 5
plots the estimated ATTs post-treatment (black) and placebo pre-treatment
(white) for each year with their respective confidence interval.
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For UW and TW, pre-treatment effects are jointly statistically signifi-
cant at the 1% and 10% level, respectively, indicating a failure of the PTA
24Since the variables included in the DID estimation are correctly specified in annual
terms, this is not an issue for the internal validity of our estimation.
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assumed in the DID regression model. Specifically, for UW, we find sta-
tistically significant, negative effects in each pre-policy year. This suggests
that UW generation trend in the treated unit prior to the policy was di-
verging from that of the DID counterfactual, leading to an overestimation
of the UPS’ treatment effect. Concerning TW, both negative and positive
statistically significant effects are estimated already pre-policy, suggesting
diverging trends, and the bias of the DID estimator.
As discussed, DID only allows for individual effects that have time-
invariant effects on the outcome, which might not be the case in our setting.
If, e.g., environmental-friendly attitudes or time and space availability have
evolving effects over time as outlined earlier, then unobserved determinants
will have varying effects in time. Controlling for this variation is at the
heart of this paper’s motivation to employ the SCM.
5 Conclusions
This paper evaluates the effects of a Unit Pricing System (UPS) imple-
mented in Trento, Italy, in 2013, on the disposal of municipal solid waste.
We use a unique data on monthly waste generation for nineteen munici-
palities in Italy over the period 2008-2016. To account for time-varying
effects of unobserved determinants of waste generation, we employ the syn-
thetic control method (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie, Diamond,
and Hainmueller, 2010), in which the counterfactual outcome of the treated
municipality is reconstructed with a convex combination of untreated mu-
nicipalities with similar outcome trajectories but not selecting into treat-
ment.
We find that UPS was effective, and caused changes in household waste
generation behavior. In particular, households responded by reducing priced
waste, i.e. unsorted waste, by 37.5% on average in the post-treatment pe-
riod. This partial causal effect seems to have been driven by waste avoidance
and, possibly, by increased recycling. In fact, our results show that total
waste decreases by 8.6% on average after policy, and recycling increases by
6.1%. The statistical significance of the results, found to be stronger for
unsorted waste, and weaker for total waste, may be explained by changes in
waste generation behaviors of households after policy. As intended, UPS in-
duced households to decrease the generation of the priced waste and sustain
increasing recycling levels. However, the policy did not cause households to
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significantly substitute priced waste by recycling. In this respect, our results
are in line with the literature that finds evidence for sizable unsorted waste
reductions and relatively smaller, often insignificant increases of recycling
(see, e.g., Allers and Hoeben, 2010; Dahlén and Lagerkvist, 2010; Fullerton
and Kinnaman, 2000; Jenkins et al., 2003).
Our findings contribute to the policy debate on policy instruments for
municipal waste reduction. We find strong evidence that monetary incen-
tives are effective to induce behavioral changes in household waste gener-
ation. The results show that unit pricing systems may help to apply the
European Union’s priority of waste reduction (EU, 2008), and to partly
internalize negative externalities of waste generation.
Moreover, municipalities might support UPS’ effectiveness in several
ways, given that rational households adjust their behavior such that their
marginal cost of waste reduction equals the unit price (Palmer et al., 1997).
For example, municipalities may consider decreasing costs of policy compli-
ance by, for instance, facilitating curbside recycling and awareness-raising
campaigns that make recycling more appealing, i.e., less time and space
consuming. Yet, introducing UPS in municipalities with high recycling may
have a limited impact because households sort most of the goods in their
bundle already before policy. For this reason, municipalities with lower re-
cycling than Trento may experience stronger UPS’ effects on this type of
waste.
Policy makers should also take into account municipalities’ heterogene-
ity. In fact, opportunity costs of waste avoidance, recycling, and illegal
dumping likely depend on municipal characteristics such as income and
education (Callan and Thomas, 2006). For example, higher-income munic-
ipalities may value their time more greatly leading to higher opportunity
costs of policy compliance. On the other hand, these municipalities may face
lower opportunity costs due to higher education and environmental aware-
ness levels. Further, law enforcement, civic mindedness and social norms
likely determine opportunity costs of illegal dumping. To increase the effi-
ciency of UPS, municipalities should reduce illegal disposal opportunities,
and possibly adjust the unit price accounting for households’ opportunity
costs. In this respect, future research would benefit from analyzing the op-
timality of the unit price, and how municipal heterogeneity impacts policy
effects.
Moreover, future work could also investigate the amount of social and,
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especially, external cost savings from waste avoidance. The latter is indeed
the most desirable outcome from a social viewpoint because, differently
from recycling, it causes no private and external costs of, e.g., collection
and treatment. Finally, studies are needed for the estimation of private
savings due to waste reductions induced by UPS.
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Heterogeneous effects of waste pricing policies
Job market paper
Abstract Using machine learning methods in a quasi-experimental setting,
I study the heterogeneous effects of introducing waste prices—unit prices on
household unsorted waste disposal—on waste demands and social welfare. First,
using a unique panel of Italian municipalities with large variation in prices and
observables, I show that waste demands are nonlinear. I find evidence of nudge
effects at low prices, and increasing elasticities at high prices driven by income
effects and waste habits before policy. Second, I estimate policy impacts on
pollution and municipal management costs, and compute the overall social cost
savings for each municipality. Social welfare effects become positive for most
municipalities after three years of adoption, when waste prices cause significant
waste avoidance.




Waste management generates pollution externalities that are not internalized
by households under traditional flat pricing schemes (Fullerton & Kinnaman,
1996). To correct this inefficiency, a growing number of municipalities have
implemented Pigou prices (1932) known as Pay-As-You-Throw (PAYT) pro-
grams that require households to pay for each unit (per bag, can, or weight) of
unsorted waste presented for collection. Theory predicts households will substi-
tute unsorted waste with increased recycling and/or waste avoidance (Smith,
1972).1 However, empirical estimates of average price effects provide mixed
evidence on the magnitude of this reduction as well as the behavioral mecha-
nisms behind it (Bueno & Valente, 2019). Moreover, policy impacts may vary
across municipalities depending, e.g., on the adopted price level and household
characteristics (Kinnaman, 2006). Disentangling sources of effect heterogene-
ity is important to tailor effective policies and deliver insights on why some
municipalities refrain from PAYT adoption.2
In this paper, I examine heterogeneous demand responses to waste prices,
and their impact on social welfare. The main challenge in the analysis is that
determinants of waste generation and policy adoption are possibly many, and
may confound the estimation of causal effects.3 This motivates the collection
of a unique panel of municipalities with a large variation in prices and observ-
ables, and the estimation of municipal level causal effects of prices (continuous
treatment) via machine learning methods. These techniques, in fact, allow to
control for a high-dimensional set of covariates.
I estimate social welfare effects for each municipality by combining price
effects on unsorted and recycling waste with their impacts on pollution and
municipal costs. First, I find that price levels matter. Higher prices cause
larger unsorted waste reductions and recycling increases. Lower prices cause
relatively more waste avoidance. Second, municipal characteristics also matter.
1Waste avoidance is defined as using household effort to reduce total waste (via e.g. product
reuse).
2In Italy, less than 8% of municipalities adopt PAYT (ISPRA, 2019). Policymakers fear
cost increases due to, e.g., higher recycling (Facchini, 2020). For anecdotal evidence, see e.g.
Gilli et al. (2018b), Allers & Hoeben (2010), Callan & Thomas (1999).
3 Previous studies suggest that waste generation determinants may also drive policy adop-
tion decisions. These are, e.g., households’ income, education and pre-policy waste levels
(see e.g. Gradus et al., 2019).
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While elasticities are rather constant at low prices, suggesting nudge effects,
elasticities increase at high prices especially for municipalities with low income
and little recycling before policy. Third, waste avoidance matters for welfare,
and drives benefits for most municipalities after three years of adoption.
This paper contributes to three distinct literatures. First, my work connects
to a large and growing literature on waste prices. One set of papers estimates
the price elasticity of waste demands or the causal effect of PAYT (binary
treatment) on waste amounts.4 Compared to my study, these papers require
more restrictive identifying assumptions, e.g., constant price effects across units
(effect homogeneity) or deliver less precise estimates, e.g., because they exploit
only one specific price change. In Bueno & Valente (2019), we have shown
that time-varying effects of unobservables on waste generation lead to bias
of the difference-in-differences estimator. The main difference between this
paper and past studies is the analysis of heterogeneous policy effects and social
welfare, while accounting for a wide range of prices, covariates, and lagged
waste outcomes. Moreover, the welfare effects of PAYT policies are largely
unexplored. Most relatedly, Dijkgraaf & Gradus (2015) show that waste prices
are more cost-effective than other institutional modes of collection.
Second, this paper contributes to studies in behavioral environmental eco-
nomics, analyzing drivers of waste behaviors.5 Building on this literature, I
rationalize welfare effect heterogeneity by showing that household reactions
on recycling and waste avoidance are ambiguous from a theoretical viewpoint.
My work also relates to the literature on nudging. Nudges, also in the form of
low prices, can correct externalities by reducing, e.g., plastic bag consumption
(Rivers, 2017). To my knowledge, my results provide the first empirical evi-
dence of agents’ nudgeability to waste prices, and of its social welfare impacts.
Third, to my knowledge, this is the first empirical application of machine
learning for causal inference combining continuous treatment, staggered adop-
tion, and self-selection. In addition, while random forests have been success-
fully applied in labor economics,6 no study applied this algorithm to high-
4This includes, e.g., Bueno & Valente 2019; Carattini et al. 2018; Bucciol et al. 2015; Huang
et al. 2011; Allers & Hoeben 2010; Fullerton & Kinnaman 2000, 1996. See Kinnaman 2014
for a review.
5See, e.g., D’Amato et al. 2016, Bowles & Polania-Reyes 2012, and Gilli et al. 2018b for a
review.
6See, e.g., Gulyas & Pytka 2019; Athey & Wager 2019; Davis & Heller 2017.
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dimensional problems in environmental economics.
I study waste generation behaviors of about 3,600 Italian municipalities
over 2010-2015. Italy provides an ideal setting to study heterogeneous effects
of waste prices because both price levels and socio-economic characteristics
largely vary across municipalities. I use web scraped and administrative data
to construct a new and rich dataset on waste generation and price adoption at
the municipal level. The final dataset includes 45 different price levels ranging
from 1 to 18 euro (e) cents per liter of unsorted waste, and 90 municipal
characteristics that may explain price adoption and waste generation.
To consistently estimate municipal level parameters with high-dimensional
data, I use machine learning-inspired matching estimators called generalized
Random Forests (RFs) (Athey et al., 2019).7 Intuitively, RFs partition the
large covariate space into small neighborhoods of municipalities mostly similar
in those characteristics that drive parameter heterogeneity. Within neighbor-
hoods, I estimate constant treatment effects by the residual-on-residual regres-
sion estimator, or R-learner (Nie & Wager, 2019).8
The advantage of using RFs is to relax the assumption of constant price ef-
fects across municipalities and estimate the full effect distribution with pointwise-
consistent confidence intervals. Estimation avoids ad hoc modeling choices,
and flexibly accounts for parameter heterogeneity in the large set of (often cor-
related) covariates.9 The improvement of RFs vis-à-vis, for instance, theory-
informed heterogeneity analysis is to provide with a data-driven documentation
of heterogeneous causal effects, as opposed to specification search.
Using these machine learning methods, I estimate municipal level price elas-
ticities of demands for unsorted, recycling, and total waste per capita. The
hypothesis of no heterogeneity is rejected for all outcomes. Waste prices cause
large unsorted waste reductions driven by increased recycling and, to a smaller
extent, waste avoidance. To disentangle sources of heterogeneity, I regress these
elasticities on price levels and a parsimonious set of relevant regressors captur-
7RFs build upon Athey & Wager (2018), Athey & Imbens (2016) and, originally, Breiman
(2001).
8R-learners are robust to confounding affecting outcome and treatment (Chernozhukov
et al., 2017).
9Differently, standard regression methods are justified if treatment effects are constant,
observables have linear or pre-specified effects, and unobservables are time-invariant (Wager,
2020).
40
ing household costs of waste disposal: income, education, and pre-policy waste
levels.10 I find a nonlinear relationship between elasticities and price levels:
while at high prices (above 9 cents) elasticities are increasing, elasticities are
rather constant at low prices. The estimated variation at low prices is 4% of
the variation at high prices. In this range, a one cent price increase reduces
unsorted waste by 5 to 10%, increases recycling by 2 to 6%, and reduces total
waste by 0.1 to 0.7%. Low prices reduce total waste by more (0.6-0.8%) and
increase recycling by less (2.5-3.2%).
I find no evidence of income effects at low prices. This finding suggests that
low prices work as nudges, i.e. instruments that influence behavior without
budgetary incidence (Farhi & Gabaix, 2020). To provide an intuition, house-
holds reducing unsorted waste by one standard trash bag (30 liters) save about
90 cents in the first price quartile (3 cents), while 4e in the third price quartile
(13 cents). As shown for plastic bag consumption (see, e.g., Rivers, 2017), low
prices are symbolic but serve to remind households of the costs of waste as well
as to promote recycling and avoidance behaviors.
Moreover, I find no evidence of waste prices being regressive at high prices:
I estimate that high-income municipalities are less elastic, and pay more under
PAYT.11 This implies that municipalities could increase waste prices without
distributional concerns.
Having established heterogeneity of price effects, the second part of the
empirical analysis focuses on municipal waste management costs. I estimate
that PAYT leaves unit costs of waste mostly unaffected, suggesting constant
returns to scale.12 Next, I simulate the impact of PAYT adoption on social
welfare using prior estimates for the relative environmental costs of unsorted
versus recycling waste (Kinnaman et al., 2014). I find that waste prices can
raise social costs, especially when households respond by increasing recycling
only. However, after three years of adoption, I predict welfare benefits for
most municipalities of on average e30 up to e170 per person. As unit costs
of unsorted waste are higher than those of recycling, waste avoidance triggers
10Their relevance is discussed in, e.g., Bueno & Valente (2019). See Gilli et al. (2018b) for
a review.
11Policy costs for rich vs. poor municipalities amount to on average e105 vs. e87 per
capita/year. Rich municipalities are defined by having an annual per capita income above
the third quartile of e16k.
12This is consistent with results on Italian municipalities by, e.g., Abrate et al. (2014).
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large welfare benefits. This implies that low prices may be preferable from
a social cost perspective although they cause comparatively smaller unsorted
waste reductions.
I present additional analyses in support of the identifying assumptions of
unconfoundedness and no spillover effects (no waste tourism). Results are also
robust to confounding from adoption of weight versus volume systems (see Bel
& Gradus, 2016, for a review of past findings). Finally, I contrast my average es-
timates to the binary treatment case, event-study-like difference-in-differences,
and R-learning LASSO regression. Results highlight the importance to account
for continuous rather than binary treatment, the bias of difference-in-differences
due to violation of its identifying parallel trend assumption, and robustness to
the specific choice of R-learning estimator.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 describes
policy background and data. Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework and
empirical methodology. Section 3 presents the main results and their policy
implications. Section 4 concludes.
1 Background and Data
1.1 PAYT policies
PAYT policies in Italy, as in many municipalities worldwide, require households
to pay a price per unit of unsorted waste according to either its volume (per
bag or bin) or weight (per kilogram). PAYT fulfills the equivalence principle
for which waste service consumers pay for its consumption (as, e.g., for energy
and water), and the polluter-pays principle for which households pay according
to their unsorted waste.
The baseline policy in both PAYT and non-PAYT municipalities is a flat
fee independent of waste quantities, namely, the unit price is zero. Flat fees
depend on house (m2) and household size (number of inhabitants). PAYT
municipalities reduce the flat fee to cover only fixed costs of waste management,
and implement waste prices to cover variable costs.
Municipalities can decide whether and when to implement PAYT, as well as
the price level and collection system. Policy adoption decisions are based on,
for instance, goals of waste pollution and management cost reduction. Price
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levels are set based on lagged and expected levels of waste generation and man-
agement costs. Yet, political and socio-economic factors may also matter (see
Gradus et al. 2019 and Section 1.4 for details). System choices are also made
at the municipal level, and depend on, e.g., demographic, geographic, and cost
factors (see Appendix D.4.1 for details). Households can pay either ex ante via
prepaid bags or ex post via identification (tag on bags, chip on bins, electronic
keys). Generally, municipalities prefer volume over weight systems because
this requires cheaper technology (Kinnaman, 2006). Yet, systems may create
asymmetric incentives.13 In sum, drivers of price adoption, waste generation
and collection mode often overlap, and are possibly many. Their relevance is,
therefore, an empirical question.
Credible enforcement and monitoring systems are crucial for policy suc-
cess.14 Illegal dumping is one of the main possible adverse effects. However,
after about fifty years of PAYT experiences worldwide, adverse effects seem a
bigger fear than reality.15 In Italy, anecdotal evidence suggests that (i) waste
tourism in surrounding municipalities is a rare and short-lived phenomenon, (ii)
enforcement and monitoring systems allow to actually decrease illegal dumping
episodes, and (iii) waste haulers encourage adoption and deem waste prices as
successful (Legambiente, 2017).
1.2 Data
Using web scraped and administrative data, I construct a new municipal level
dataset with information on waste prices, waste amounts (main outcomes) and
management costs, as well as socio-economic, geographic, and political deter-
minants of waste generation and price adoption. The final database is a panel
of Northern and Central Italian municipalities over the sample period 2010-
2015. I exclude municipalities with missing values as well as South and Insular
13For instance, volume systems can encourage waste compacting and be, therefore, less
effective.
14E.g., trash bins are locked, drones and photo traps track illegal dumping, and reciprocal
monitoring is enforced by charging all households in a building for lack of policy compliance
(CONSEA, 2019).
15See, e.g., Bueno & Valente (2019) for Italy and Skumatz (2008) for the US. The latter
found illegal dumping to be a short-term issue which lasts three months or less and involves
3% of municipalities.
43
Italy because arguably not suitable for being in the control group.16 Treated
municipalities for which second-order lags are missing are also excluded.17
The resulting municipalities are 3,574. Waste prices, the treatment, cover
1.7 million people living in 194 municipalities, of which 106 in the North-West,
82 in the North-East, and six in the Center. Most of the treated municipalities
implement PAYT for the first time in 2013 (77), while the others in 2012 (48),
2014 (36), and 2015 (33). Figure 1 shows the distribution of PAYT and non-
PAYT municipalities in the sample.
Figure 1: Map of PAYT and non-PAYT municipalities in the sample. White areas show the
excluded South and Islands, municipalities with missing values, and those adopting PAYT
before 2012.
This data allow for (counterfactual) predictions of policy and welfare effects for
26 million people (45% of the population) living in 3,380 municipalities without
PAYT.
Variables come from a variety of sources. Waste generation and management
costs are from the National Environmental Protection Agency (ISPRA). Mu-
nicipal socio-economic attributes are from the National Institute of Statistics
(ISTAT) and web scraping the online database of comuni-italiani.it. Political
variables on, e.g., municipal elections and mayors’ characteristics are obtained
from the Ministry of the Interior upon request. Geographic variables measur-
16Missing values are due to merging administrations and data errors. See Appendix B for de-
tails. In South and Insular Italy, as defined by the NUTS 1 classification, there are no treated
municipalities over the sample period, and data is incline to significant mismeasurement due
to illegal disposal (ISTAT, 2018).
17Policy adoption decisions correlate with second- or earlier-order outcome lags. First-order
lags are biased predictors due to anticipation effects. See Section 3.4.1 for details and esti-
mates.
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ing, e.g., the distance to waste treatment sites are geocoded using the software
R and data of the European Pollution Release and Transfer Register (E-PRTR).
At the time of writing, there is no open-source database on PAYT prices
in Italy. I acquired the list of PAYT municipalities from the National En-
vironmental Protection Agency (ISPRA), the National Association of Italian
Municipalities (ANCI), and from waste hauling companies.18 I collected a
cross-section of price data directly from municipalities and companies upon
request, and indirectly from municipal balance sheets. I created a database
containing average or median prices over the analyzed time period depend-
ing on the acquired data. Detailed information on data management, variable
denomination and descriptive statistics is presented in the Appendix B.
1.3 Summary Statistics
Table 1 compares key attributes of never-treated (non-PAYT) and treated
(PAYT) units before policy. The main outcomes are kilograms of per capita
unsorted (UW), recycling waste (RW), and total (TW) which is the sum of the
previous two. Full summary statistics of the included attributes are presented
in Tables 8 and 9 in Appendix B. Relevant predictors are discussed in the next
section.
Table 1: Summary statistics for key attributes of never-treated vs. treated municipalities
before policy. Waste amounts are measured in kilograms (kg) per capita (p.c.).
Never-treated Treated (before)
Obs. 19,448 Mean Sd Mean Sd
Outcomes: Recycling Waste (RW) kg p.c. 233.9 82.84 296.8 89.9
Unsorted Waste (UW) kg p.c. 223.5 120.5 216.0 115.1
Total Waste (TW=RW+UW) 457.4 127.0 512.7 142.9
Costs e: RW unit costs per kg 0.18 0.12 0.16 0.08
UW unit costs per kg 0.28 0.19 0.29 0.16
RW management costs p.c. 40.34 22.48 47.73 24.31
UW management costs p.c. 53.83 34.26 50.01 23.88
Covariates: Income p.c. (x e1,000) 13.9 2.3 14.2 2.0
Pop. share with college deg. 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.03
Distance to PAYT city (km) 50.0 63.2 33.8 38.0
(. . . up to 90 variables) (. . . ) (. . . ) (. . . ) (. . . )
18E.g., Aimag, Ascit, Clara, Dolomiti Energia, Hera, Iren, SEAB, Soraris, etc.
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Households generate relatively more RW than UW on average. Municipal unit
costs are largely heterogeneous, and managing one unit of UW costs on average
twice as much as RW. Costs for UW are slightly higher also in per capita terms.
Per capita costs indicate that one individual on average spends about e100 per
year for waste services, and pays the most for unsorted waste.19 This implies
that UW reductions that do not translate into RW increases will potentially
drive cost savings for both households and municipalities.
Comparing never-treated and treated units before adoption reveals that the
latter recycle more on average. This is not surprising as adopting PAYT where
households are used to recycle helps preventing policy adverse effects (Bueno
& Valente, 2019). PAYT is implemented in municipalities with slightly higher
income and comparable education levels. Units introducing PAYT, the treat-
ment, in a certain year are much closer to units which already had the treatment
in previous years, suggesting, e.g., information dissemination.
Focusing on treated municipalities, Table 2 compares per capita waste amounts
and municipal waste management costs before and after policy.
Table 2: Before-and-after comparison of waste outcomes and management costs of treated
units.
Before After
Obs. 1,164 Mean Sd Mean Sd
Outcomes: Recycling Waste (RW) kg p.c. 296.8 89.90 337.9 92.10
Unsorted Waste (UW) kg p.c. 216.0 115.1 115.9 80.90
Total Waste (TW=RW+UW) 512.7 142.9 453.8 127.2
Costs e: RW management costs p.c. 47.73 24.31 54.29 20.20
UW management costs p.c. 50.01 23.88 40.31 18.11
RW unit costs per kg 0.16 0.08 0.17 0.07
UW unit costs per kg 0.29 0.16 0.43 0.26
As expected, UW and TW decrease, and RW increases after PAYT. This leads
to higher costs of RW and lower costs of UW per capita. Unit costs of UW
increase after policy suggesting possible economies of scale. Yet, large standard
deviations indicate that average effects mask important heterogeneities across
municipalities.
19Municipal p.c. costs approximate household expenditures as, in Italy, municipalities are
cost minimizers such that fee revenues finance total waste management costs, a principle
known as budget balance.
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Table 3 reports price summary statistics by policy year. Prices range be-
tween 1 cent and 18 euro cents per liter of UW, for a total of 45 price levels.
The average price is 8 cents, and the standard deviation is 0.05. Performing
Wilcoxon and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (1945; 1971) shows that price distri-
butions do not statistically differ across policy years.
Table 3: Price summary statistics for PAYT municipalities by policy year.
Treatment Year Mean Sd Min P50 P75 Max
PAYT price e per liter 1 (obs. 194) 0.073 0.046 0.01 0.066 0.13 0.18
2 (obs. 161) 0.080 0.046 0.01 0.079 0.13 0.18
3 (obs. 125) 0.088 0.044 0.01 0.090 0.13 0.18
Using prices and UW post-policy, I calculate household variable costs in each
municipality.20 In the third policy year, households in high-price municipalities
(>13 cents) pay on average e176 per capita. In low-price municipalities (<3
cents), they pay on average e21 per capita. The magnitude of this gap raises
several questions. After partialling out confounding factors, do reactions in
municipalities setting high versus low prices differ? What role play income
effects in driving these differences? More broadly, how do behaviors toward
recycling and waste avoidance adjust to a decrease in unsorted waste?
1.4 Predictors
Accounting for observable determinants of price adoption and waste generation
requires adjustments for many sorts of covariates. I include waste generation
and policy adoption determinants for a total of 90 municipal attributes which
can be grouped into six categories: socio-economic, geographic, and political
variables, neighborhood effects, pre-policy waste amounts and management
costs.
Socio-economic characteristics.–This group of covariates proxies for hetero-
geneous household opportunity costs of time and space. Above all, the lit-
erature highlights income and education levels.21 The latter is measured by
20I use waste haulers’ data for liter-to-kg conversion. If missing, I use the median value.
21See, e.g., Callan & Thomas (2006); Kinnaman (2006); Jenkins et al. (2003); Miranda &
Bauer (1996); Van Houtven & Morris (1999); Richardson & Havlicek (1978); Grossmann
et al. (1974); Wertz (1976).
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the population share with graduate degree or higher, and elementary degree
or none. Income effects are indeterminate a priori (Callan & Thomas, 2006).
Higher-income households may be less elastic due to, e.g., lower budget con-
straints and higher time opportunity costs. Both education and income may
proxy for citizens’ demands for environmental quality (Dunlap et al., 2000).
These variables, therefore, may drive both policy adoption and effects. Fur-
ther, I control for demographics as, e.g., average house and household size,
home ownership, age structure, and tourism intensity. Labor market attributes
proxy for, e.g., time spent at home. I include the share of unemployed and out-
of-the-labor force population, and indeces of labor market activity, commuting
intensity, and social deprivation.
Geographic characteristics.–I control for the distance of each municipality
to waste incinerators, landfills, and hazardous waste treatment facilities. Prox-
imity to waste sites may induce, for instance, lower waste generation through
households’ pollution awareness. In addition, distant waste sites may cause
high transportation costs and, therefore, correlate with price adoption deci-
sions. I further distinguished communities by urbanization levels, and regional
or provincial seats. These variables proxy for differences in administrative ca-
pacity, recycling infrastructure, and PAYT system (Gradus et al., 2019).
Neighborhood effects.–Vicinity to other PAYT municipalities likely matters
for two reasons. First, information dissemination: municipalities may adopt
PAYT to mimic successful neighbors’ policies (Allers & Hoeben, 2010). Second,
consortia effects: nearby municipalities often share the same waste hauling
company to save, e.g., collection costs. As a proxy, I control for the distance
to the closest municipality that implemented PAYT in prior years. Hence, this
variable takes similar values for neighboring municipalities that adopt PAYT
and belong to the same consortium.
Political variables.– Policymakers may adopt PAYT in response to citizens’
demand for, e.g., better service quality, lower waste charges, and fairer waste
pricing (Dijkgraaf & Gradus, 2009; Batllevell & Hanf, 2008). Public engage-
ment may, in turn, impact policy acceptance and reactions. To proxy for polit-
ical participation, I include municipal level voter turnouts in the 2013 Italian
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general election. Political polarization and lack of social cohesion may also im-
pact policy adoption and effectiveness. Protest votes and extreme ideology are
proxied by vote shares for big tent parties, and for extreme left- and right-wing
parties. Mayor characteristics can matter as well. Newly elected, young mayors
may be willing to invest in waste technology; citizens may elect green mayors
putting PAYT in their agenda; locally born mayors of regional parties may rely
on large consensus and push reforms. To control for this, I add mayor’s age,
term length, party, and place of birth.
Pre-policy waste generation.–Lagged waste generation may drive policy adop-
tion as well as effect heterogeneity (Kinnaman, 2006). In fact, lagged waste
outcomes reflect initial opportunity costs of household recycling and waste
avoidance, and account for existing differences in the recycling infrastructure,
e.g., at the curb. The waste generation history also contains information
about unobservables such as motivation and experience in waste reduction,
and pro-environmental attitudes (Bueno & Valente, 2019). Including lagged
waste amounts, therefore, accounts for possible time-varying effects of fixed
unobservables.
Pre-policy waste management costs.–Price adoption decisions largely rely on
municipal cost levels, both in per capita and per kg terms. If salient to the
household, lagged per capita costs may also impact household waste generation.
Cost variables include budgetary costs for waste collection (e.g., labor), disposal
(e.g., machinery and land), transportation (e.g., trucks), treatment (e.g., store
and transform), and administrative services, net of recycling revenues from
selling products and energy recovery.
2 Theory and Empirical Framework
2.1 Theoretical Predictions
I am interested in how a price on household unsorted waste disposal affects
waste generation and social welfare. I show that household responses on re-
cycling and waste avoidance behaviors are ambiguous from a theoretical view-
point, and depend on the household cost structure as well as on whether these
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behaviors are substitutes or complements in household preferences. I provide
simple theoretical predictions that account for effect heterogeneity in a possibly
large number of household characteristics. Empirical analysis is, therefore, re-
quired to gauge the magnitude and the direction of price elasticities, as well as
the impact of relevant socio-economic determinants. For the sake of simplicity,
the theoretical model falsely assumes linear demands. In the empirical part,
however, I will control for any potential nonlinear effect of prices. Finally, in
line with the empirical setting, my discussion here will show that understanding
policy effects on recycling and waste avoidance is crucial for welfare analysis.
Heterogeneous demand responses to PAYT.–By pricing unsorted waste gen-
eration, PAYT provides monetary incentives that decrease the relative price
(opportunity cost) of two other waste disposal behaviors: waste avoidance and
recycling. In this way, prices alter households’ optimization problem regarding
waste generation. To formalize these arguments, I derive a utility maximiz-
ing model of household consumption that highlights heterogeneous opportu-
nity costs of recycling and waste avoidance behaviors. Based on comparative
statistics, my simple formulas show that reactions to prices crucially depend
on household marginal costs of these behaviors, as well as behaviors’ substi-
tutability or complementarity. All derivations are reported in Appendix A.
What makes recycling and waste avoidance more or less costly for house-
holds? The behavioral economic literature offers at least three (non mutually-
exclusive) theories. Cecere et al. (2014) provides a first testable theory: re-
cycling is more convenient than waste avoidance because the latter requires
learning new techniques and relies on intrinsic motives. Taken to an extreme,
households may find recycling so convenient that total waste increases, causing
rebound effects (see, e.g., Hong & Adams, 1999, for evidence on Korea.)
Kinnaman (2006) provides a second testable theory: households recycling
the most before policy would find it difficult to reduce waste substantially
further after policy. Thus, waste habits pre-policy matter. Time opportunity
costs and income levels can matter as well, since busy households may not take
the time to engage in additional recycling.
Lastly, analyzing how behaviors affect each other, D’Amato et al. (2016)
provide a third testable theory: recycling and avoidance behaviors may be
negatively correlated due to multi-tasking effects. This refers to households
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being induced to focus on one behavior and reallocate some attention away
from the other (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991). Alternatively, behaviors could
be complements if waste prices crowd in pro-environmental preferences by, e.g.,
raising awareness of the waste pollution problem.
PAYT and social welfare.– I define policy social welfare effects as changes in
social costs of waste management caused by PAYT. These are measured as the
sum of municipal (private) plus environmental (external) costs of unsorted and
recycling waste caused by PAYT. How do PAYT-induced changes in household
waste generation affect social welfare? This depends on the relative size of
social benefits from unsorted waste reductions versus social costs of recycling
increases.
The welfare analysis presents at least three challenges. First, municipal level
estimates of the environmental impacts of unsorted and recycling waste are
typically not available. Second, available estimates are generally not monetized,
and the monetizing literature is scarce. Third, while it seems reasonable to
assume that PAYT has no impact on external costs, private costs may instead
be affected through, e.g., (dis)economies of scale. I overcome these issues by
relying on prior estimates of environmental impacts, and assessing PAYT effects
on municipal unit costs of waste management directly from the data.
Unsorted waste disposal causes external costs associated to landfill and in-
cineration.22 A review of the life-cycle literature shows that external costs are
constant and rather small. Based on prior estimates, Kinnaman et al. (2014)
assume a baseline external marginal cost of $15/ton for landfill disposal and
$30/ton for incineration. Relying on these estimates, I assume an average
external costs of unsorted waste of e20/ton for unsorted waste.23
Recycling waste causes, to a large extent, external benefits.24 These are due
to saved pollution from the avoided extraction of virgin materials. Based on
prior estimates ($200/ton), I assume a marginal external benefit of e180/ton
for recycling. This is further reduced to e120/ton to account for actual recov-
22External costs include pollution from climate change emissions and waste transportation
as well as local disamenity externalities such as nuisance effects to neighboring properties
(Kinnaman et al., 2014).
23Data on amounts sent to landfills and incinerators are unavailable. Thus, I consider the
average cost.
24The treatment process of recycling also causes external costs. Yet, benefits overcompensate
costs.
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ery rates of 66% in Italy (Ronchi, 2016).
In my sample, private unit costs of recycling are on average higher, though
comparable to its external benefits. Differently, private unit costs of unsorted
waste are on average twice as high as its external costs. This implies that
unsorted waste reductions that do not translate into an increase in recycling
are the driving source of social cost savings. In other words, household reactions
towards waste avoidance matter for welfare.
2.2 Identification and Empirical Specification
As the previous section shows, a large number of variables come into play in
the estimation of heterogeneous causal effects of PAYT policies. Therefore, I
have to include a large number of municipal characteristics possibly explaining
price adoption and effectiveness.
I follow the potential outcome approach (Rubin, 1974). Let (Xit, Yit, Pit)
be the available data for municipality i = 1, ..., n at time t = 2010, ..., 2015,
where Xit ∈ Rd is a vector of d covariates, Yit is the waste outcome for either
unsorted (UW), recycling (RW), or total waste (TW), and Pit ∈ P = [0; pmax]
is the price (treatment) variable in year t. Henceforth, I omit the true sub-
script t for simplicity whenever possible. Note that prices range between zero
(for all untreated years) and the maximum price set in treated years (pmax).
For every unit i, there is a set of potential waste outcomes Yi(p), p ∈ P , each
being a random variable mapping a particular potential treatment, p, to a
potential outcome such that Yi = Yi(p). This is also referred to as the unit
level dose-response function. For any municipality defined by a vector of char-
acteristics Xi = x, I wish to estimate the individual treatment effect of unit
i, which is defined as Yi(p) − Yi(0) and is, however, unobserved for any unit.
Therefore, I will estimate the Conditional Average Treatment Effect (CATE)
function ∆(x) = E [Yi(p)− Yi(0)|Xi = x] and the Conditional Average Price
Effect (CAPE) function δ(x) = ∂E[Yi(p)|Xi=x]
∂p
under the “canonical” assump-
tions of unconfoundedness and no spillovers, aka Stable Unit Treatment Value
Assumption (SUTVA). I refer to Hirano and Imbens (2004) and Imai and van
Dyk (2004) for a description of these assumptions. In essence, unconfounded-
ness requires to have enough controls - usually pre-treatment covariates and
outcomes - so that, conditional on those controls, treatment assignment is as
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good as randomized. In the case of multivalued treatment, this assumption
writes Yi(p)⊥Pi|Xi ∀p ∈ [0; pmax], i.e., requires conditional independence to
hold for each value of the treatment. Imbens (2000) referred to this as weak
unconfoundedness, since it does not require joint independence of all potential
outcomes.25 While this assumption is not directly testable, I make it plausible
by controlling for a large set of covariates and pre-policy outcomes. I further
assess unconfoundedness in Section 3.4.1.
SUTVA excludes the possibility of interference between units and, given
the observed covariates, allows to consider the potential outcomes of one unit
to be independent of another unit’s treatment status. To fulfill this assump-
tion, I control for neighborhood effects, and I assess robustness to spillovers in
untreated units (see Sections 1.4 and 3.4.1).
In order to fulfill unconfoundedness in the case of non-random price adop-
tion, one needs to control for the sources of self-selection, i.e., capture the effect
of Xi on Pi. Consider the partially linear waste outcome model:
Yi = E [Yi(0)|Xi] + Piδ(Xi) + εi(Pi). (1)
Under unconfoudedness, E [εi(Pi)|Xi, Pi] = 0; further, E [Yi(0)|Xi] represents
the possibly non-linear direct effect of covariates on untreated outcomes. Note
that Xi is of potentially very high dimension. Let E [Yi|Xi] and E [Pi|Xi] be
the conditional outcome and price mean, respectively. By means of algebraic
transformations, model (1) can be rewritten as:
Yi − E [Yi|Xi] = (Pi − E [Pi|Xi])δ(Xi) + εi(Pi), (2)
where δ(Xi) identifies the CAPE as the effect of the leftover price variation
Pi− E [Pi|Xi] on the leftover outcome variation Yi− E [Yi|Xi] not explained by
the observed covariates. The standard partially linear model considers solely
the case of constant treatment effects (Robinson, 1988). Yet, Nie & Wager
(2019) study identification of model (2) for flexible heterogeneous treatment
effect estimation via machine learning approaches. In particular, we can esti-
mate δ(x) in two steps: First, we separately estimate the nuisance components
25Yet, it is difficult to think of applications where the weaker form would be plausible but the
stronger form would not be. Differences between the two are rather conceptual (see Imbens,
2000, for details).
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E [Yi|Xi = x] and E [Pi|Xi = x]. Second, we plug in their fitted values to ob-
tain δ̂(x) by regressing residualized outcomes on residualized prices. In this
step, we do not consider all residuals as equally important, and we estimate
a local version of model (2) that gives more weight to those residuals in the
neighborhood of x (see the next subsection for details).
Residual-on-residual regression methods, also known as R(esidualized)-learning
in high-dimensional settings, make the parameter estimate insensitive to small
errors in the nuisance components, thus improving its robustness. Note that, as
an alternative approach, one could directly estimate model (1) by including the
high-dimensional covariate set. However, regularization of E [Yi(0)|Xi] would
cause an especially large bias when covariates are correlated with prices (Athey
et al., 2017; Chernozhukov et al., 2017).26 Conversely, residualization removes
the correlation of covariates with both prices and outcomes, rendering the es-
timator robust to the parametric form in which covariates are included. In
particular, residualization makes the estimator “doubly robust”, i.e., as long as
either the estimator for either propensity scores or conditional outcome expec-
tation is consistent, the resulting estimator for the treatment effect is consistent
(Athey & Imbens, 2017a).
Estimation of the unit level causal effect of continuous treatment.–I now
discuss how to estimate the unit level predictions for the conditional expecta-
tions of interest: as mentioned above, I estimate first the generalized propen-
sity score s(x) := E [Pi|Xi = x] and the expected outcome marginalizing over
treatment y(x) := E [Yi|Xi = x], and finally the causal effect of continuous
treatment δ(x) or CAPE. I propose to use nonparametric machine learning
methods that explicitly account for heterogeneity in the parameter estimation
procedure. This allows to overcome three econometric issues. First, standard k-
nearest neighbor/kernel matching methods are bound to fail, as the concept of
neighbor vanishes in high-dimensions (Abadie & Imbens, 2016; Giraud, 2015):
conversely, machine learning allows to handle the large covariate dimension.
Second, nonparametric estimation allows to capture possibly complex inter-
actions in a data-driven model specification which, therefore, allows to reduce
the risk of model misspecification and ad-hoc model selection. Third, and most
26Without regularization, the inclusion of a large set of partly correlated predictors may lead
to, e.g., variance inflation and incorrect signs.
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importantly, machine learning allows to consistently estimate the full CAPE
mapping; in turn, this allows to construct a policy targeting function mapping
observed covariates to unit level causal effects. Among the class of adaptive
(data-driven) k-nearest neighbor matching estimators, I implement the Ran-
dom Forest (RF) method developed in Athey et al. (2019) that generalizes
the original algorithm of Breiman (2001) by adapting to the problem of both
prediction and heterogeneous treatment effect estimation.
Breiman’s RFs make predictions as an average of trees, as follows (see also,
for a more comprehensive treatment Scornet & Biau, 2016): (1) For each tree
b = 1, . . . , B, draw a random subsample of training data strb ⊆ {1, . . . , n}; (2)
Estimate a tree via recursive partitioning on each such subsample of the data:27
the resulting tree is a sequence of binary regions partitioning the covariate space
and grouping observations in the bottom regions called leaves Lb; (3) Make
predictions of y(x) in the leaf containing the set of units {i : Xi ∈ Lb(x), i ∈








Yi1(Xi ∈ Lb(x), i ∈ strb )
|i : Xi ∈ Lb(x), i ∈ strb |
(3)
where Lb(x) denotes the leaf of the b
th tree containing the training sample x.
In the case of out-of-sample prediction, I estimate y(x) using ŷ−i(Xi), based
on considering only those trees b for which i /∈ strb .28
Breiman’s RF is understood as an ensemble method averaging predictions
made by individual trees. However, as shown in Athey et al. (2019), we can
equivalently think of RF as an adaptive kernel method. For instance, we can
re-write the forest prediction (3) as ŷ(x) =
∑n
i=1wi(x)Yi where wi(x) is a data-
adaptive kernel that measures how often the ith training unit falls into the same
leaf as x. Weights sum up to 1, and define the forest-based adaptive neighbor-
hood of x (see Athey et al., 2019, for a formal definition). This kernel-based
perspective of RFs allows to cast this method as an adaptive locally weighted
27The process is termed recursive because each subsample of the data can in turn be split an
indefinite number of times until the splitting process terminates after a particular stopping
criterion is reached.
28Without out-of-sample prediction, random forest estimators are asymptotically normal,
since each estimate is derived by averaging estimates from many trees, but they overfit and
do not converge at the square-root-n rate, thus, are bias-dominated (Athey & Imbens, 2016;
Mentch & Hooker, 2016).
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estimator that first uses a forest to calculate a weighted set of neighbors for
each test point x, and then solves a weighted version of the residual-on-residual
regression (2). The resulting CAPE estimator writes:
δ̂(x) =
∑n
i=1wi(x)(Yi − ŷ−i(Xi))(Pi − ŝ−i(Xi))∑n
i=1wi(x)(Pi − ŝ−i(Xi))2
, (4)
where ŝ−i(Xi) are out-of-sample predictions of the propensity scores s(x).
Equation (4) defines the CAPE as a weighted residual-on-residual regression es-
timator with forest weights w(x) defining the nearest neighbors of x produced
by different trees.29 This distinguishes the CAPE from the APE estimator
which is the unweighted version of (4).30 Variance of δ̂(x) is estimated by eval-
uating the estimator on bootstrapped half-samples of the training data, also
called bootstrap of little bags (Athey et al., 2019; Sexton & Laake, 2009).
As for Breiman’s forests, estimation of a tree proceeds greedily, namely, the
partitioning is done continuously by choosing the split-point and the covari-
ate that attain the best fit (maximize or reduce some metric in that specific
partition). In the case of generalized random forest, such criterion is chosen
to maximize heterogeneity in the quantity of interest (outcomes, propensity
scores, treatment effects) between partitions. For instance, the metric chosen
for estimation of the CAPE function maximizes nLnR(δ̂L − δ̂R)2 where δ̂L,R is
the CAPE estimated in each binary (Left; Right) partition including a frac-
tion of training units equal to nL,R. Athey et al. (2019) discuss the design of
computationally efficient splitting rule for generalized forests in more detail.
Estimation of policy social welfare effects.–For each municipality i = 1, ..., n
with attributes Xi = x, I define the policy Social Welfare Effect (SWE
P>0(x))
in per capita euros as the sum of municipal (private) plus environmental (ex-
ternal) costs of unsorted and recycling waste caused by PAYT (P > 0). The
29RFs have tuning parameters such as minimum leaf-size and penalties for imbalanced parti-
tions. These are obtained via cross-validation as in Tibshirani et al. (2018), i.e., choosing the
ones that make out-of-sample estimates of the regression errors minimized in the R-learning
objective as small as possible.











UW (x) +ECUW ) +CATERW (x)(PC
P>0
RW (x) +ECRW ).
]
(5)
CATEUW (x) and CATERW (x) are municipal level causal effects of waste prices
on unsorted and recycling waste, respectively (in kg per capita). PCP>0UW (x) and
PCP>0RW (x) are municipal level unit costs of, respectively, unsorted and recycling
waste management under PAYT (in e/kg). ECUW and ECRW are the exter-
nal marginal costs of unsorted waste and recycling, respectively, where the
first is positive and the second is negative (in e/kg). As a result, a nega-
tive CATEUW (x) (UW reductions) brings both private and external benefits,
while a positive CATERW (x) (RW increases) brings private costs and external
benefits. The net welfare effect is ex-ante unclear, and remains an empirical
question.
While EC are assumed to be constant across units and rely on prior esti-
mates, CATE(x) and PC(x) are estimated for all municipalities in the sample,
treated and untreated. CATE(x) is estimated for each waste type (here, UW
and RW) as pδ̂(x) with δ̂(x) being statistically significant CAPE estimates for
the respective waste type.31 For untreated units, the price p is assigned based
on closest generalized propensity score prediction.
PCP>0(x) are observed for treated units (under treatment) but unobserved
for untreated units. In order to predict counterfactual values for untreated
units, I use the R-learning RF method described in Section 2.2. I regress all
the covariates - including municipal attributes, lagged waste and cost values -
and a policy indicator on municipal unit costs, running separate forests for UW
and RW. I obtain a kernel function that maps municipal observables to policy
causal effects on unit costs. I next use this function to predict unit costs for
untreated units under PAYT. For each municipality defined by Xi = x, I assess
if PAYT affects unit costs significantly. If this is the case, I replace PCP>0(x)
for untreated units with P̂C
P>0
(x), their predicted counterpart under PAYT.
31As CAPE is the first derivative of the CATE, then an estimate of the CATE is just the
integral of the estimated CAPE, i.e. of δ̂(x) (Torricelli-Barrow theorem).
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3 Main results
I have explored from 500 to 10,000 trees in the RF, and treatment effect es-
timates become stable after 1,000 trees, thus, results are obtained using this
value. Further, each tree is built with data for the same year to account for
common shocks to all units. All trees are grown with cross-validated values
for the number of randomly subsampled covariates, minimum leaf size, and
penalty for imbalanced splits, namely, splits in which the size of parent and
child node are very different are penalized. Additionally, since the treatment
group is substantially smaller than the control group, each node is required
to include a minimum number of both treated and control units, i.e., enough
information about both factual and counterfactual to estimate the treatment
effect reliably. For this reason, a penalization is imposed also to nodes includ-
ing an unbalanced number of treated and control units. Following Athey et al.
(2019), values for such parameters are obtained via cross-validation.32 In order
to credibly estimate policy causal effects, the common support condition for
treated and untreated units needs to hold. Figure 10 in Appendix C provides
evidence of such support.
3.1 Behavioral responses
I begin my empirical analysis by estimating unit level causal effects of prices
on demands for unsorted, recycling, and total waste per capita (UW, RW,
TW, respectively). In this section, I focus the attention on elasticities in the
third policy year in order to have a closer estimate to the long-term effects of
PAYT.33 I run separate random forests for each waste outcome: UW, RW, and
TW (for robustness). Figure 2 presents the distribution of the estimated semi-
elasticities of waste demands for all municipalities in the sample. All estimates
are statistically different from zero (p-values < 0.01). The hypothesis of effect
homogeneity is rejected for all outcomes and policy years.34
32I use the software R-3.4.2 and the grf package version 0.10.0 (Tibshirani et al., 2018).
33I analyze the dynamics of price effects in Section 3.2. One caveat is that these elasticities
cannot be estimated for late adopters. Reassuringly, there are no statistically significant
differences in the distribution of price effects between early and late adopters in the first two
policy years.


















Figure 2: Unit level estimates of price semi-elasticities (CAPE) of waste demands.
CAPE are measured as % changes of waste amounts for a one cent price increase.
The estimated price effects on waste demands for UW and RW are large in
magnitude. Using the estimates to compute factual and counterfactual waste
amounts implies that prices cause an annual UW decline of 50% on average.
This reduction is mainly driven by an average RW increase of 32% and, to
a lesser extent, by an average TW reduction of 5%.35 The large substitution
effect of UW with RW caused by the policy, therefore, represents a strong
change in household waste behavior.
I proceed with the analysis of the sources of effect heterogeneity. In order
to summarize the CAPE function, I linearly project the CAPE estimates onto
price levels, a set of features, and their interactions (Tibshirani et al., 2019).
The literature on waste prices is especially interested in learning the elasticity of
demand as a function of a few variables such as income or education. Thereby,
the set of features includes relevant regressors capturing household opportunity
costs of waste disposal: income, education, and pre-policy waste levels. Figure 3
plots fitted semi-elasticities (CAPE) across prices, ceteris paribus.36 Pointwise
estimates are obtained by fitting a smooth regression line. Shaded regions are
the 95% confidence intervals.
35This corresponds to -110 kg (UW), +80 kg (RW) and -25 kg (TW) per capita. Thereby,
estimates from separate forests are consistent with each other (CATETW ≈ CATEUW +
CATERW ).
36Data inspection suggests quadratic demand curves. Thus, I fit a polynomial regression of





















Figure 3: Fitted price semi-elasticities (CAPE) of waste demands at each price level.
Slopes of waste demands in high and low price regions differ. I use the median
value of 9 cents to define these regions, indicated by the vertical line in the
boxplot above the image. While at high prices elasticities are increasing, elas-
ticities are rather constant at low prices. The estimated elasticity variation at
low prices is 4% of the variation at high prices. All other things equal, a one
cent price increase reduces unsorted waste by 5 to 10% (vs. 4.7-5.7% at low
prices), increases recycling by 2 to 6% (2.5-3.2%) and reduces total waste by 0.1
to 0.7% (0.6-0.8%). Further, household behavior at high prices sheds new light
on the mechanism behind UW reductions: increasing UW reductions reveal a
negative correlation between RW and TW reactions, suggesting that recycling
and waste avoidance are substitutes in individual preferences.37 Thus, higher
prices do not further reduce total waste, instead they simply reallocate waste
to the recycling pile.
Having established effect heterogeneity across prices, I analyze possible in-
come effects. Figure 4 plots fitted semi-elasticities by income level, ceteris
paribus.
37This result confirms case (i) among the theoretical predictions reported in Appendix A.
Estimates of the elasticity of substitution between recycling and avoidance are provided in
Section 3.3.
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Figure 4: Fitted price semi-elasticities (CAPE) of waste demands by income levels.
Thresholds q25 and q75 indicate first (e13k) and third (e16k) quartiles of annual income
per capita.
Low-income municipalities are on average one percent point more elastic than
high-income municipalities.38 Thus, high prices enter budget constraints. How-
ever, income effects are not statistically significant at low prices. This means
that high- and low-income households are similarly elastic, and possible differ-
ences in time opportunity costs do not trigger heterogeneous reactions.
Findings can be interpreted as follows: on the one side, no income effects and
constant elasticities at low prices are consistent with nudge theories where small
incentives have substantial behavioral impacts without budgetary incidence
(Farhi & Gabaix, 2020). This interpretation is supported by the low monetary
benefits of reducing UW at low prices: households reduce UW by 13.6% in the
first price quartile (3 cents) and save less than one euro. On the other side,
income effects at high prices provide evidence against possible regressive effects
of waste prices. This result is new to the literature as previous studies typically
consider the effects of low prices.39
Looking at heterogeneity across education levels, I estimate no significant
38In particular, at high prices, semi-elasticities for low-income municipalities are on average
-7.5% for UW, 5.2% for RW, and -0.5% for TW, ceteris paribus.
39The highest price in, e.g., Fullerton & Kinnaman (2000) is $2.18 per 32-gallon bag (120L)
or $0.02/L. This data include prices up to e0.18/L. See Bel & Gradus (2016) for a review
of previous studies.
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effects, suggesting that education plays, if any, a relatively minor role. Con-
versely, recycling habits before policy matter, as predicted by Kinnaman (2006):
households recycling little before policy are more elastic.40
The literature typically estimates average point-elasticities smaller than one.
For comparison, I compute point-elasticities at mean values and find similar
values (see Table 10 in Appendix D.1). However, converting slope estimates
into point-elasticity estimates may not be useful since price elasticity varies
along the demand curve.
3.2 Welfare analysis
Welfare effect heterogeneity is driven by both demand and cost effects. In order
to understand why municipalities may refrain from policy adoption, this section
analyzes welfare effects in the short- versus longer-run. Demand effects (CATE)
on UW are lowest in the first policy year. This is consistent with economic
theory showing that elasticities are typically lower in the short-run because
fewer alternatives are available (Usui, 2009). UW reductions are largely driven
by increased recycling and, to a smaller extent, by waste avoidance. Further,
behavior changes toward waste avoidance are relatively smaller and slower.
This is consistent with behavioral economic predictions by e.g. Cecere et al.
(2014) who argues that waste avoidance requires more effort and learning than
recycling.41 Figure 5 plots the distribution of statistically significant demand
effects on TW by policy year.
40See Figure 12 in the Appendix D.3.












Figure 5: Unit level estimates of causal effects (CATE) on total waste demands in the
second and third policy year (p-values < 0.05). The y-axis refers to the number of treated
municipalities.
In year 1, there are no statistically significant effects on waste avoidance (total
waste reduction). In year 2 (grey), waste avoidance grows in a fraction of
municipalities, and increases significantly for all municipalities in year 3 (blue).
Next, I flexibly estimate policy causal effects on unit management costs for
UW and RW via random forests: overall, I find no economies of scale, confirm-
ing results on Italian municipalities by e.g. Abrate et al. (2014). In a fraction
of municipalities, estimates suggest economies of scale for UW and RW because
their unit cost increases (decreases) when UW (RW) reduces (increases).
Finally, I compute social welfare effects by combining CATE with manage-
ment and pollution cost estimates. Table 4 shows social welfare effects (e p.c.)
by policy year.
Table 4: Summary statistics for Social Welfare Effects (SWE). Estimated private
(municipal), external (environmental), and social cost effects per capita (p.c.) by policy
year.
Year SWE e p.c. Mean Sd
1 Private 0.13 10.16
External 6.87 5.33
Social 7.01 10.35
2 Private 3.14 7.10
External 5.96 4.75
Social 9.11 9.08




Especially in year 1 and 2, welfare effects can be negative. As feared, higher
recycling can indeed increase costs for society. In year 3, however, PAYT
generates welfare benefits in most municipalities. Average benefits are e25
per capita, which is about one fourth of what municipalities spend for waste
management per person on average. These benefits are mainly due to private
costs savings. As management unit costs are largely unaffected, savings come
from UW reductions that do not translate into higher RW. In other words,
welfare benefits are largely driven by waste avoidance.
As higher prices promote increased recycling rather than waste avoidance,
the largest welfare benefits occur in municipalities setting low prices after three
years of adoption. Figure 6 shows social welfare effects at different quartiles of
the price distribution in the third policy year, when waste avoidance is highest.
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Figure 6: Social welfare effects (largely, welfare benefits) at different price levels after three
years of adoption. First and third quartiles correspond to 3 and 13 cents, respectively.
This implies that (i) higher prices may be less desirable from a social cost
perspective, although they cause larger unsorted waste reductions, and (ii)
targeting waste avoidance in high-price municipalities could improve welfare
benefits substantially.
The final implication of this paper may help local governments to overcome
their initial fears regarding the implementation of PAYT policies. This paper
provides evidence that short-term costs may indeed increase due to higher re-
cycling,42 but these costs are outrun by the long-term savings due to reductions
in overall waste. This new information may help municipalities to overcome
42Especially if municipalities ignore global environmental benefits of recycling, and consider
only avoided local pollution due to unsorted waste reductions.
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their hesitation in adopting waste charges, and to increase policy benefits by
focusing on waste avoidance targets.
3.3 Welfare simulations
Using random forests, I estimate a kernel function that maps municipal ob-
servables to policy causal effects. I next use this function to estimate overall
causal effects on waste demands and social welfare if all municipalities in the
sample were to implement PAYT.
Figure 7 plots the predicted price semi-elasticities of RW and TW demands
after three years of adoption. As expected, color differences in the same area
indicate that higher recycling is associated to lower avoidance and vice versa.
Figure 7: Predicted semi-elasticities (CAPE) on total waste and recycling demands for all
municipalities three years after policy. Higher elasticities on waste avoidance and recycling
indicated by warmer colors.
Figure 8 shows the negative correlation between price elasticities of recycling


































































Figure 8: Semi-elasticities (CAPE) on recycling (x-axis) plotted against semi-elasticities on
avoidance (y-axis). Note that −CAPETW =CAPEA. A smooth line is fitted through
percentile values.
The elasticity of substitution between behaviors is not constant and does not
lead to rebound effects on total waste (i.e., a negative CAPEA). Using local
linear regression (Li & Racine, 2004), I estimate that one percent point increase
in the price semi-elasticity of recycling reduces that of waste avoidance between
0.03 and 0.4 percent points. This result is consistent with theories predicting
multi-tasking effects between recycling and waste avoidance behaviors (e.g.
D’Amato et al., 2016), and provides new evidence on the magnitude of these
effects.
Despite substitutabilities between recycling and avoidance behaviors, welfare
simulations show that most municipalities would benefit from PAYT adoption.
Table 5 shows predicted welfare effects by policy year if all municipalities were
to implement PAYT.
Table 5: Summary statistics for predicted Social Welfare Effects (SWE). Estimated private
(management), external (environmental), and social cost effects per capita (p.c.) by policy
year.
Year SWE e p.c. Mean Sd
1 Private 1.45 10.90
External 7.05 4.64
Social 8.50 10.51
2 Private 3.95 9.33
External 6.90 4.90
Social 10.86 10.54




Compared to counterfactual municipal and pollution costs, UW reductions lead
to benefits for both waste management (-24%) and the environment (-2.3%)
on average over the policy years. Further, increased RW causes higher costs
for waste managements (+21%) but also pollution reductions for the environ-
ment (-15%). In year 3, average welfare benefits per capita amount to e30,
however, there is large variation. Figure 9 maps this variation: despite effect
heterogeneity, waste prices cause welfare benefits for most municipalities.
Figure 9: Distribution of predicted welfare benefits in the third policy year in e per capita.
3.4 Robustness and sensitivity
3.4.1 Assessing assumptions: Unconfoundedness and SUTVA
Anticipation effects.–By conditioning on a large number of observables, this
analysis aims to make the impact of leftover unobserved factors negligible
and, thereby, unconfoundedness a plausible assumption. Although being per
se untestable, unconfoundedness can be assessed by testing for significant ef-
fects on outcomes pre-policy (Athey & Imbens, 2017b). I run a RF including
a binary treatment indicator, all covariates and available lags (up to order 2).
Table 6 shows average price effects (APE) for three years pre-policy estimated
as average treatment effects at the mean price level (ATE/P̄ ).
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Table 6: Placebo APE at the mean price (ATE/P̄ ) from log-level (%) and level-level (kg)
residual-on-residual regression (∗∗∗p-value < 0.01). Standard errors are clustered by year.
Year UW % kg s.e. RW % kg s.e. TW % kg s.e.
-3 -5.63 -2.90 9.81 6.07 12.5 10.54 -2.34 -11.3 21.33
-2 -6.07 -16.8 17.98 5.16 12.6 8.42 2.68 15.5 22.27
-1 -8.29 -16.9 13.26 21.59∗∗∗ 46.4∗∗∗ 9.53 9.60∗∗∗ 28.8∗∗∗ 10.27
Results suggest that unconfoundedness holds. Though, as expected, there is
evidence of anticipation effects in the first pre-policy year. Before the official
start, municipalities typically implement pilot programs where the new system
is in place but households still pay according to the old regime of flat fees.
This serves to promote recycling habits and minimize the risk of policy adverse
effects. Estimates show a significant increase in RW that leads to higher TW,
indicating that households largely substitute towards more recyclable products
as, e.g., bulky items (Hong & Adams, 1999; Podolsky & Nestor, 1998). In
terms of magnitude, the APE on TW approximately equals the sum of APE
on RW and UW, however, a large standard error makes the latter statistically
insignificant.
System effects.–I assess another possible threat to identification:
unaccounted-for heterogeneity in system adoption.43 In the sample, about 7%
of treated units pay per weight, 16% per bag, 72% per emptying, and 5% have
a mixed system. I first test for whether the included covariates can explain
system adoption. Second, I test for significant differences in price elasticities
between systems. Using all covariates, system choices are predicted by RF for
classification. Reassuringly, observables can predict the adoption of volume
systems correctly, out-of-sample, and misclassify 33% of weight systems only.
Next, I test for effect heterogeneity. Results of pairwise mean comparison tests
(Games & Howell, 1976) show that price elasticities do not statistically differ
between systems.44
Waste tourism.–Violation of the no spillover assumption (SUTVA) could
possibly come from waste tourism, namely, households may discharge their
43I cannot include system dummies in RF because, as for any policy indicator, I would force
treated and untreated units into different neighborhoods.
44Results are reported in Table 13 in Appendix D.4.2.
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waste for free in surrounding municipalities without PAYT. I geocode neigh-
bors as never-treated units sharing a border with treated units. The remaining
untreated units represent the control group. I find that PAYT has no signif-
icant effect on the waste amounts collected in surrounding municipalities on
average. As a further robustness check, I re-estimate causal effects for PAYT
municipalities excluding neighbors from the control group, finding no signifi-
cant change in estimates. As in other empirical studies (e.g. Carattini et al.,
2018; Allers & Hoeben, 2010; Dijkgraaf & Gradus, 2004), waste tourism is not
relevant on any significant scale.
3.4.2 Supporting analyses: Robustness to alternative assumptions
I compare my average estimates to (i) the binary treatment case, which assumes
no effect heterogeneity in prices; (ii) the dynamic (event-study-like) difference-
in-differences design, which assumes no effect heterogeneity, and selection based
on time-constant variables; and (iii) penalized linear regression methods known
as LASSO, which assumes no effect heterogeneity, sparsity and linearity in a
high-dimensional set of covariates.
Binary treatment case.–Results show that mean elasticities (APE) on UW
are overestimated by 28% on average (see Table 14 in Appendix D.4.3). Why
does this happen? The forest kernel assigns similarity weights to units based
on a residual-on-residual regression that ignores the price variation and uses a
binary indicator instead. Hence, the algorithm may place units adopting high
and low prices in the same neighborhood, and assign the same prediction to
both units. However, I have shown that price responses at high and low prices
are not the same, and the sources of effect heterogeneity differ.
Difference-in-Differences.–Results from a two-way fixed effect regression
show that APE on UW are underestimated by 29% on average (see first panel of
Figure 13 in Appendix D.4.3). The identifying parallel trend assumption is vi-
olated. There are at least three possible sources of bias. First, unaccounted-for
time-varying effects on the outcomes (Bueno & Valente, 2019). Second, non-
interpretable causal coefficients (Callaway & Sant’Anna, 2018). Due to the
staggered policy adoption, APE represent weighted averages of effects com-
puted using both treated and untreated outcomes, which may not allow for
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a comparison with my estimates. Third, falsely assuming policy homogeneity
(Abraham & Sun, 2018). Intuitively, pre-trends can arise solely from effect het-
erogeneity because the coefficient on a given lead or lag can be contaminated
by effects from other periods.
LASSO.–Similarly to RF, doubly robust LASSO regression estimates the
APE after removing the correlation of covariates with outcomes and prices.
Yet, differently from RF, it assumes causal effect homogeneity and, typically,
linearity in covariates (Athey et al., 2017; Belloni et al., 2017). I find that
my APE estimates are almost insensitive to these assumptions when differ-
ences in covariates are effectively adjusted. Yet, this method does not allow to
consistently estimate unit level causal effects and identify effect heterogeneity.
Summary.–Table 7 summarizes all APE estimates by estimation method.
Residualized reg via RF is my main estimation method; residualized reg via
RF (bin.) assumes no heterogeneity in prices; dynamic difference-in-differences
(DiD) assumes constant APE and selection due to time-constant variables; dou-
ble selection and residualized LASSO reg assume constant APE and linearity
after effectively removing differences in covariates.
Table 7: Method comparison: APE estimates in the third policy year. Estimates represent
average kg changes in waste for a one cent price increase.
Method/APE estimates UW kg s.e. RW kg s.e. TW kg s.e.
residualized reg via RF -11.50 1.50 8.10 2.20 -2.70 0.90
residualized reg via RF (bin.) -16.50 1.10 13.0 2.20 -3.20 2.90
dynamic DiD reg -7.40 0.30 2.70 0.70 -4.70 0.50
double selection LASSO reg -9.30 0.40 9.40 0.60 -1.00 0.50
residualized LASSO reg -9.00 1.30 8.80 1.00 -1.00 1.30
4 Conclusions
This paper models and estimates causal effects of waste prices (PAYT) on recy-
cling and avoidance behaviors by explicitly accounting for heterogeneity with
machine learning methods. I analyze unique data with large variation in price
levels and a high-dimensional set of municipal characteristics. I estimate mu-
nicipal level price elasticities using a random forest and R-learning estimator
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robust to confounding that affects outcomes and prices. By mapping municipal
attributes to causal effects, I predict heterogeneous policy effects for all munic-
ipalities in the sample, treated or not. The welfare analysis is motivated by a
theoretical model that predicts heterogeneous reactions on recycling and total
waste. On the one hand, higher recycling brings environmental benefits. On
the other hand, it increases municipal management costs. Theoretically, total
waste reductions seem crucial to decrease municipal social costs substantially,
and generate overall welfare benefits.
Disentangling effect heterogeneity in prices from other sources, I find that
waste demands are nonlinear. Low prices, nudging households toward similar
reactions, trigger large unsorted waste reductions, increase recycling, and de-
crease total waste. High prices make waste demands increasingly elastic, and
induce recycling rather than waste avoidance. On average, policy causal effects
amount up to -50% on unsorted waste, 32% on recycling, and -5% on total
waste. Income effects and waste habits pre-policy well explain nonlinearities
at high prices. I find that lower-income municipalities are more price elastic,
which indicates that PAYT is not regressive. Despite large effect heterogene-
ity, the policy reduces social costs in most municipalities after three years of
adoption, especially where total waste reductions are large. This implies that
higher prices may be less desirable from a social cost perspective although they
cause relatively larger unsorted waste reductions.
In sum, this study shows that price levels matter for household waste behav-
ior as well as social welfare. Estimating heterogeneous responses on unsorted
waste, and especially on recycling and total waste is crucial to assess overall
welfare effects. Behavior changes towards waste avoidance, however, may not
be immediate, and social costs may increase in the short-run. One upshot of
this paper is that low prices can have a big impact on waste behavior and social
welfare. Analyzing the long-term effects of PAYT policies presents an exciting
research opportunity that I hope to tackle in future work.
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A Appendix: Theoretical predictions
The model.–Consider the household problem to maximize utility from consump-
tion net of the disutility of avoidance and recycling efforts. The corresponding
expression is:
maxwA,wR : V (·) = U(y − t(W − (wA + wR)))− C(wA, wR,W0,WR(W0), X, Z)
(6)
where U(·) is the utility from consumption, y−t(W−(wA+wR)), withW−(wA+
wR) being the amount of unsorted waste subject to the PAYT price, t, which is
taken as exogenous in the following derivations. Avoided (A) and recycling (R)
waste amounts, wi (i = A,R), are generated from a potential waste amount,
W , associated to the consumption of goods purchased with income y. Total
waste is defined by the sum of unsorted and recycling waste, and equals W −
wA. Regarding consumption utility, the household is assumed to prefer more
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consumption to less ( ∂U(·)
∂y−t(W−(wA+wR))
> 0), waste avoidance and recycling to
unsorted waste generation. This implies that marginal consumption utility with
respect to waste avoidance and recycling is positive (∂U(·)
∂wi





Moreover, households get disutility, C(·), from time and effort spent in dis-











The first two conditions indicate that avoiding and recycling waste is costly,
and marginal costs are increasing with the reduction of unsorted waste. The
third relationship, importantly, captures the degree to which households are
able to shift between disposal methods, pointing to either complementarities
or substitutabilities between the two behaviors with ∂
2C(·)
∂wA∂wC




respectively. Empirically, an indication of substitute (complement) behaviors
may derive from the estimation of a negative (positive) correlation between
individual price reactions on recycling and on avoidance.
The arguments of the cost function, C(·) are current {wi} and initial (lagged)
waste {W0,WR(W0)} with the latter accounting for waste reduction and recy-
cling habits. Additionally, C(·) depends on waste-reduction technology shifters
(X) which are exogenous socio-economic factors such as household income and
education, and taste shifters (Z) such as preferences for the environment. In
particular, households may derive utility from waste avoidance and recycling
due to the psychological reward of contributing to public good provision or
“warm-glow”, and external rewards (peer approval) for pro-social and environ-
mentally responsible actions.45
Solving problem (6) for wi (i = A,R) leads to the following first-order
45For a discussion see, e.g., Abbott et al. (2013); Bénabou & Tirole (2003); Brekke et al.
(2010); D’Amato et al. (2016); Gilli et al. (2018a); Kahn (2007); Jenkins et al. (2003);
Thøgersen (2006). The PAYT price may also enter C(·) directly since it may partly crowd
out households’ intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, increasing the disutility from waste recy-
cling and avoidance (see, e.g., Bowles & Polania-Reyes, 2012; Cecere et al., 2014; Chi-ang
& Zheng, 2017; Ferrara & Missios, 2012, and citations therein). Yet, this section outlines a





= U ′(·)t− ∂C(·)
∂wi
, (8)
with U ′(·)t being the marginal utility of avoiding or recycling waste, and ∂C(·)
∂wi
its marginal cost. Optimality conditions (8) for both wA and wR allow to
derive the comparative statics about the impact of PAYT pricing (t) on waste




























where sgn(·) is a function that extracts the sign of PAYT causal effects. Specif-
ically, equations (9) mean that the sign of PAYT causal effects depends on
complementarities/substitutabilities between waste reduction behaviors. As a
result, theoretical predictions of PAYT causal effects are threefold:
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∂wA∂wR
















if A,R are substitutes ( ∂
2C(·)
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> 0) and marginal costs of avoidance are
steeper than marginal costs of recycling such that |∂
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< 0) if A,R are substitutes and marginal costs of recycling are steeper
than marginal costs of avoidance such that |∂
2C(·)
∂w2R







Formulas show that whether PAYT causes an increase in both pro-
environmental behaviors depends on household marginal costs of recycling
versus avoidance relative to the degree to which behaviors are substitutes or
complements in individual preferences.




















































































where the denominator is the determinant of the Hessian, and is therefore









Moreover, from equation (8) compute the following derivatives:
∂2V (·)
∂wi∂t
= −U ′′(·)t(W − (wA + wR)) + U ′(·) (14)
∂2V (·)
∂wA∂wR






























)(U ′(·) + U ′′(·)t(wA + wR −W ))
soc
, (18)
where U ′(·) +U ′′(·)t(wA +wR−W ) > 0 since wA +wR−W < 0, and standard
conditions on the utility function are satisfied such that U ′(·) > 0, U ′′(·) < 0.




is determined as in equation (9).
B Appendix: Descriptive statistics
This appendix presents descriptive statistics and denominations of the X vari-
ables included in the estimation of propensity scores and treatment effects. In
particular, economic theory and knowledge of the policy setting leads to the
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inclusion of 90 control variables. Differently from past literature, this analysis
does not ex-ante select among possibly relevant variables. The collected data is
richer than that available in previous studies, and the employed random forest
approach works well with large and high-dimensional data.
Data errors due to, e.g., typing and misreporting, are analyzed by looking
at anomalies in MSW generation over time, specifically, by comparing devi-
ations to the municipal-specific median with the sample upper bound (SUB)
defined by Q3 + (Q3 − Q1) where Q is the quartile value, (Q3 − Q1) the in-
terquartile range. Municipalities with deviations to the median beyond the
SUB are eliminated from the data. Looking at possible outliers, the sample
includes all extreme outcome values but excludes units with extremely low val-
ues in recycling shares and per capita recycling to increase the comparability
of municipalities’ waste management practices. Extreme values are eliminated
if they are below the sample lower bound (SLB) defined by Q3− 0.5(Q3−Q1)
where 0.5 is chosen to avoid that Q3 takes negative values.
Table 8: Descriptives for treated (T) and never-treated (NT) municipalities (2010-2015)
mean(T) min(T) max(T) Sd(T) (NT)
Price 0.08 0.01 0.18 0.05 0 0 0 0
RW 315.41 84.79 721.51 93.14 353.94 13.13 828.52 82.84
TW 486.00 350.62 1594.06 139.08 457.40 107.63 1193.25 127.03
UW 170.59 35.83 1016.42 112.62 235.47 21.62 867.26 120.53
RWrate 0.66 0.17 0.90 0.15 0.53 0.03 0.91 0.17
costRW 51.30 0.11 294.66 22.39 40.34 0.11 327.44 22.48
costUW 44.73 6.65 134.79 21.47 53.83 0.11 682.79 34.26
costTW 96.03 21.68 301.31 26.75 94.17 2.30 805.79 38.21
avgCostRW 0.17 0.00 0.60 0.07 0.18 0.001 2.24 0.12
avgCostUW 0.37 0.02 1.78 0.23 0.28 0.00 4.40 0.19
avgCostTW 0.21 0.03 0.67 0.07 0.22 0.005 1.93 0.09
distPayt 22.55 0.00 339.55 35.02 50.00 1.00 371.26 63.35
distHaz 10.71 0.00 48.13 9.92 13.80 0.00 115.40 15.40
distInc 26.29 0.00 72.49 21.30 29.00 0.00 178.01 28.39
distLandf 7.70 0.00 24.51 6.49 11.21 0.00 89.93 10.95
popDens 263.87 3.80 3581.35 396.69 337.29 1.33 7765.52 579.97
hhSize 2.49 1.12 6.95 0.83 2.31 1.00 7.09 0.34
income 14.44 6.97 22.98 1.95 13.86 4.66 45.62 2.29
migrNet 0.00 -8.80 14.68 0.55 0.00 -0.14 0.18 0.01
pop 8.52 0.12 192.84 19.27 7.35 0.03 1345.85 34.72
foreignPop 0.10 0.01 0.19 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.41 0.04
males 0.49 0.41 0.54 0.01 0.49 0.39 0.69 0.02
popGrowth 0.01 -0.72 0.56 0.12 0.00 -1.28 1.49 0.15
tourism 0.36 0.00 9.34 1.01 0.33 0.00 11.64 0.85
age0 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.01
Continued on next page
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age14 0.14 0.07 0.21 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.35 0.03
age65 0.22 0.11 0.34 0.04 0.35 0.05 0.51 0.05
elemDeg 0.31 0.19 0.42 0.04 0.31 0.14 0.57 0.05
collegeDeg 0.09 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.18 0.03
rentedHouses 0.09 0.04 0.17 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.44 0.03
hhPerSqMeter 2.24 1.68 3.08 0.26 2.30 1.28 3.27 0.27
oneParentFam 0.10 0.06 0.16 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.19 0.02
students 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.01
commuters 0.26 0.09 0.36 0.05 0.26 0.06 0.37 0.06
deprIndex -1.87 -6.42 1.70 1.32 -1.50 -7.62 6.14 1.58
outLabRate 0.62 0.51 0.78 0.05 0.63 0.46 0.90 0.06
unempOutLab 0.06 0.01 0.13 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.35 0.02
labMarket 6.27 0.11 57.94 15.03 0.44 0.01 0.66 0.13
polPart 0.61 0.01 0.82 0.24 0.69 0.14 0.91 0.09
votesBigTent 0.35 0.09 0.37 0.05 0.35 0.00 0.58 0.07
votesLeft 0.06 0.02 0.24 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.84 0.10
votesRight 0.12 0.03 0.30 0.06 0.13 0.00 0.57 0.08
localMayor 0.85 0.00 1.00 0.36 0.76 0.00 1.00 0.42
mayorCenter 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.05
mayorGreen 0.03 0.00 1.00 0.16 0.01 0.00 1.00 0.11
mayorLeft 0.07 0.00 1.00 0.26 0.07 0.00 1.00 0.25
mayorOther 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.35 0.11 0.00 1.00 0.32
mayorReg 0.66 0.00 1.00 0.47 0.71 0.00 1.00 0.46
mayorRight 0.10 0.00 1.00 0.30 0.10 0.00 1.00 0.30
mayorAge 51.14 21.00 78.00 10.47 52.04 22.00 87.00 10.47
yearsOffice 1.98 0.00 5.00 1.46 1.84 0.00 8.00 1.38
noSeat 0.97 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.97 0.00 1.00 0.17
provSeat 0.03 0.00 1.00 0.16 0.01 0.00 1.00 0.10
regionSeat 0.01 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.06
urban 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.38 0.00 1.00 0.49
urbanHigh 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.35 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.40
urbanLow 0.38 0.00 1.00 0.49 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.49
Table 9: Variables’ description. Census indicates 2011 values (ISTAT, 2011).
Variables’ description
PAYT price treatment: unit price on unsorted waste in e per liter
RW recycling waste (RW) per capita (kg)
TW total waste (TW) per capita (kg)
UW unsorted waste (UW) per capita (kg)
RWrate recycling rate (% of total waste)
costUW per capita costs of UW management (euros)
costRW per capita costs of RW management less recycling revenues (euros)
costTW per capita costs of TW management (euros)
avgCostUW average costs of UW management (euros per kg)
avgCostRW average costs of RW management less recycling revenues (euros per kg)
avgCostTW average costs of TW management (euros per kg)
distPayt distance to closest municipality with PAYT in t-1 (km)
distHaz distance to closest hazardous waste treatment facility (km)
Continued on next page
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distInc distance to closest waste incinerator (km)
distLandf distance to closest waste landfill (km)
popDens population density (inhabitants per km2)
hhSize average household size (n. household members)
income income per capita (x 1,000 euros)
migrNet net migrant flow per capita
pop population (x 1,000 inhabitants)
foreignPop share of foreign population
males share of male population
popGrowth population growth
tourism capacity of tourist accommodation per capita (x 1,000)
age0 share of population aged less than 5 (census)
age14 share of population aged less than 14
age65 share of population aged more than 65
elemDeg share of population with elementary degree or lower (census)
collegeDeg share of population with college degree (census)
rentedHouses share of rented houses (census)
hhPerSqMeter housing density (inhabitants per 100m2, census)
oneParentFam share of single-parent families (census)
students share of population older than 15 and students (census)
commuters share of commuters (census)
deprIndex social deprivation index (-/+ less/more deprived, census)
outLabRate out-of-the-labor force rate (census)
unempOutLab unemployed and out-of-the-labor force rate (census)
labMarket commuting intensity between municipalities (IIRFL index 0-100, census)
polPart voter turnout in the 2013 Italian general election (IGR13)
votesBigTent vote shares for big-tent parties in the IGR13
votesLeft vote shares for extreme left-wing parties in the IGR13
votesRight vote shares for extreme right-wing parties in the IGR13
localMayor mayor born in the municipal province (dummy)
mayorCenter centre-party mayor (dummy)
mayorGreen green-party mayor (dummy)
mayorLeft left-wing mayor (dummy)
mayorOther mayor of other party (dummy)
mayorReg mayor of local party (dummy)
mayorRight right-wing mayor (dummy)
mayorAge mayor’s age
yearsOffice mayor’s term of office (years)
noSeat no capital (dummy)
provSeat provincial capital (dummy)
regionSeat regional capital (dummy)
urban mediumly urbanized municipality (dummy)
urbanHigh highly urbanized municipality (dummy)
urbanLow lowly urbanized municipality (dummy)
C Appendix: The overlap assumption
Overlap analysis indicates that differences in treatment status can be explained
to some extent by the included covariates. If X would fully (not) explain treat-
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ment assignment I would observe terminal nodes including only either treated
or untreated units and, thus, Generalized Propensity Scores (GPS) equal to
one and zero. This would indicate that treatment assignment is deterministic,
namely there is no randomness that allows municipalities with identical char-
acteristics to be observed in both states (Heckman et al., 1997). Hence, overlap
guarantees that a comparable unit can be found for each municipality. Figure













Figure 10: Common support condition for treated (PAYT) and never-treated (non-PAYT).
In particular, treated and control groups are similar in their GPS means, first
and third quartiles. Statistics computed following Imbens & Rubin (2015)
and Kluve et al. (2012) show that the two groups are not apart, namely, the
(normalized) difference in estimated GPS is less than one standard deviation
(0.62). Also, there is good coverage frequency for both treated and control
group meaning that, specifically, 100% (96%) of the treated (control) units have
GPS values inside the .025 and .975 quantiles of the GPS distribution of the
control (treated) units. Further, all units have close comparisons in the opposite
treatment group. In particular, for all treated units and for 96% of the control
units there are units with the other treatment status that have differences in
GPS less than 10%, a threshold that guarantees unbiased estimates of the causal
effects without extrapolation (Imbens & Rubin, 2015). Therefore, causal effects
for the control group, and not only for the subpopulation of treated units, can
be credibly estimated under unconfoundedness.
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D Appendix
D.1 Average point-price elasticities
Table 10 shows a comparison with the literature values of average point-price
elasticities of waste demands. Typically, the literature relies on the assumption
that the mean price and waste quantity are on one point along the linear
demand curve (see e.g. Fullerton & Kinnaman, 2000). I derive the slope of the
demand curve by estimating the APE in kg, and multiply this value by mean
price and waste quantity. Table 10 reports estimates for all waste types and
policy years.
Table 10: Average point-price elasticity estimates calculated at mean values with 95%
confidence intervals [ci.low; ci.up].
Year UW ci.low ci.up RW ci.low ci.up TW ci.low ci.up
+1 -0.38 -0.25 -0.51 0.18 0.12 0.24 -0.00 -0.06 0.05
+2 -0.56 -0.43 -0.68 0.16 0.10 0.35 -0.03 -0.02 0.01
+3 -0.90 -0.66 -1.14 0.17 0.08 0.25 -0.05 -0.09 -0.02
The estimate of -0.38 is in line with the literature’s value of -0.344, the average
elasticity estimate of UW demands one year after policy computed across 72
studies (Bel & Gradus, 2016). Cross-price elasticity estimates for RW are
also in the range of previous estimates: I find higher values than Fullerton &
Kinnaman (1996) (0.073), and lower values that Fullerton & Kinnaman (2000)
(0.22) and Callan & Thomas (2006) (0.387).
Similarly to the literature, this study consistently estimates price inelastic
waste demands. However, comparing elasticities across studies is not straight-
forward because mean price and waste quantity vary across data sets. The
mean price in this study is generally higher, which can explain point-elasticity
estimates above the literature’s average.46 In the first two policy years, my
results are in line with e.g. Hong & Adams (1999) who finds that higher prices
do not statistically influence total waste on average. However, after three pol-
icy years, higher prices lead to significant total waste reductions on average,
suggesting that waste avoidance is rather a long-term effect.
46For instance, Callan & Thomas (2006) use a mean price of $0.012 per gallon which trans-
lates into less than one cent per liter (vs. mean price of about 8 cents per liter in this
study).
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D.2 Testing for effect heterogeneity
Levene’s tests (1960) reject the null hypothesis of no CAPE heterogeneity for
all outcomes. Moreover, as suggested in Athey et al. (2017), I perform the
following heuristic to test for effect heterogeneity. First, I group observations
into a high and low APE group using the median CAPE as a threshold. Next, I
derive an estimate of the APE for each subgroup by residual-on-residual regres-
sion. Results are provided in the Table 11, and show statistically significant
differences in APE between subgroups for all outcomes and policy years.
Table 11: Difference in APE (dUW, dRW, dTW in kg) between high and low APE group
with 95% confidence intervals [ci.low; ci.up].
Year dUW ci.low ci.up dRW ci.low ci.up dTW ci.low ci.up
1 -2.72 -2.98 -2.46 -5.05 -5.29 -4.82 -5.77 -6.04 -5.51
2 -3.69 -3.95 -3.43 -5.15 -5.38 -4.91 12.01 11.62 12.41
3 -4.49 -4.75 -4.24 -6.13 -6.35 -5.91 -3.32 -3.57 -3.07
D.3 Price causal effects on waste demands
Figure 11 reports effect heterogeneity across price levels. Price effects on the y-
axis (CAPE Kg) are estimated as quantity changes for a one cent price increase.
CAPE heterogeneity varies at low versus high prices, ceteris paribus: a one cent
price increase reduces UW by 10.8 kg at low prices vs. 14.2 kg at high prices,
ceteris paribus. Higher prices lead to increased recycling by 6.8 kg at low prices























Figure 11: Fitted price effects on waste demands (CAPE Kg) as quantity changes for a one
euro cent price increase.
Figure 12 reports effect heterogeneity across pre-policy RW levels. Effect
heterogeneity is statistically significant only at high prices: municipalities re-
cycling little before policy have generally higher elasticities, ceteris paribus, by
on average 1.4 percent points.
Low RW pre−policy <q25 High RW pre−policy >q75













outcomes RW TW UW
Figure 12: Fitted price semi-elasticities (CAPE) of waste demands by pre-policy recycling
levels. Thresholds q25 and q75 indicate first (248 kg) and third (344 kg) quartiles of annual
recycling per capita.
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D.4 Heterogeneity in PAYT systems
D.4.1 Determinants of system choice
Evidence provided by manufacturers of PAYT technology (e.g., magnetic cards,
tags and RFID readers) suggests that system choices are driven by three main
factors. First, proximity: neighboring municipalities may either share the same
waste hauler or influence each other through information dissemination. Sec-
ond, population density: sparsely populated municipalities are more likely to
adopt weight systems (PartItalia, 2020).47 Third, geography: physical charac-
teristics of the territory such as uphills and one-way roads impact transporta-
tion costs and collection modes.
I run a multinomial logit regression in order to assess whether observables
can partly explain the choice of the adopted PAYT system. These are: pop-
ulation size (pop), distance to neighboring PAYT municipalities (distPayt),
population density (popDens) as described in Table 9 in the Appendix B. Addi-
tionally, I distinguished communities by their metro status: urban, peri-urban,
semi-peripheral, and very peripheral (the reference category). Categories are
defined based on travel times (t) from each municipality to the closest urban
center. Table 12 shows the results including all treated observations in the first
policy year. The dummy for weight systems is the reference choice.
47Implementing curbside collection is especially difficult in low-density areas. Also, trans-
portation costs would be high. Thus, communities generally prefer to organize waste collec-
tion in centralized disposal areas rather than door-to-door. As volume systems would imply
carrying heavy bags and bins, weight systems facilitate households allowing them to carry
smaller quantities of waste.
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Table 12: Average partial effect estimates of multinomial logit regression. Weight systems





pop −0.085∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗ 0.032
(0.032) (0.036) (0.022)
popDens 0.009∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.011∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
distPayt −0.006 −0.017∗ −0.073
(0.008) (0.010) (0.046)
peripheral(40<t<75’) 1.189∗ 1.655∗∗∗ 28.377∗∗∗
(0.663) (0.000) (0.663)
semi-peripheral(20<t<40’) −21.713∗∗∗ 5.599∗∗∗ 4.797∗∗∗
(0.924) (0.952) (0.962)
semi-urban(t<20’) −24.078∗∗∗ 2.523∗∗∗ 2.132∗∗∗
(0.699) (0.718) (0.781)
peri-urban −24.819∗∗∗ 1.111∗∗ −36.060∗∗∗
(1.618) (0.525) (0.000)
urban −20.275∗∗∗ 4.625∗∗∗ −5.571∗∗∗
(1.097) (0.912) (0.223)
Constant 36.339∗∗∗ 13.313∗∗∗ 0.799
(1.145) (0.980) (0.706)
Observations 194 194 194
Year and area dummies Yes Yes Yes
Akaike Inf. Crit. 284.558 284.558 284.558
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Lower population density (popDens) significantly increases the probability to
adopt weight programs over any other, as expected. Higher populated munici-
palities (pop) are more likely to implement weight vs. bag/emptying programs,
perhaps to exploit returns to scale. Information dissemination effects (distPayt)
positively increase the choice of bag programs. Finally, geographic character-
istics seem to have similar effects for bag and mixed program choices with less
peripheral municipalities being more likely to adopt these systems (with the
exception of “peri-urban” for mixed systems). Most of emptying programs
seem to be adopted in peripheral municipalities (rather than very peripheral
or urbanized ones).
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D.4.2 CAPE heterogeneity by system
Table 13: Pairwise comparison of price elasticities (CAPE) on waste amounts by PAYT
system: Mean differences (dUW, dRW, dTW in kg per euro cent), standard errors and
p-values estimated by Tukey-Kramer’s method (1956).
PAYT system dUW s.e. p-value dRW s.e. p-value dTW s.e. p-value
emptying - bag 0.12 0.27 0.96 0.47 0.24 0.18 0.55 0.23 0.06
mixed - bag 0.19 0.52 0.98 0.56 0.46 0.59 0.62 0.44 0.47
weight - bag 0.76 0.52 0.44 0.16 0.46 0.98 1.06 0.44 0.07
mixed - emptying 0.07 0.48 1.00 0.09 0.42 1.00 0.07 0.40 1.00
weight - emptying 0.64 0.48 0.52 -0.31 0.42 0.87 0.50 0.40 0.57
weight - mixed 0.57 0.66 0.81 -0.40 0.57 0.89 0.44 0.55 0.85
Differences are overall statistically insignificant at conventional confidence lev-
els. Estimates only suggest that pay-per-bag systems are (weakly) associated to
more waste avoidance (p-values < 0.1): Price semi-elasticities on avoidance are
0.55 and 1.06 kg higher than with pay-per-emptying and weight-based systems,
respectively. Overall, my study does not point towards significant differences
in price elasticities between PAYT systems.
D.4.3 Supporting analyses
Binary treatment case.–The binary case assumes that the policy has homoge-
neous effects across prices, and that policy adoption is homogeneous in prices.
Table 14 reports average price effects (APE) estimated as average effects of a
binary treatment at the mean price level (ATE/P̄ ). The binary case overesti-
mates APE on UW by 28% on average.
Table 14: Continuous APE vs. Binary APE estimates (kg) at the mean price (ATE/P̄ )
from (level-level) residual-on-residual regression with year clustered standard errors.
Continuous Binary
Year UW kg s.e. vs. UW kg s.e.
1 -7.38 1.30 -7.60 2.55
2 -8.86 1.03 -11.3 1.97
3 -11.5 1.53 -16.5 1.08
Difference-in-differences.–When the timing of treatment varies across units,
Difference-in-Differences (DiD) designs are commonly extended to allow for
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dynamic average treatment effects by including leads and lags of treatment as
regressors (Jacobson et al., 1993). These dummy variables allow policy effects
to vary by the number of years relative to separation from policy. Figure 13
presents the results from a dynamic (event-study-like) DiD regression estimated
using a standard two-way (unit and time) fixed effects model.48 The regression
includes three leads and lags, and uses the second (unaffected) lead before pol-
icy (-2) as a baseline dummy. Since potentially relevant covariates are many
and partly collinear, and there is no a priori guidance on which one to exclude,
this DiD only controls for time-invariant waste generation determinants cap-
tured by municipal fixed effects. Figure 13 plots lead and lagged average price
effect (APE) estimates (continuous treatment) with their confidence intervals.
Black dots represent statistically significant effects at 5%, and vertical dotted
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Figure 13: Dynamic DiD estimates (2010-2015, n = 19, 982) of average price effects (APE
kg) on UW, RW, TW with year and unit fixed effects. Clustered standard errors (Driscoll
& Kraay, 1994). Statistical significance (5%) indicated by black dots.
Considering the pre-policy period, DiD estimation shows non-zero and statisti-
cally significant coefficients on leads. This indicates the presence of pre-trends
which invalidate causal effect estimates due to violation of the generalized
parallel trends assumption necessary to identify the dynamic DiD estimator
(Freyaldenhoven et al., 2019; Abraham & Sun, 2018). The bias possibly de-
rives from having erroneously assumed selection based on time-constant vari-
ables. This could be corrected by including time-varying characteristics and
allowing variables to have time-varying effects on policy adoption and waste
generation. Yet, DiD only allows for time-invariant unobserved effects on the
48For the analysis, I use the software R, and, particularly, the package plm (Croissant &
Millo, 2008).
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outcome, which might not be the case in this setting (Bueno & Valente, 2019;
Gobillon & Magnac, 2016). For instance, opportunity costs of waste disposal
may have evolving effects over time. Including pre-policy waste outcomes and a
high-dimensional set of covariates aims to capture types of heterogeneity that
jointly influence the dependent variable and the price. Controlling for this
variation is at the heart of this paper’s motivation to employ a forest-based
approach.
93
The Arab Spring migrant wave and illegal labor
on vineyards: Counting the uncountable
with Stefan Seifert∗
Published in DIW Discussion Papers here.
Abstract About 2,7 million irregular migrants are estimated to work in Eu-
rope, of which up to 12% are illegally employed in Italian agriculture. Both
farmers and illegal workers have incentives to match on the labor market, and
irregular migrant waves may provide additional labor supply shocks. Using the
exogenous variation of the 2011 Arab Spring migrant wave on southern Ital-
ian coasts and focusing on vineyards, this paper quantifies illegal employment
caused by the migration-induced supply shock. Identification relies on abnor-
mal increases in reported labor productivity due to underreported labor hours.
Based on farm data at regional level and a dynamic panel model, labor produc-
tivity is estimated to abnormally increase by about 11% on average for 2011
and 2012 on vineyards of the landing regions Sicily and Apulia. We show that
this corresponds to a total of around 10 million unreported work hours in each
year, or 5,500 agricultural work units. We interpret this as an increase in illegal
employment with displacement of legal labor due to the migration wave.
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Introduction
European industries such as agriculture and construction have long relied on
illegal employment and migrant workers to reduce factor costs, and to sustain
international competition (Boswell & Straubhaar, 2004). In fact, employing
irregular migrants for seasonal, labor-intense jobs is often the only option due
to the lack of native labor supply. In this respect, labor supply shocks of
irregular migrants may allow an easy match of seasonal labor demand to supply
of individuals willing to work illegally.1 Both irregular migration and illegal
work are top priorities in the European Union (EU) due security, financial, and
welfare concerns including, e.g., labor market effects on incumbent workers
and employers, losses to national revenues, integration of irregular migrants,
exploitation of illegal workers, and other violations of labor and human rights
(Penal Code, 2009). Policies addressing such concerns need to account for the
dimension of the phenomenon, however, the number of irregular migrants and
illegal workers is unobserved, and difficult to estimate (Borjas, 2017).
In this paper, we propose a way to identify unreported labor, and we estimate
the amount of illegal employment in the grape growing sector caused by a
sudden irregular migrant wave. The latter is used as a source of exogenous
variation to identify illegal employment under the assumption that an increase
in illegal employment leads to an abnormal increase in labor productivity due
to underreported work hours. Under plausible assumptions, this paper provides
evidence on the displacement of legal by illegal labor in the agricultural sector,
which, to our knowledge, is rarely addressed by the literature.2
In our empirical analysis, we study labor productivity on vineyards in Italian
and French regions, and we analyze the impact of the 2011 Arab Spring migrant
wave on illegal employment in the landing regions Sicily and Apulia. The iden-
tification of illegal labor uses vineyard labor productivity defined as the ratio
of output over labor input. Contrary to its two components, this ratio is rather
constant over time3 and less sensitive to unobserved and time-varying factors
such as weather, which allows us to better isolate the effect of the illegal labor
1We use “irregular” to refer to unauthorized/undocumented persons on the European Union
territory, and “illegal” to any worker, regular or not, without legal employment.
2This is usually due to the lack of data on illegal labor, and, generally, on the informal
sector.
3See, e.g., discussions in Jorgenson & Griliches, 1967; Lamouria et al., 1963.
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supply shock on vineyards. Thereby, if illegal employment increases after the
supply shock, vineyard labor productivity is expected to abnormally increase
due to underreported work hours because the output is not impacted by the
sudden availability of illegal labor. This is due to the fact that grape growers
generally harvest all the output. As a result, an abnormal increase in labor
productivity after the shock indicates displacement of legal with illegal em-
ployment. This, however, does not necessarily indicate that incoming irregular
migrants displace incumbent workers. Since identification only requires that
illegal labor can substitute unskilled labor flexibly without sacrificing learning
effects, former legally employed workers might become illegally employed due
to increased competition.
We use the exogenous variation from the 2011 Arab Spring migrant wave
that hit the southern Italian regions of Apulia, Calabria and, primarily, Sicily.
This was the largest wave of the last decades crossing the central Mediterranean
with about 64,000 detected and further undetected landings (FRONTEX, 2016;
INEA, 2014). In particular, in the first half of 2011 about 50,000 migrants
landed illegally, compared to an average of about 4,000 persons in the same
period in the two prior years. This labor supply shock can be considered as
exogenous because neither Arab Spring migrants nor southern Italian coasts
self-selected into treatment, and labor markets of origin- and host-countries are
not interdependent. Indeed, the migrant wave was so unexpected that Italy
declared the state of emergency already in February 2011. Specifically, Italy
lacked resources for continuous coastal monitoring as well as migrants’ first aid,
identification, and detention (Gola, 2015).
In our analysis, the “treatment” is the migration-induced supply shock of
illegal labor, and the “treated” regions are Sicily and Apulia4 which are the
only regions where large numbers of incoming, undetected migrants may have
supplied illegal labor to local farmers – in our case, to grape growers.5 As
a control group we use Italian and French regions where migrant landings,
namely, irregular migrant shocks, do not take place. We find it plausible that
irregularly landed migrants may travel to control regions, though not in masses.
4Calabria, a region located between Sicily and Apulia that likely received a large number
of migrants as well, is excluded due to missing data, but it also has only a very small grape
sector.
5Background information on illegal labor channels for undetected migrants in the treated
regions is provided in Section 1.1.
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In fact, travelling is difficult due to the lack of documents and the risk of
immediate expulsion if caught. Therefore, we assume that an irregular migrant
shock occurs only in the landing regions, and not in other Italian and French
regions.6
The illegal labor supply shock is expected to be absorbed by the grape grow-
ing sectors of Sicily and Apulia due to the large demand for seasonal, cheap
labor as well as sizable informal agricultural labor markets. The demand side
is characterized by a large number of on average very small farms (80% with
less than 5 hectares) that are, however, worldwide leaders in table grape pro-
duction, and also produce large quantities of wine, mostly low-quality (INEA,
2012). Since the 2000s, increasing international competition, shrinking de-
mand globally for wine, climatic shocks, and failed agricultural policies leading
to deregulation of the EU wine sector (CMO, 2008) required grape growers -
and in particular, (small) less favored vineyards - to reduce factor costs (Gaeta
& Corsinovi, 2014). One option is to rely on illegal and migrant workforce.
In particular, in Sicily (Apulia), there are about 114,000 (110,000) agricul-
tural workers of which about 32,000 (26,000) foreigners (non-EU 15) employed
mostly in tree crops (over 30%) with seasonal contracts (98%), fully legal for
only 30%, and with 90% of the wages below the minimum admitted by law
(INEA, 2012).
Farm migrant labor in Sicily and Apulia is often absorbed through capo-
ralato, an increasingly widespread informal system to recruit and exploit un-
derpaid workforce through intermediaries (Flai-Cgil, 2016).7 There is consider-
able anecdotal evidence that shows the link between migration waves and illegal
farm work: For example, in August 2011, the first self-organized revolt of farm
pickers took place, leading to investigations that revealed illegal migrant traf-
ficking between Apulia, Calabria, and Sicily (Spagnolo, 2017). However, there
is little empirical evidence on the amount of illegal labor in agriculture and
its effects on the agricultural labor markets, especially in the European Union
6We cannot extend our sample to regions of other European countries because they are
either recipients of large migrant waves, or have very different viticultural traditions, grape
sectors, climatic conditions, and regulations of agricultural labor markets (Section 2). Sen-
sitivity of our results is tested against different choices of the control group (Section 4).
7Over 400,000 irregular workers, most often undocumented migrants, are estimated to be
part of such system, for a 1.8 billion euro loss to national revenues each year (Flai-Cgil,
2018).
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(EU). This paper contributes to filling the gap.8
For estimation, we use farm-level data aggregated at the regional level
for Italy and France between 1999 and 2012 supplied by the Farm Accoun-
tancy Data Network (EC, 2017). We analyze causal effects using a Difference-
in-Differences (DiD) framework in a dynamic linear panel regression model.
Thereby, using a lagged dependent variable as an exogenous predictor accounts
for the persistence that characterizes vineyard labor productivity while simulta-
neously controlling for time-varying effects of unobserved heterogeneity. Vari-
ous tests support this model, and indicate that fixed effect approaches are likely
not suited to account for the underlying dynamics in the data. As a robust-
ness check against the residual presence of unobserved fixed (time-invariant)
effects in the dynamic model specification, we implement an Anderson-Hsiao
type regression (Anderson & Hsiao, 1981). To further validate our results un-
der different choices of the control group, we use k nearest neighbor matching
to identify the best control matches for each treated region, and we re-estimate
the DiD model for different values of k. Finally, we check for model misspecifi-
cation and allow for more flexible functional forms, and we estimate the causal
effect on the selected model using the post-lasso estimator as introduced by
Belloni et al. (2012, 2013).
Our results point to an increase of illegal employment on vineyards after
the 2011 migrant wave. Indeed, we find that this labor supply shock has a
statistically significant average causal effect on labor productivity on Siciliy’s
and Apulia’s vineyards, increasing by around 11% on average over the post-
treatment period (2011 and 2012). Under further assumptions, we show that
this effect corresponds to around 10 million unreported hours in the treated
regions in each year – or around 5,500 unreported agricultural work units (each
defined as working 1800 hours a year; EC, 2017). In other terms, the migration-
induced supply shock caused the average farm to illegally employ about one
full-time grape picker for its harvest (about 30 days for one grape variety).
As mentioned before, these workers can be undocumented migrants from the
2011 migration wave, and/or other workers available to work illegally, including
former legally employed workers. Further, due to high labor intensity and low
mechanization of the grape growing sector of the treated regions, a substitution
8More about the existing literature on the identification of illegal labor, and its effect on
legal employment is discussed in Section 1.
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effect of capital with illegal labor is rather unlikely. Given the absence of any
technological shock in grape harvesting, price shock of the harvested grapes, or
additional labor market shocks in the analyzed period, our findings are likely
due to the displacement of legal with illegal workforce caused by the 2011 inflow
of migrants.
It should be noted that our estimates of the treatment effect on reported
labor productivity is only a lower bound of the actual treatment effect. The
reason for this is that reported labor productivity is already upward biased
before the treatment due to the employment of illegal labor. Thus, also esti-
mates of the displacement of legal workforce is only a lower bound. Moreover,
the treatment could have also caused displacement of former illegal labor with
incoming illegal labor which cannot be captured by our identification strategy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 provides further
background information about this study and summarizes related literature.
Section 2 outlines our empirical strategy. The data are described in Section 3.
Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes.
1 Background and Literature
1.1 Farm labor and the 2011 migrant wave
The Italian Association for Juridical Studies on Immigration (ASGI, 2015)
reports numerous violations of the EU Directive on illegal immigration and
illegal employment of migrants without the required legal status in the EU
(2009/52/EC). In Italy, estimates report over 400,000 illegal farm workers of
which around 80% are migrants, often undocumented (Assosomm, 2016; Flai-
Cgil, 2014). Indeed, about 30% of total agricultural employment in Italy, and
up to 70% in Sicily and Apulia at local level, is illegal (Flai-Cgil, 2012). These
estimates are in strong contrast to the only 5,200 agricultural labor contracts
found to be illegal by the Labor Inspectorate in 2018 (Flai-Cgil, 2018). In
addition, illegal workers in agriculture seem to be increasing over time, with
up to 50,000 more from 2016 to 2018, producing an overall value of 4.8 billion
euros and causing losses to national revenues for around 1.8 billion euros (Flai-
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Cgil, 2018).9 Often, illegal migrant labor is exploited with wages below the
legal minimum thresholds of around 850 euros per month (about 5 euros per
hour), averaging 40% lower than domestic wages (ETI, 2015). In fact, studies
report wages between 1.60 and 3 euros per hour over a 12 to 16-hour working
day, with which workers have to pay intermediaries for transportation, food,
and accommodation (Palmisano & Sagnet, 2016).
The 2011 migrant wave might have further contributed to increase illegal
employment in agriculture. In the following, we outline (I) why and (II) how
Arab Spring migrants avoid or leave the legal asylum framework, and (III)
provide evidence that only Sicily and Apulia are the recipients of the illegal
labor supply shock.
(I) Landed migrants want to avoid expulsion and, most often, reach other
EU destinations. However, high risks of asylum rejection which implies de-
tention and expulsion, or even immediate repatriation are strong incentives to
avoid or leave first aid and reception centers in the landing regions. In 2011, the
risk of asylum rejection was very high for most migrants because local admin-
istrations considered many countries of origin to be safe (CeSPI, 2012).10 Also,
an immediate repatriation agreement was signed with Tunisia in April 2011(Il
Post, 2011).11 Lastly, migrants’ living conditions in overcrowded temporary
facilities were usually very bad, and law infringements including violations of
human rights were often reported (e.g., in ASGI, 2011). Thus, migrants have
strong incentives to find alternative ways to make money and to obtain (forged)
documents in the landing regions. One common way is to use the intermedi-
ation of gangmasters, called caporali, who negotiate with farmers and supply
workers (Spagnolo, 2017; Flai-Cgil, 2012).
(II) Once landed, migrants can enter illegal labor channels in several ways.
Many migrants land on Italian shores undetected (INEA, 2014). Detected
migrants obtain first aid in emergency shelters called hotspots. In 2011, of the
approximately 64,000 detected landings on southern Italian shores, only around
9Compared to the overall value of the informal economy (200 billion euros), the value of
unreported labor amounts to 77 billion euros (4.8% of GDP), and comes from about 3 million
workers (ISTAT, 2017).
10Indeed, 65% of political asylum requests were rejected, though, most verdicts were appealed
(MPP, 2012; Sasso & Sironi, 2012).
11Of the 19,000 Tunisians held in temporary camps for expulsion, only about 4,000 and 2,400
were actually expelled in 2011 and 2012, respectively (ISMU, 2015). This led to revolts and
further fleeings.
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55,000 arrivals are recorded at the hotspots (SPRAR, 2011). Further 11,700
migrants seem to have disappeared in the initial months of 2011 (Polchi, 2011).
Yet, without documents and money, migrants are most often not able to travel
to their destination country immediately. Among the landed migrants, those
not applying for asylum are sent to detention and expulsion centers. Instead,
asylum seekers are hosted in reception camps called Centers for First Assistance
(abbreviated as CDA), and Centers for Assistance of Asylum Seekers (CARA).
In these camps, authorities decide whether immigrants should be expelled.
Migrants stay in such facilities also for years, and, despite surveillance, many
cases of migrant fleeing camps, temporarily or permanently, have been reported
(Gatti, 2015).
(III) As a consequence of the 2011 migration wave, the number of migrants
hosted in CDA and CARA tripled: From around 12,000 and 11,000 in 2009
and 2010, respectively, to around 32,000 in 2011 (SPRAR, 2012; ASGI, 2012).
95% of migrants in CDA and CARA are hosted in Sicily, Apulia, and Calabria
(SPRAR, 2012). In particular, in 2011, Sicily’s and Apulia’s centers hosted
around 10,800 and 13,800 migrants, respectively, each hosting around 10,000
migrants more than in 2010, and with a 15 and 10 percentage point increase
of the share of hosted migrants, respectively. On the contrary, centers in other
Italian regions, specifically, Lazio, Marche, and Friuli Venezia Giulia on average
reduced both the number and the share of hosted migrants from around 2,100 in
2010 to 1,600 in 2011, and from around 18% in 2010 to 5% in 2011. Therefore,
we may expect that, despite surveillance, only migrants hosted in CARAs and
CDAs of Sicily, Apulia, and Calabria may leave camps in large numbers, and
work in the informal sector on a regular basis.
Furthermore, a number of asylum seekers, only after completed identifica-
tion procedures, are relocated in reception centers across the country within
the System for Protection of Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR). Numbers
reveal that Italian regions did not experience abnormal arrivals or departures
of asylum seekers in their SPRAR centers over the years – which may have
caused shocks to the local formal and/or informal agricultural labor market
(see Table 7 in the Appendix). Moreover, with funds available for emergency
management, the Italian government provided about 22,000 extra places in
hotels and apartments to host asylum seekers, which were distributed in each
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region according to its population (DPC, 2017).12 As a result, each region re-
ceived a relatively low number of migrants (around 1,000 on average). Regional
numbers as of September 2012 as well as the share of the 17,859 people hosted
in each region are reported in Table 1.13
Table 1: Number of Arab Spring asylum seekers and refugees relocated across
Italian regions in apartments and hotels (source: Sasso & Sironi, 2012).
n.people share pop.∗ N.people Share Pop.∗
North-East North-West
Friuli V.G. 397 0.02 1.2 Aosta V. 20 0.00 0.1
Veneto 1274 0.07 4.9 Piedmont 1549 0.09 4.4
Trentino A.A. 172 0.01 1.1 Lombardy 2548 0.14 10
Emilia R. 1585 0.09 4.5 Liguria 540 0.03 1.6
Center South
Tuscany 1141 0.06 3.7 Abruzzo 11 0.00 1.3
Marche 462 0.03 1.5 Molise 116 0.01 0.3
Lazio 1790 0.10 5.9 Campania 2155 0.12 5.8
Umbria 338 0.02 0.9 Basilicata 200 0.01 0.6
Islands Apulia 1071 0.06 4.1
Sicily 1110 0.06 5.1 Calabria 956 0.05 2.0
Sardinia 424 0.02 1.6 Total 17.859 60.5
∗ total regional population in million people
As in SPRAR facilities, migrants could not take an unjustified daily leave
and were not allowed to work.14 Further, in addition to board and lodging,
they also received pocket money and temporary documents to access health
care services (ANCI, 2011). Therefore, it does not seem plausible that relo-
cated migrants illegally worked on vineyards in other parts of Italy. In fact,
both asylum seekers and refugees had no incentive to put their status at risk
by working illegally. Also, most refugees seem to have left Italy after positive
asylum decisions (Labanca, 2016). However, as of November 2012, most of the
pending and rejected asylum seekers did not leave migrant facilities waiting
for asylum decisions and appeals, respectively (Lambruschi, 2012). Thus, the
12I.e., 10,000 migrants for 100,000 inhabitants. Also note that, in 2011, Lombardy’s SPRAR
hosted less asylum seekers (see Tab. 7), but the highest share of the extra places was assigned
to this region.
13Note that 22,216 persons were hosted as of November 2011, therefore regional numbers
were slightly higher compared to September 2012.
14Officially, asylum seekers cannot work for six months from the asylum application, however,
practically, work permits are very difficult to obtain also within 12 months from the request
(MPP, 2013).
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Italian government offered an accelerated procedure to regularize asylum ap-
plicants through concession of an humanitarian visa (Interior Ministry, 2012).
Thereby, from 2013 onwards, rejected asylum seekers, in particular, may have
entered illegal labor channels to avoid expulsion (Giangrande, 2017).15
1.2 Literature
A vast literature on the impacts of immigration on productivity and labor
market outcomes has developed (for overviews see Peri, 2016; Dustmann et al.,
2016; Okkerse, 2008). This includes studies on the long-term consequences of
immigration as well as on the labor market effects of sudden migration waves.
However, the effects on the informal sector have been rarely addressed.
This paper, by proposing a new way to identify unreported labor and quan-
tifying illegal employment causal to an irregular migrant wave, contributes at
the intersection of three streams of literature. The first stream aims to identify
and quantify irregular migrants already present in the host country, and stud-
ies their labor supply (see, e.g., Borjas, 2017; Warren & Passel, 1987; Kelly,
1977). The second evaluates the effects of immigrants working illegally on le-
gal employment in the agricultural sector (see, e.g., Venturini & Villosio, 2008;
Vaiou & Hadjimichalis, 1997). Finally, the third analyzes the effects of migrant
labor supply shocks on illegal employment and, generally, on the informal labor
market using available survey data on informal workers and irregular migrants
(see, e.g., Tumen, 2016; Ceritoglu et al., 2015; Del Carpio & Wagner, 2015).
Borjas (2017) represents the latest example within the first stream of liter-
ature. In his paper, Borjas extends past methods to identify undocumented
migrants at individual level in survey data based on residual calculations and
reconstructions of foreign-born persons that cannot be labelled as legal. This
allows the analysis of long-term trends of migrant illegal employment, and the
comparison with legal migrant as well as native employment trends. Findings
show that irregular male migrants participate more in the labor force than
natives and legal migrants, a gap found to increase over time. We relate to
this literature in scope as we try to “count the uncountable” by estimating the
population of illegal workers when an illegal labor supply shock occurs, and by
giving an indication of the magnitude of the phenomenon. Also, we contribute
15For this reason we do not extend our empirical analysis after 2012.
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by proposing a new way to estimate the relative size of the illegal labor em-
ployed when a source of exogenous variation is available but data on incoming
as well as incumbent populations are not.
In the second stream of literature, to the authors’ knowledge, Venturini
(1999) is the study most closely related to ours. It uses national-level estimates
of the number of illegal immigrant workers in Italy to estimate substitution and
complement effects with legal workers. Results reveal that the former compete
with the latter in the agricultural sector due to the unskilled, homogeneous
nature of farm labor, causing legal labor to be displaced. Similarly for Greece,
Vaiou & Hadjimichalis (1997) and Lianos et al. (1996) find that illegal em-
ployment of agricultural labor competes with legal labor, lowers factor costs,
and has a dampening effect on wages of legal workers. We contribute to this
literature by providing further evidence of the displacement effects of inflows
of irregular migrants on legal workers in the agricultural sector for the Arab
Spring migrant wave.
Finally, in the third stream of literature, a series of papers analyzes the la-
bor market impacts of the migration waves following the outbreak of the Syrian
civil war in 2011. Focusing on Turkey, Ceritoglu et al. (2015) estimate negative
causal effects on employment of informal native workers using survey data in
a DiD framework. Likewise, Del Carpio & Wagner (2015), Tumen (2016), and
Balkan & Tumen (2016) conclude that a strong displacement of natives by im-
migrants occurs especially in the informal sector. This literature concludes that
the combination of prevalent informal employment along with a supply shock
of undocumented refugees increased the magnitude of the negative effects of
the Syrian migrant wave on natives’ employment. However, Peri (2016) argues
that the estimation of these causal effects could be biased due to potential war
spillovers between the neighboring Syria and Turkey not directly related to the
migrant influx, preventing potential outcomes caused by forced migration to
be disentangled from other labor market adjustments. The question of which
type of worker is actually displaced by incoming irregular migrants is very im-
portant also in our case, though, it remains open because we lack statistical
information to estimate this relation. However, the above conclusions are in
line with our findings which suggest that, due to the Arab Spring migrant wave,
legal labor was partly displaced by illegal labor on vineyards – a sector strongly
101
characterized by informality, especially in southern Italy.16
2 Methodology
2.1 Identification and estimation
We aim at identifying the causal effects of the migration wave on illegal employ-
ment by analyzing labor productivity under the assumption that employment
of illegal labor leads to underreported labor input and, thus, overreported la-
bor productivity. In the agricultural sector, unskilled labor productivity is
fairly constant over time once we control for farm inputs, and production en-
vironment, e.g., weather conditions (Jorgenson & Griliches, 1967; Lamouria
et al., 1963). This persistence of outcomes may be due to time-invariant, unit-
specific unobservables (fixed effects) and due to so-called state dependence.
State dependence (Heckman, 1981), i.e., a dynamic outcome process in which
past outcomes help predicting future outcomes, can be explained by observed
past behavior, but also by time-varying effects of unobserved heterogeneity. If
ignored, the latter would cause inconsistent model estimates due to Omitted
Variable Bias (OVB).
In particular, in our setting, the estimation of labor productivity would
suffer from OVB if regional differences in farmers’ propensity to hire illegal
labor are not accounted for. This varies among regions and over time, and its
determinants are, e.g., organized crime intensity, and farmers’ attitudes toward
risk and law obedience due to different incentive and monitoring systems at
regional level. Further, the propensity to hire illegal labor in a region is likely
serially correlated because farmers who have hired illegal labor in the past are
more likely to do so also in the future.
To account for these effects, we model labor productivity as a dynamic linear
process with limited memory under the assumption of sequential exogeneity.
The latter means that the inclusion of a Lagged Dependent Variable (LDV)
16Another paper closely related to ours estimating the short-term impact of the Arab
Spring migrant wave is provided by Labanca (2016). Analyzing selected subgroups of (le-
gal) refugees, and based in particular on Tunisians, results indicate that the migration wave
induced natives to shift sectors of employment, specifically from mining, wholesale trade,
restaurants and hotels to construction. Interestingly, no effects on the legal agricultural
sectors are found.
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makes the outcome conditionally independent on past values of observed and
unobserved variables. In particular, the inclusion of a LDV controls for state
dependence as long as it absorbs time-varying effects of unobserved heterogene-
ity at regional level. On the contrary, a static model with fixed effects is not
able to capture state dependence. While combining both LDV and fixed effects
is possible, testing for unobserved time-invariant, unit-specific effects allows to
identify the most likely source(s) of this persistence (Breusch & Pagan, 1980;
Honda, 1985).
The model to identify the average causal effect of the illegal labor supply
shock writes:
yit = ρyit−1 + γXit + δDit + µi + εit, (1)
where subscripts i and t indicate units and time, respectively, yit is labor pro-
ductivity, yit−1 is the (observed) LDV capturing (unobserved) time-varying,
unit-specific effects on yit through the parameter ρ,
17 Xit are other exogenous
regressors, µi are (unobserved) fixed effects, εit error terms, and Dit is a treat-
ment dummy. Following the potential outcome approach by Rubin (1974), the
DiD estimator δ̂ estimates the Average Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT)
as the difference of two differences: the average outcome in the treatment
group, i.e., Sicily and Apulia, before and after shock, and the average outcome
in the control group before and after shock. In particular, the ATT is the state-
dependent causal effect of the migration-induced labor supply shock on labor
productivity. This is a conditional DiD estimator (Fitzenberger et al., 2009)
where the treatment effect is conditional on the reported labor productivity in
the previous period t−1, including the amount of misreporting already in t−1.
Thus, by conditioning on the reported labor productivity in the previous year,
we account for the short-run dynamics in labor misreporting.
If outcome persistence is mainly due to state dependence, the model in-
cludes only the dynamic component, and µi drops. Excluding µi, the dynamic
model (1) can be estimated by pooled OLS (DPOLS) under the assumption of
exogeneous regressors and sequential exogeneity. If the LDV absorbs residuals’
autocorrelation, parameter estimates are unbiased and consistent.18
17Any LDV model assumes two (tested) stability conditions on the autoregressive process,
i.e., covariance stationarity (|ρ| < 1) and weak dependence of the outcome (Hsiao, 2014).
18If, instead, autocorrelation would still be present, the model is likely non-stationary even if
|ρ| < 1, causing inconsistent and biased estimates (Keele & Kelly, 2006), and, in particular,
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The identification of δ in (1) is based on two assumptions: conditional in-
dependence (CIA), and no externalities of treatment aka stable unit treatment
value assumption (SUTVA).19
The CIA requires that, conditional on explanatory variables, the assignment
of the treatment is as good as random. Indeed, the 2011 migration wave was an
exogenous shock as it was unexpected and abnormally large, only hitting the
southern Italian coasts due to their geographic vicinity. In particular, migrants
escaping from wars did not select southern Italy as their preferred destination
due to its large agricultural informal sector. Because neither migrants nor the
treated regions self selected into treatment and because regressors are chosen to
be exogenous, we consider this assumption as fulfilled. In addition, political and
economic dynamics of the immigrants’ countries of origin do not affect southern
Italy as these economies are not interconnected and no spillovers occur.
Lastly, SUTVA states that no spillover effects on the control units take place
after the shock. Indeed, no treatment effect is expected outside Sicily and
Apulia (and excluding Calabria) for the years 2011 and 2012. In particular,
migrants either avoiding or leaving first aid and reception camps are irregular
and at risk of expulsion; thus, provided that they find informal employment
in the landing regions, they have no incentive to leave, travel undocumented
across Italy, and run a higher risk of detention and expulsion. In addition,
relocated migrants across Italy do not represent a supply shock to other regional
informal sectors. The main reason is that asylum seekers and refugees had no
incentive to put their status at risk by working illegally (see related discussion
in Section 1.1). However, with the end of the state of emergency on January
2013, the Italian government interrupted the extra financing of asylum seeker
and refugee support services, which may have caused rejected asylum seekers
to stay irregular and to look for an irregular job (Giangrande, 2017). For this
reason we do not extend our analysis after 2012.
In any observational study, the choice of the optimal control group is ex ante
difficult. In our case, a panel instead of a pure time series regression allows to
distinguish the treatment from a year effect such as general weather conditions.
However, control regions should be untreated and resemble the treated regions
upward bias for ρ̂, and downward bias for the other coefficients (Achen, 2000).
19Note that parallel trends assumption in the case of a LDV model is generally not required
to hold as there is regression to the mean.
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in the relevant observed characteristics. Thus, we use Italian and French re-
gions as the control group, but we cannot extend our sample to regions of other
European countries because they are either recipients of large migrant waves,
or have very different viticultural traditions, grape sectors, climatic conditions,
and regulations of agricultural labor markets. On the contrary, Italian and
French regions are comparable in many respects and are therefore suitable as
a control group. Specifically, France and Italy share a border and have similar
climatic conditions with warm Mediterranean climate in the south and tem-
perate oceanic climate in the north. Further, both countries are EU member
states, grape growers are working under mostly identical regulation, and both
countries have a long grape growing tradition. Finally, also on French farm-
lands, migrant seasonal workers are or become often illegal: Most workers are
recruited from abroad via foreign recruitment agencies, and are given a tempo-
rary work permit for the harvesting season after which some of them are often
offered to work illegally (Flai-Cgil, 2016).20 Also, farmers face limited risks
in terms of sanctions due to lack of labor inspectorate effectively monitoring
working conditions and paid wages (Meyer & Dumortier, 2014).21
Furthermore, since no treatment is expected to occur before the migrant
wave, the assumption of joint significance of treatment dummies before treat-
ment, aka in-time placebos, should be tested, and rejected (Autor, 2003).
2.2 Robustness checks
As a robustness check against the residual presence of unobserved fixed effects,
µi, we implement an Anderson-Hsiao type regression by first differencing the
model and instrumenting the endogeneous first-differenced LDV with lagged
outcomes (AH, Anderson & Hsiao, 1981). First differencing may, however,
induce new problems: First, if the DPOLS errors in (1) are not serially cor-
related, this induces autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors, weakening
the exogeneity of the chosen lagged outcomes as instruments; second, first dif-
ferencing may induce outcome cross-sectional dependence that was not present
20In 2002, the increasing magnitude of this phenomenon and the need to document illegal
practices led to the creation of the Association for the Defense of Foreign Seasonal Workers
in Agriculture aka CODETRAS (see codetras.org).
21To address this problem, the 2014 National Action Plan against Human Trafficking re-
formed and extended the mandate of labor inspectors (NAPHT, 2014).
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in levels.
In addition, we perform a sensitivity analysis on the choice of the control
group. Given that some regions are more likely to be similar to the treated
regions in terms of pre-treatment characteristics, we use k nearest neighbor
matching to identify for each treated region the k best control matches based
on covariate balance. Successively, we re-estimate the DiD model for different
values of k.
To check for model misspecification and to allow for more flexible functional
forms, we use the post-lasso regression method as introduced by Belloni et al.
(2012, 2013). With this approach, in a first stage, a model is selected using a
lasso-type regression applied to a high-dimensional model. In a second stage,
the ATT is estimated using the selected model (post-lasso). For this purpose,
we first extend our initial model by other farm-related variables and many
technical variables from the chosen covariates, such as interaction terms, log
specifications, as well as second- and third-order orthogonal polynomials. We
obtain a high-dimensional model with many parameters relative to the sample
size that can be estimated under approximate sparsity and, as before, condi-
tional sequential exogeneity. Lasso regularizes the regression by the penalized
L1-norm to avoid overfitting, thereby selecting the variables with the best ex-
planatory power (for details see, e.g., Chernozhukov et al., 2013; Chernozhukov
et al., 2017). In the second stage, the selected model is used to estimate the
ATT. This post-lasso regression undoes the regularization bias caused by the
parameter shrinkage.22 By doing so, we retain those variables that can increase
prediction accuracy while reducing variance. However, model specifications se-
lected with a lasso approach lack theoretical justification, and the economic
interpretation of parameter estimates is often not straightforward. For this
reason, we use post-lasso as a complementary approach to check if our ATT
estimates are robust to alternative model specifications.
3 Data
We use data from the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN, EC, 2017) and
explanatory variables from the Eurostat labor force survey (LFS, EUROSTAT,
22Post-lasso is shown to perform at least as well as lasso in terms of the rate of convergence,
and has the advantage of a smaller regularization bias (Belloni & Chernozhukov, 2013).
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2017). The dataset is a balanced panel over the period 1999-2012. Each cross-
section is the average farm of each region on the NUTS 2 level. The sample
is representative due to stratified sampling and weighting. The farms in our
sample are vineyards, i.e., farms specialized in grape and wine production.23
The sample consists of 25 regions of which 14 are located in Italy and 11 in
France, adding up to in total 350 observations.24
We consider the two southern Italian regions Sicily and Apulia as the treated
units, for which the treatment, i.e., the illegal labor supply shock, takes place
in 2011, and may have effects in 2012. As Figure 1 highlights, a sudden increase
in landings of migrants on the southern Italian coast took place in the spring
preceding the grape harvest of that year. Further, as previously discussed, the
number of landings is likely underestimated (INEA, 2014), as well as a large
number of irregular migrants seem to have avoided or fled migrant shelters,
and might have been available as labor force from 2011 onwards.
However, despite data availability for later years, we restrict the analysis
to 2011 and 2012. The reasons are twofold. First, the effect of the treatment
could be confounded by the additional landings registered in 2013 (see Figure
1 and FRONTEX, 2016). Second, potential spillover effects from 2013 onwards
may violate the assumption on the untreated status of the control regions (for
a discussion, see Section 2.1).
To analyze labor productivity, we define our logged dependent variable
LabProd as the total output from crops in euros divided by total hours worked,
which is the sum of all paid and unpaid hours worked and includes family la-
bor. While this measure controls effectively for seasonal/unseasonal jobs and
working regimes, it should be noted that it may vary due to quantity and price
variations, with the latter being the main source of concern. However, we are
confident in ruling out such effects for several reasons. First, price effects could
be sizable only for high-quality wines, i.e., those with Protected Designation
of Origin (PDO). In 2011, in Sicily (Apulia) PDOs account for only 4% (15%)
of the regional wine production, and for only 1% (6%) of total Italian PDO
23Additional farm income from other agricultural activities plays a minor role amounting to
only 3.5% on average, with very low variation across regions and time.
24This selection excludes non-grape growing regions. For six regions single missing data
points until 2003 are imputed using Multivariate Imputation by Chained Equations (MICE,






























































Figure 1: Detected illegal border crossings on the Central Mediterranean
route
(own illustration, source: FRONTEX, 2016)
production (Baccaglio, 2016). Thus, price fluctuations can have only limited
impact. Second, no sizable price shocks among Sicilian and Apulian PDOs
have been registered (ISMEA, 2018). Third, average PDO wine prices follow
similar trends in all regions of Italy and France,25 decreasing in 2009 due to
a lower international demand, and evolving fairly stable until 2012 when they
increase due to scarce harvests (FranceAgriMer, 2014; ISMEA, 2018, and see
Figure 3 in the Appendix).26
Our explanatory variables are chosen to be exogenous, and contain measures
of capital, land, labor, as well as other farm and labor market characteristics.
Regarding capital, we include capital intensity in terms of book values of ma-
chinery over total vineyard hectares (in logs, lnMachinery) as well as the lagged
investment rate computed as gross investment over total fixed assets (invRate).
In fact, the degree of capital intensity determines both workers’ day-long fatigue
level and the efficiency of grower management practices, two main drivers of
25The assumption of parallel trends across regions is not rejected (F-test p-value = 0.7).
26In fact, in 2012, both France and Italy had similar growing conditions with wet spring and
hot summer (WineSpectator, 2012). Extreme cases are 2012 hail storms in Burgundy and
Beaujolais that caused particularly low yields and high prices, and Veneto’s Prosecco boom
between 2009 and 2012.
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labor productivity in grape harvesting and grapevine pruning (Lamouria et al.,
1963). Further, these variables control for the more intense use of grape har-
vesting machines in some regions. Land input is included as total vineyard
hectares (in logs, lnLand) to capture potential returns to scale. To account for
different degrees of vineyard specialization at regional level, we use the share of
vineyard hectares over total utilized agricultural area (vineSpec). Furthermore,
we include two variables to control for potential competition on the labor mar-
ket: the deviation of the regional unemployment rate from its long-term mean
(unempRate), and the share of population above the age of 15 with less than
primary or secondary education (ISCED11) (unskilledLab) as an indicator of
unskilled workforce available for the harvesting. To account for weather effects
that may impact both potential output and harvested output through workers’
fatigue, we include the average of the daily minimum temperatures measured
at the major regional airports (minTemp).27 Finally, three additional control
variables are included: A fixed effect for France to account for unobserved
systematic differences in labor productivity at country-level (france), a linear
time trend (trend), and a time dummy to absorb the effects on both vineyard
output and hours worked of 2002 anomalous weather events including heavy
precipitations that destroyed considerable shares of the harvest in both Italy
and France (weather2002). The treatment dummy, Dit, used to estimate the
treatment effect, δ, is the interaction term of treated × post, where treated is
a unit dummy equal to one for Sicily and Apulia, and post is a time dummy
equal to one for the post-treatment periods.
Table 2 reports data descriptive statistics separately for the treated and
control units. In particular, the table shows that variable values for Sicily
and Apulia are within the range of the control regions, and mostly around the
sample mean. This can be also visualized from the boxplots in the Appendix
(Figure 4) displaying the distribution of data. The figure shows overlap of
support for individual variable values for Sicily and Apulia, which is especially
important when estimating the average treatment effect for the two regions.28
In particular, the dependent variable for the treated units lies between the first
and the second quartile of the sample.
27This data is scraped from www.wunderground.com.
28Only the maximum value of minTemp for Sicily exceeds the range slightly.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Sicily & Apulia Control units
Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD
LabProd 2.441 2.170 2.840 0.179 3.089 1.574 4.395 0.599
lnLand 1.534 1.092 1.887 0.195 2.035 0.350 3.301 0.751
vineSpec 0.671 0.472 0.821 0.099 0.640 0.260 0.961 0.153
lnMachinery 8.027 7.396 8.530 0.366 8.372 6.326 9.539 0.660
minTemp 10.596 8.333 13.143 1.456 6.134 1 12 2.552
invRate 0.010 0.000 0.075 0.017 0.068 −0.044 0.255 0.064
unempRate 0 −0.046 0.068 0.032 0 −0.059 0.063 0.018
unskilledLab 0.200 0.160 0.230 0.023 0.171 0.086 0.270 0.044
4 Results
We estimate the causal effects of the 2011 migration wave on vineyard labor
productivity using a dynamic regression model as outlined in Section 2. Af-
ter assessing the validity of our dynamic model specification, we estimate the
DPOLS model in equation 1 with and without common time effects. Results
from these models show that the 2011 migration wave led to a statistically
significant increase in labor productivity of, on average, 11% in 2011 and 2012.
Further, robustness checks by the Anderson-Hsiao type regression, and the
post-lasso approach confirm the results outlined above.29
Table 3 reports the results of the DPOLS model. Models M1, M2 refer
to DPOLS without time effects, with time effects (unit-demeaned), respec-
tively. The DPOLS models with/without time effects show that the average
causal effect estimate over 2011-2012, i.e., the ATT calculated as exp (δ̂) − 1,
ranges between 10.7% and 11.7%, and it is statistically significant at 1%. Con-
sidering the average causal estimate from these two models as its lower- and
upper-bound, respectively, this means that the 2011 migration wave led to an
abnormal average increase in LabProd of about 11.2%.30
The other explanatory variables show the expected signs. lnLand and lnMa-
chinery indicate that more land and capital assets increase LabProd, pointing
29For the analysis, we use the software R, and, particularly, the packages plm (Croissant &
Millo, 2008), MatchIt (Ho et al., 2011), and hdm (Chernozhukov et al., 2016).
30Static fixed effect and simple pooling regressions estimate relatively larger δ of 0.256 and
0.227 with standard errors equal to 0.116 and 0.132 (5% and 10% statistical significance),
respectively. This is expected as fixed effects and LDV models bracket the treatment effect
between an upper and a lower bound, respectively (Angrist & Pischke, 2010).
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Table 3: DPOLS model without time effects (M1), with time effects (M2)
(M1) (M2)
ρ 0.714∗∗∗ (0.040) 0.723∗∗∗ (0.041)
lnLand 0.149∗∗∗ (0.030) 0.136∗∗∗ (0.029)
vineSpec 0.018 (0.064) −0.011 (0.059)
lnMachinery 0.119∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.115∗∗∗ (0.027)
minTemp −0.008 (0.005) −0.006 (0.005)
invRate −0.191 (0.227) −0.226 (0.237)
unempRate −0.924∗ (0.546) −0.278 (0.663)
unskilledLab 1.508∗∗ (0.604) 1.242∗∗ (0.604)




treated 0.017 (0.037) 0.008 (0.036)
post 0.074∗∗ (0.037)
δ 0.102∗∗ (0.040) 0.111∗∗∗ (0.038)
constant −0.916∗∗∗ (0.342)
Obs. 350 350
Time effects No Yes
F Statistic 450.2*** 554.5***
Adjusted R2 0.918 0.914
Notes: ***p=.01; **p=.05; *p=.1
toward economies of scale. On the contrary, larger deviations from the long-
term unemployment rate, unemp, are negatively related to LabProd. Given the
systematic higher unemployment rate in the south of both France and Italy,
as well as the relatively low variance of such variable over time, this partial
effect may simply reflect the north-south gap in labor productivities. A higher
availability of unskilled labor positively correlates with Labprod, likely indicat-
ing the higher labor productivity of more developed regional low-skilled labor
markets. Lastly, france indicates that Labprod is on average higher in France
than in Italy. The parameter for the 2002 extreme weather events also has the
expected sign and positively affects Labprod, mainly due to the drop in labor
force needed on vineyards in that year. Lastly, the autoregressive parameter
ρ is statistically significant and amounts to about 0.7, confirming the presence
of a well-behaved autoregressive process with a relatively high degree of state
dependence.31
31The key stability conditions of the autoregressive outcome process are initially tested,
and are fulfilled, i.e., the outcome covariance structure and unit-root tests indicate weak
dependence and covariance stationarity, respectively (Choi, 2001; Hadri, 2000).
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To provide evidence supporting the validity of the models and results out-
lined above, we conduct a series of tests. First, we test a static fixed effect
(within) model for the residual presence of unobserved unit-specific effects by
means of LM tests (Breusch & Pagan, 1980; Honda, 1985). Results indicate a
significant, large residual variance across units (all p-values < 0.01), i.e., the
presence of leftover unobserved unit-specific effects also after time-demeaning
the model. Moreover, tests show that serial correlation of residuals is present
(Breusch, 1978; Godfrey, 1978). Second, we perform the same tests on the dy-
namic model (equation 1). In this case, the lagged dependent variable absorbs
these unobserved unit-specific effects (p-values > 0.1) and residuals’ first-order
serial correlation. Thus, parameter estimates of the DPOLS model are con-
sistent. Moreover, no cross-sectional dependence is detected (p-values > 0.06,
Pesaran, 2004), and Newey-West corrected standard errors (Newey & West,
1994) are used as a safeguard also with rejected serial correlation (as suggested
by Wooldridge, 2013, ch. 12.5).
We also test our results for robustness against different choices of the con-
trol group. Based on covariate balance, we select the k best control matches
(nearest neighbors) for each treated region, and we re-estimate the DiD model
for different values of k. We find that the DiD parameter is generally of similar
magnitude and statistically significant (see Table 8 in the Appendix).32
Next, we transform our estimates on labor productivity into estimates of
the unreported (illegal) hours worked at Sicily’s and Apulia’s vineyards. To do
so, we perform simple back of the envelope calculations in the following way.
Total production Output is a function of labor productivity LabProd and labor
input L such that Output = LabProdl ∗ Ll + LabProdil ∗ Lil with superscripts
l and il denoting legal and illegal labor input, respectively. Solving for Lil
delivers the illegal input as a function of the observed values of output and
legal labor input, while the values of true labor productivity of legal and illegal
input are not observed. An estimate of the true labor productivity of legal
input is calculated from the reported labor productivity LP reported using the
estimated average treatment effect: ˆLabProdl = e−δ̂∗LabProdreported. Thereby,
we assume homogenous treatment effects for the treated regions. Further, we
parameterize labor productivity of illegal input as a function of legal inputs as
32Full results for in-time placebos, further dynamic and static models are available upon
request.
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LabProdil = θLabProdl. This delivers:
L̂il =






The rationale behind this parameterization is that the productivity of illegal la-
bor might differ from that of legal labor, e.g., due to fatigue from long working
hours (Palmisano & Sagnet, 2016; Lamouria et al., 1963). Therefore, θ relates
the two labor productivities such that illegal labor and legal labor are identi-
cally productive for θ = 1, and for example θ = 1.2 (0.8) indicates 20% higher
(lower) labor productivity for illegal labor. Further, not only is the relationship
between L̂il and θ non-linear, but L̂il decreases faster for low productivity levels




Table 4 reports the estimates of unreported work hours for the average farm,
the two different model specifications, and for different values of θ arbitrar-
ily chosen to vary between 0.8 and 1.2. Estimates are calculated under the
assumption of homogeneous treatment effects, i.e., δ is constant across the
treated units. Estimates slightly vary between years and regions. We find
generally slightly higher values for Apulia than for Sicily, although differences
are small. For identical productivity of legal and illegal workforce (θ = 1),
unreported labor input is estimated to vary between 205 and 278 hours. These
estimates correspond to 11% (205h/1800h) and 15% (278h/1800h) of an annual
work unit (AWU) – which is the agricultural equivalent of a full-time employee
as defined by the EU (EC, 2017) – or one person working around 5 to 7 40-hour
weeks.33 This corresponds to the length of the harvest for one grape variety
(about 30 days), thus about one full-time grape picker might not be reported
by the average farm during this time.
While these estimates seem to be rather low, it should be noted that the sec-
tor is characterized by a strong fragmentation with a large number of fairly
small vineyards. To estimate the overall effect, we transform our estimates at
a regional level by multiplication with the number of farms within a region.
Table 4 summarizes the results. For θ = 1, total unreported labor input ranges
between 9 and 10.3 million hours in 2011, and 10 and 12.2 million hours in
33However, for illegal labor input, and in particular for labor input employed through capo-
ralato, working conditions are usually tougher, and 40-hour weeks are likely an underestimate
(INEA, 2012).
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2012. Annual estimates range between 12.2 and 13.6 million hours for θ = 0.8,
and between 8 and 9 million hours for θ = 1.2. In terms of AWU (assumed
to work 1800 hours a year), 10 million unreported hours correspond to around
5,500 illegally employed AWUs, or 5,500 full-time employees.
However, this calculation is sensitive to various factors: First, hours worked
per day might be considerably higher. Second, estimates vary strongly with θ.
Thirdly, the estimated average treatment effect, δ̂, identifies only the increase
in labor productivity due the migration wave. If labor productivity is already
overestimated before this shock due to unreported labor, the estimated unre-
ported hours are only a lower bound of the actual numbers, which is likely the
case due to the historical presence of illegal employment of labor (Flai-Cgil,
2016).
Table 4: Estimated unreported hours worked for the average farm by region
(and total per region in thousand)
θ = 0.8 θ = 1 θ = 1.2
M1 (δ̂ = 0.102)
Sicily 2011 268 (5, 825) 214 (4, 660) 178 (3, 884)
Apulia 2011 286 (6, 064) 229 (4, 851) 190 (4, 043)
Sicily 2012 249 (6, 490) 199 (5, 192) 166 (4, 327)
Apulia 2012 285 (6, 061) 228 (4, 848) 190 (4, 040)
M2 (δ̂ = 0.111)
Sicily 2011 293 (6, 368) 234 (5, 095) 195 (4, 246)
Apulia 2011 312 (6, 629) 250 (5, 304) 208 (4, 420)
Sicily 2012 272 (7, 095) 217 (5, 676) 181 (4, 730)
Apulia 2012 312 (6, 626) 250 (5, 300) 208 (4, 417)
4.1 Robustness checks
4.1.1 In-time placebo DiD
Since treatment effects on the outcomes of the treated regions before the mi-
grant wave are not expected, thus, should not occur, we introduce placebo
treatment dummies for the five years before the shock. The left graph of Fig-
ure 2 displays the evolution of the placebo treatment effects over time (x-axis),
and the respective parameter estimates as well as confidence intervals (y-axis).
For 2011 and 2012, the estimated average causal effects result to be the largest
in magnitude and with the smallest confidence levels. Joint (as well as indi-
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vidual) statistical insignificance is not rejected with a p-value = 0.99. Instead,
yearly treatment effects for 2011 and 2012 are statistically significant at 5%.
On the right, instead, parameter estimates (x-axis) are plotted against their
respective standard errors (y-axis), and the shaded area indicates that there


































































Figure 2: DiD in-time placebos and dynamic causal effects
4.1.2 Anderson-Hsiao type regression
To further check for the robustness of our results against unobserved fixed
effects, µi, we use the AH estimator on the first-differenced dynamic model
(Anderson & Hsiao, 1981). First differencing swaps away unit-specific fixed
effects; however, it induces correlation between the first-differenced LDV and
error term, thus, endogeneity. We choose the second and third lagged outcomes
to instrument the first-differenced lagged outcome, both in levels and in first
differences. Table 5 reports the results of the two-stage least square estima-
tion using first-differenced instruments (column 1 and 2) and level instruments
(column 3 and 4), respectively, with and without time effects. All four mod-
els show a positive causal effect of the illegal labor supply shock on measured
labor productivity. Parameter estimates of these causal effects are generally
of higher magnitude than those obtained with the DPOLS specification (cp.
Table 3), ranging between 15.4 and 17.9%. Despite the overall lower efficiency
of the AH estimator, these estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level.
The instruments are relevant according to robust F-tests on the first-stage re-
gressions (p-values < 0.01). Further, auxiliary-regression based Sargan tests
with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation corrected residuals indicate that
the instruments are exogenous, i.e., uncorrelated with the AH model’s resid-
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uals (p-value > 0.3). However, it should be noted that first differencing the
model induces serially correlated residuals, as well as unobserved unit-specific
heterogeneity with a large residual variance across regions (p-values < 0.005).34
For this reason, both the exogeneity of the first-differenced lagged instruments
and the model specification may be problematic. Therefore, we consider ro-
bustness of AH model estimates only as an indicator of robustness against
alternative model specifications.




ρ 0.217 (0.189) 0.034 (0.132)
lnLand 0.535∗∗∗ (0.039) 0.517∗∗∗ (0.048)
vineSpec 0.116 (0.241) 0.003 (0.275)
lnMachinery 0.065∗ (0.039) 0.064∗ (0.036)
minTemp 0.004 (0.010) 0.013∗∗ (0.006)
invRate 0.249 (0.223) 0.200 (0.201)
unempRate −0.336 (1.297) −0.300 (2.041)




δ 0.151∗∗∗ (0.039) 0.143∗∗∗ (0.029)
Obs. 325 325
Time effects No Yes
F Statistic 9.199*** 5.394***
Adjusted R2 0.151 0.190
Notes: ***p=.01; **p=.05; *p=.1
34In this case, we follow Driscoll & Kraay (1994) and use standard errors corrected for both





ρ 0.317 (0.270) 0.146 (0.154)
lnLand 0.533∗∗∗ (0.038) 0.517∗∗∗ (0.046)
vineSpec 0.138 (0.246) 0.017 (0.300)
lnMachinery 0.057 (0.043) 0.059 (0.037)
minTemp 0.003 (0.011) 0.013∗∗ (0.007)
invRate 0.217 (0.242) 0.171 (0.218)
unempRate −0.319 (1.295) −0.257 (2.117)




δ 0.165∗∗∗ (0.045) 0.161∗∗∗ (0.032)
Obs. 325 325
Time effects No Yes
F Statistic 8.346*** 4.882***
Adjusted R2 0.122 0.099
Notes: ***p=.01; **p=.05; *p=.1
4.1.3 Post-lasso approach
To check for possible model misspecification and to allow for a more flexible
functional form, we enlarge the set of covariates with additional farm-related
characteristics, as well as high-dimensional variables, in particular, interaction
terms, log specifications, and second and third order orthogonal polynomials.
We perform, first, model selection by lasso and, then, post-selection DiD es-
timation of the ATT as proposed by Belloni et al. (2012, 2013). Main results
from the post-lasso regression are the following: (I) The model specification
is dynamic (ρ is not shrunk to zero); (II) rigorous lasso selects 17 variables,
including some of our original covariates, some of their interaction terms, and
some newly included farm-related variables; (III) after model selection, post-
lasso DPOLS estimation reports plausible signs, and additionally selects the
rent paid for farm land and buildings and rental charges (in logs); and (IV) the
treatment dummy is highly statistically significant (p-value = 0.015), amount-
ing to 9.3% (for details, see Table 9 in the Appendix).
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Table 6 presents a comparison of the ATT estimates obtained by the previ-
ous methods, and the post-lasso approach. Although smaller in magnitude, the
ATT computed by post-lasso confirms the presence of a statistically significant
average causal effect of the illegal labor supply shock on vineyard labor produc-
tivity in Sicily and Apulia, indicating the presence of illegal labor employment.
Table 6: Comparison of ATT estimates
Model Estimate Std. Error
DPOLS: M1 0.102 0.040
DPOLS: M2 0.111 0.038
AH2 (lower bound) 0.143 0.029
AH3 (upper bound) 0.165 0.045
Post-lasso 0.093 0.037
5 Conclusions
This paper aims to identify and quantify illegal employment causal to an ir-
regular migrant wave, and shows (I) a new way to identify unreported labor,
and (II) a lower-bound estimate of the amount of unreported labor caused by
the migration-induced supply shock. To identify changes in illegal employment
we use the exogenous variation of the 2011 Arab Spring migrant landings on
southern Italian shores, and we consider labor productivity on vineyards in the
landing regions. Identification relies on abnormal increases in reported labor
productivity coming from underreported labor hours. Based on farm-level data
aggregated at regional level and using a dynamic panel model, labor produc-
tivity is estimated to abnormally increase by about 11% on average for 2011
and 2012 on vineyards in the landing regions. We show that this effect cor-
responds to around 10 million hours irregularly worked in the treated regions
in each year – or around 5,500 agricultural work units. These workers can be
undocumented migrants from the 2011 migration wave, and/or other workers
available to work illegally, including former legally employed workers. Thereby,
our results suggest that illegal workforce displaced legal workforce, leading to
underreported labor input and overreported labor productivity.
These results are in line with the literature which finds low-skilled jobs
(see, e.g., Dustmann et al., 2016; Peri, 2016) and informal native employment
(see, e.g., Tumen, 2016; Del Carpio & Wagner, 2015) the most vulnerable to
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migrant labor supply shocks. Indeed, this is the case for vineyard labor: The
seasonal nature and the low skill requirements of field picker jobs limit workers’
bargaining power and makes them substitutable.
Our results also underline several flaws in existing policies. First, the lack
of regulation and inspection on farmlands prevents the effectiveness of existing
laws against caporalato and illegal employment because employers face very
low probabilities of being caught. Second, in this respect, European laws that
assign temporary residence permits to irregular migrants who denounce severe
exploitation - partially introduced in Italy only in 2012 - could be fully applied
to guarantee workers’ protection, and limit employers’ exploitment incentives.
Third, more efficient evaluations of asylum requests would avoid lengthy, com-
plicated, and often unclear procedures that encourage migrants to stay irregu-
lar. Finally, future research should analyze alternatives to the existing voucher
systems and other type of contracts designed by European governments that
aim to facilitate matching agricultural labor demand and supply.
Also, several questions related to our study remain open and should be ad-
dressed in future research. Generally, the impacts of the Arab Spring migration
crisis on European labor markets needs further investigation. In particular, in
addition to employment effects, the impact of the supply shock on wages of
both legal and illegal labor should be analyzed. Further, the current analysis
should be extended to the whole agribusiness as it is the sector that absorbs
most of the illegal workforce. Finally, long-term effects on labor markets need
to be evaluated taking into account the current EU immigration policy and the
recent regulatory efforts against labor exploitation.
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6 Appendix
Table 7: Share of asylum seekers hosted in SPRAR reception centers in each
Italian region over 2010-2012 (SPRAR, 2010, 2011, 2012)
2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012
North-East North-West
Friuli V.G. 4.8 4.6 4.2 Aosta V. 0.0 0.0 0.0
Veneto 4.7 5.8 4.0 Piedmont 4.6 5.3 4.5
Trentino A.A. 0.6 0.6 0.4 Lombardy 16.5 5.7 16.8
Emilia R. 6.2 7.8 6.8 Liguria 2.7 3.0 2.2
Center South
Tuscany 4.4 4.5 4.6 Abruzzo 0.5 0.5 0.6
Marche 4.2 4.5 3.5 Molise 0.5 0.6 0.6
Lazio 22.4 26.2 21.2 Campania 2.9 3.2 2.0
Umbria 2.0 2.7 2.0 Basilicata 0.7 0.6 0.7
Islands Apulia 7.1 8.0 6.2
Sicily 11.4 11.3 14.6 Calabria 3.5 4.7 4.9






























Figure 3: Average high-quality (PDO) wine prices for the treated regions
Sicily (SIC) and Apulia (APU) (black) and control regions (grey),
highlighting the discussed cases of Burgundy (BUR), Beaujolais (BEA), and
Veneto (VEN) (dashed)




















































Figure 4: Descriptive statistics: Boxplots of mean-corrected variables (for
comparability and visualization reasons, each variable is normalized by
dividing it by its mean)
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Table 8: DPOLS model estimates with time fixed effects (M2) for different
choices of the control group based on k nearest neighbor matching
(1999-2012). For each treated region, k nearest neighbors are selected
resulting in sample sizes of 2(k + 1)T , and the full control group is selected
for k = 12.
(k = 6) (k = 7) (k = 8) (k = 9) (k = 10) (k = 11)
ρ 0.665∗∗∗ 0.634∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.673∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.066) (0.050) (0.051) (0.043) (0.042)
lnLand 0.121∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.049) (0.036) (0.040) (0.030) (0.029)
vineSpec −0.006 −0.097 0.040 0.046 0.096 0.009
(0.137) (0.084) (0.077) (0.068) (0.068) (0.059)
lnMachinery 0.135∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.040) (0.035) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027)
minTemp −0.008 −0.006 −0.015∗∗ −0.009 −0.011∗∗ −0.007
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
invRate −0.414 −0.273 0.267 0.157 0.196 −0.233
(0.427) (0.278) (0.352) (0.286) (0.301) (0.244)
unempRate −0.059 0.420 −0.250 −0.326 −0.523 −0.364
(0.852) (0.735) (0.729) (0.691) (0.693) (0.669)
unskilledLab 0.310 −0.058 0.045 1.197∗ 1.320∗∗ 1.394∗∗
(0.943) (0.677) (0.762) (0.666) (0.653) (0.607)
france 0.274∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 0.072 0.154∗ 0.158∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.083) (0.089) (0.080) (0.077) (0.074)
treated −0.024 0.004 −0.018 0.008 0.010 0.011
(0.042) (0.038) (0.040) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036)
δ 0.135∗∗ 0.105∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.051) (0.043) (0.040) (0.039) (0.038)
Obs. 196 224 252 280 308 336
F Statistic 175.8*** 272.4*** 347.2*** 358.7*** 504.6*** 545.6***
Adjusted R2 0.905 0.892 0.912 0.897 0.906 0.915
Notes: ***p=.01; **p=.05; *p=.1
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Notes: ***p=.01; **p=.05; *p=.1
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Introduction
The effectiveness of hybrid warfare, described as the use of insurgent tactics
coupled with conventional military power to achieve politico-strategic goals,
relies on ethnic grievances and weak civil societies (Lanoszka, 2016). Due
to the close link between belligerents and the target society as well as the
evolving and unpredictable nature of such conflicts, governments face several
challenges in developing conflict management strategies (Giegerich, 2016).
For instance, counter-insurgencies may deteriorate rather than improve the
country’s state of affairs.
Military conflicts always entail large costs, including economic, social,
political, psychological and environmental ones. A vast literature is devoted
to the ex-post evaluation of the economic costs of conflict to assess the
losses incurred by the states and the civil society. Starting from Keynes
(1919), many studies show that war has persistent negative consequences
on the welfare of the populations involved (see, e.g. Gates, 2012; Koubi,
2005; Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003). To our knowledge this is the first
paper that identifies and quantifies the causal effects of the hybrid war in
the Donbass region on Ukraine’s GDP. Additionally, our study discusses
mechanisms underlying these causal effects, and statistical challenges in the
analysis arising from the complex nature of hybrid wars.
The war. The Donbass war is an armed conflict between anti-government
groups of pro-Russian separatists and the Ukrainian government, taking
place in the aftermath of the 2013 Euromaidan protests and the 2014
Ukrainian revolution. Thereby, this war embodies the hybrid form of state-
on-state (Russian-Ukrainian) conflict. Located in eastern Ukraine, the Don-
bass region is considered Ukraine’s productive core due to coal mining and
highly productive heavy industry.1 As such, the Donbass war has taken a se-
vere toll on Ukraine, especially in terms of production, employment, number
of displaced persons, and civilian as well as military casualties (Angelovski,
2015).
The Donbass is of considerable importance for Ukraine’s production.
Before the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution, this region accounted for about a
quarter of the country’s exports and more than 15% of capital investment
(Ukrstat, 2014). For instance, the Donbass used to provide raw materials
such as coal, steel and other industrial goods to international manufactur-
1For a map of the conflict, see Figures 9 and 10 in the Appendix 6.1.
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ing industries. As of August 2014, the industrial production dropped by
60% and 85% in the Donbass regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, respectively,
due to power cuts and the destruction of transport infrastructures (Havlik,
2014). Overall, major reasons for the decline of Ukraine’s economic activity
are high costs of trade together with employment, agricultural and financial
losses, compressed government spending, and the partial military mobiliza-
tion coupled with growing political instability (Foreign Affairs Ministry,
2015).
As a hybrid and complex form of warfare, the Donbass war is an espe-
cially interesting case study.2 Modern conflicts are indeed more likely to
arise as a consequence of regional struggles with governments facing non-
governmental actors who operate in concert with external players. Specif-
ically, hybrid wars especially threaten the government’s sovereignty due to
lack of soil governance and means to tackle issues like unclear front lines or
friendly/enemy areas; unclear casus belli and politico-strategic goals; and
new tactics that focus on the weakening of governments and state institu-
tions rather than on direct combat (Deshpande, 2018).
In this respect, this paper aims to help deconstructing the complexity
of the Ukrainian conflict by (i) providing formal statistical evidence on the
causal effects on the country’s economy both at national and regional levels
and (ii) discussing market mechanisms underlying these effects, also in the
prospects of governments’ conflict management and resolution.
The war’s outcomes. Due to the Donbass’ strategic role in the coun-
try’s economy and its large contribution to the GDP, we expect the war to
have a negative causal impact on this outcome. Although its components
are of relative importance in determining the causal effect, we focus on the
GDP foregone as an aggregate measure of the economic costs for two rea-
sons. First, we want to allow for a higher degree of internal and external
validity of our analysis. This approach is also followed by, e.g. Costalli
et al. (2017), Horiuchi and Mayerson (2015), and Abadie and Gardeazabal
(2003), who find strong significant average per capita GDP losses ranging
2As a matter of fact, despite more than ten thousand casualties and continuous fights
(OHCHR, 2017), neither Ukraine nor any other entity declared the war status: the
Ukrainian government referred to it as an anti-terrorist operation, and, on the other
side, Russia admitted that intelligence military forces were sent to Ukraine, but denies
the use of regular troops (Walker, 2015). As a result, although there are many signs
indicating Russia’s involvement in the Donbass war (Rácz, 2015), the lack of undeniable
confirmation from Kremlin’s side complicates the relationship between both countries
and hinders any mitigation of the conflict.
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from 8.6% to 17.5% (see, e.g. Gardeazabal, 2012, for a review of existing
studies). As such, constructing an accurate (in terms of quality of the avail-
able data) and reliable (in terms of theoretical guarantees) counterfactual
for Ukraine’s per capita GDP contributes to the cross-country comparison
of our results with the literature’s. Second, since the Donbass war is still
ongoing at the time of writing, it is difficult to give precise estimates of other
types of costs due to lack of data. In light of these factors, we consider per
capita GDP foregone as the main measure of welfare loss.
Empirical strategy. We use the Synthetic Control Method (SCM) to
estimate causal effects of this war on Ukraine’s GDP per capita. Since its
first application by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and later formalisation
in Abadie et al. (2010), this method has been more recently employed to
estimate the causal effects of conflicts on GDP by, e.g. Echevarŕıa and
Garćıa-Enŕıquez (2019b,a) but also by, e.g. Albalate and Bel (2020) to
estimate the effects of government formation deadlocks on GDP growth.
Building on the potential outcomes approach (Rubin, 1974), we obtain
the counterfactual, ’synthetic’, Ukraine as a weighted average of control
(unaffected) countries with weights reflecting the resemblance of both the
outcome variable and outcome predictors in Ukraine before the war’s out-
break. A country-level panel data over the period 1995-2017 is used for
the analysis. Causal effects are estimated by computing the yearly differ-
ence in GDP per capita between Ukraine and its synthetic counterpart after
the eruption of the war. Moreover, we apply the SCM iteratively to check
for other potential shocks taking place in Ukraine before the Donbass war,
in particular, the 2004 Orange Revolution, and the 2009 gas dispute with
Russia. Finally, since the war is likely to affect the Ukrainian territory un-
equally, we further conduct a similar analysis for the Donbass regions of
Donetsk and Luhansk.
Preview of results. Results indicate that due to the Donbass war,
whose start is set to 2013, Ukraine’s foregone GDP per capita amounts to
15.1% on average in the post-war period and, respectively, 5.23% ($460.26),
9.18% ($832.96), 19.63% ($1,823.78), 19.80% ($1,893.38), 21.67% ($2,184.13)
in 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017. The obtained estimates are validated
by a series of robustness checks. After iteratively applying the SCM, we
find that gas disputes led to an overestimation of the previous causal ef-
fects by 1.21 percentage points ($128.04) on average. Instead, our findings
show that the Orange Revolution did not considerably influence Ukraine’s
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economic development and, thus, did not confound the obtained causal es-
timates of the war. Lastly, results from the regional analysis confirm the
devastating effect of the war for the Donbass area. In particular, we esti-
mate that Donetsk’s per capita Gross Regional Product (GRP) dropped by
42% ($4,294) on average due to the war. Estimates for Luhansk are of even
larger magnitude with a per capita GRP average decrease of 52% ($3,355).
1 Empirical strategy
This section presents the SCM as developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal
(2003) and later refined by Abadie et al. (2010). In addition to the identi-
fication and estimation strategy, we discuss advantages of the SCM as well
as its limitations especially related to inference.
The true causal impact of a conflict on per capita GDP is given by out-
come differences between Ukraine after the war and its counterfactual with-
out the war. The SCM builds upon the potential outcomes approach (Ru-
bin, 1974) to estimate this counterfactual, ’synthetic’ Ukraine, by weighting
units in the control group before the war to resemble Ukraine in all outcome-
relevant variables, in particular observed time-varying covariates and a set
of pre-intervention outcomes. Once the control group is weighted to pre-
dict Ukraine’s per capita GDP path before the war, post-war differences
would only be due to the war if Ukraine’s per capita GDP is accurately
fitted by the synthetic control pre-war. Our main parameter of interest is
the Average Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT) over the periods af-
ter treatment, which can be computed as the post-war average difference
between the observed outcome of Ukraine and synthetic Ukraine (Gobillon
and Magnac, 2016; Abadie et al., 2010).
Consider i = 1, . . . , J + 1 countries and t = 1, . . . , T time periods with
1 ≤ T0 < T pre-war periods, and define Y Nit to be the per capita GDP of
Ukraine i = 1 in time t, if not exposed to the war. Let Ukraine be the only
recipient of the war, and let any other j = 2, . . . , J+1 country be unaffected
by the conflict for a total of J unaffected units. Note that SCM assumes
that no country anticipates the war’s outbreak before the time period T , and
that there are no spillover effects of the conflict on the J control regions after
the war (known as Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption, SUTVA). We
further denote the observed outcome for unit i at time t as Yit = Y
N
it +αitDit
where Dit serves as a conflict indicator taking value 1 for Ukraine after
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2012 and 0 otherwise. The war causal effect to be estimated is given by
the Treatment effect on the Treated, TTt = Y1t − Y N1t for t > T0, and the
empirical challenge is to reconstruct the counterfactual Y N1t , i.e. the post-
treatment outcome of the treated unit had it not been treated. Once the
counterfactual outcome, Ŷ N1t , is estimated, the ATT over the T −T0 periods





(Y1t − Ŷ N1t ).
Consider a (J × 1) vector of optimal weights W ∗ = (w∗2, ..., w∗J+1)′ with
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jt . The synthetic control method recreates this






. The aim of this analysis is to obtain the ATT over the












The estimation of the optimal W ∗ follows a nested optimization pro-
cedure. First, an inner optimization minimizes the Euclidean distance be-
tween X1 and X0W , (r + k) × 1 and (r + k) × (J) matrices, respectively,
containing k covariates and r linear combinations of pre-war outcomes used
as predictors (2):
W ∗ = arg min
W
||X1 −X0W ||v =
√
(X1 −X0W )′V (X1 −X0W ), (2)
where V is a (r+k)× (r+k) symmetric diagonal matrix with non-negative
components, in which the diagonal elements v = (v1, ..., vr+k) are the pre-
dictor weights assigned to the fitted pre-intervention variables. In an outer
optimization, V ∗ can be estimated such that the Mean Squared Error (MSE)
of per-capita GDP outcomes is minimized for pre-treatment periods accord-
ing to V ∗ = arg minV (Y1 − Y0W ∗(V ))′(Y1 − Y0W ∗(V )), where Y1 denotes
pre-war outcomes of Ukraine and Y0 refers to linear combinations of pre-
war outcomes of control countries, which can be, e.g. averaged over some
pre-war periods.
The SCM identifying assumptions are twofold. First, the outcome of
all countries is required to follow a linear model, like, e.g. a factor model
including interactive fixed effects that capture time-varying unobserved het-
erogeneity (see Abadie et al., 2010, and Ahn et al., 2013). Since Abadie and
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Gardeazabal (2003) introduce the SCM using GDP as the dependent vari-
able, we consider this assumption as fulfilled (see, e.g. Costalli et al., 2017;
Horiuchi and Mayerson, 2015 for similar choices). Second, there exist opti-
mal (non-negative) weights (smaller than and adding up to one) that build
the synthetic control as a convex linear combination of control countries
matching a set of covariates and outcomes pre-war. This is violated in the
presence of interpolation bias, i.e. if the synthetic control obtains weights
for countries that largely differ in terms of unobservable confounders that
may trigger any change in the outcome. In our context, confounders could
consist of, e.g. unobserved time-varying factors driving both GDP and
the conflict. To avoid the interpolation bias we restrict the control group to
countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc which are not treated
with the Donbass war or other shocks, as they most accurately reflect the
Ukrainian economy, and we exclude Russia because it is part of the Don-
bass war, of the 2014 annexation of Crimea, and the consequent economic
sanctions imposed by the European Union and the United States. There-
fore, provided that the number of pre-war periods is large and interpolation
bias is not present, the synthetic control approximately fits Ukraine also
in its individual time-varying heterogeneity (Abadie et al., 2010). In such
cases, the SCM provides unbiased estimates of the counterfactual with more
identification power than traditional regression methods accounting only for
time-invariant unobserved differences (Gobillon and Magnac, 2016).
We perform standard statistical inference and robustness analyses by (a)
in-space placebo tests, and also (b) in-time tests. In the latter case (b), we
apply the SCM on Ukraine’s outcome pre-war as a means to uncover likely
confounding effects of two events: the 2009 gas disputes with Russia, and
the 2004 Orange Revolution. In the former case (a), we build a synthetic
control for each country in the control group, and we estimate the corre-
sponding ATT (Abadie et al., 2010). We compute empirical p-values as the





for i = 1, ..., J+1 where 1(|ATTi| ≥ |ATT1|)
takes value 1 when |ATTi| is equal or larger than |ATT1| and 0 otherwise.3
Additionally, we perform in-space placebo tests accounting for the pre-
diction accuracy of the estimated synthetics in the pre-war period. For every
country i = 1, ..., J + 1, we first compute the pre-war average Mean Predic-
3When the magnitude of ATT1 is extreme relative to the permutation distribution, we
obtain the smallest p-value of size 1J+1 .
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tion Error (MPE) defined as 1
T0
∑
t≤T0 [Yit − Ŷ
N
it ], with Ŷ
N
it being the syn-
thetic control estimated for every country in the sample. Second, we condi-





|MPE1|. Note that this test differs from the inferential technique per-
formed by, e.g. Abadie et al. (2010) who compute the ratio between post-
intervention and pre-intervention MSE. In this case, the numerator results
to be inflated in the presence of, for instance, a large causal effect in one
single post-war period, as squaring post-war gaps assigns a higher weight
to exceptionally large deviations. On the contrary, a counterweight of this
effect in the denominator for pre-intervention MSE is unlikely to occur as
every placebo country with a much (typically, five to three times) higher
MSE than the one of the treated unit is excluded from the computation
of the p-values. Motivated by the above as well as by recommendations
in Arkhangelsky et al. (2019), Ferman and Pinto (2017), and Firpo and
Possebom (2018), MPE-based inference is also presented.
What are the advantages of the SCM over other techniques in our con-
text? Due to the variety of costs that can be attributed to armed conflicts,
researchers have adopted three types of evaluation tools: cost-accounting,
regression-based, and counterfactual methods (for a detailed overview see,
e.g. Gardeazabal, 2012; de Groot et al., 2009). In this paper, we find the
SCM to be most suited to evaluate the cost of the Donbass war for at
least five reasons. First, unlike cost-accounting methods employed in, e.g.
Skaperdas et al. (2009), Bilmes and Stiglitz (2006) and Arunatilake et al.
(2001), the SCM does not require multiple calculations of a broad variety
of costs, which relies on the availability and quality of governmental data
as well as on expertise in listing all types of costs and avoiding double
counting. In addition, the SCM allows to perform statistical inference and
assess the uncertainty inherent in the cost estimate. Second, in contrast
to panel data and time-series methods used by, e.g. Enders et al. (1992)
and Barro and Lee (1994), the SCM is more robust against the presence of
unaccounted-for factors that may influence the outcome. By assuming a fac-
tor model specification, the SCM allows for a multidimensional unobserved
heterogeneity, i.e. for multiple interactive effects, not just additive ones as
imposed, e.g. in the difference-in-differences setting (Gobillon and Magnac,
2016). In practice, interactive effects can be considered as time-varying fixed
effects like, for example, country-specific variations in strategic alliances.
Therefore, the SCM generalizes the difference-in-differences method allow-
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ing to clearly identify the causal effect of the Donbass war on GDP per
capita, disentangling the causal effect from other unobserved time-varying
confounders. Third, the SCM improves upon other regression methods be-
cause it performs well with small-sized groups, it safeguards against ad-hoc
model specification searches, and precludes negative weights, thus, avoids
extrapolation outside the support of the data (Abadie, 2019). Finally, the
SCM estimates sparse weights for the control units allowing to assess their
contribution to the counterfactual, and to evaluate directions of potential
biases. As a result, the SCM is a well established causal inference tool, ac-
cording to Athey and Imbens (2017) one of the most important innovations
in the evaluation literature in the last fifteen years.
2 Data
We use yearly country-level panel data over the period 1995-2017 obtained
from the World Development Indicators database of the World Bank. The
dependent variable used in the SCM analysis is the GDP per capita (GDPpc)
in 2011 dollars (PPP). Further, outcome predictors used to match Ukraine
in the pre-war period are chosen based on literature review (e.g. Abadie and
Gardeazabal, 2003). We include inflation measured by consumer price index
due to the prevalence of hyperinflation in post-Soviet states, and its influ-
ence on economic development. Further, we control for domestic investment
with gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) as a percentage of GDP, and we
measure the dependence on trade with Russia as the sum of share of exports
and imports with the Russian Federation in countries’ total international
trade (TradeDep). Finally, to account for political and socio-economic re-
semblance, we also include the Human Development Index (HDI) which is
a composite indicator of life expectancy, education, and per capita income,
as well as the Polity variable from the Polity IV project dataset in which
values equal to 10 (-10) indicate a strongly democratic (autocratic) regime
(Marshall, 2017). In the SCM estimation, we match on covariates’ averages
over the 1995-2012 period, and on two outcome lags. The following Table 1
provides data descriptive statistics, while the variables’ full description can
be found in Table C.1 in the Appendix 6.3.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of variables.
Mean Standard Deviation Maximum Minimum
TradeDep 0.15 0.15 0.76 0.01
GFCF 23.79 6.37 57.71 5.39
GDPpc 14032.00 8509.13 31339.00 1043.00
Inflation 18.45 59.98 1058.00 −8.52
Polity 4.96 6.25 10 −8
HDI 0.74 0.08 0.81 0.53
The SCM makes a crucial assumption that Ukraine’s GDP per capita
and all its predictors have to lie within the convex hull spanned by the
countries from the donor pool, such that a convex combination of the control
countries can actually resemble the treated unit. Figure 1 shows evidence
on the presence of such common support. The plot presents boxplots of
all predictor variables after their mean normalization, i.e. for each variable
we computed (Xk − µk) for k = 1, . . . , 6. It can be inferred from the the
plot that the values of the predictors for Ukraine lie within the spectrum






































Figure 1. Boxplots of mean-corrected variables.
As outlined in the Data, synthetic Ukraine is built as a weighted aver-
age of former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries to most accurately
resemble its unobserved fiscal and economic conditions over time. We also
excluded countries experiencing other shocks in the considered pre-war pe-
riod. As a result, the control group comprises 17 countries, which are listed
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in Table 2 of the Results.
A last note regarding the onset of the Donbass war. The war burst out
in 2014, however, it was preceded by the 2013 violent Euromaidan protests
and a period of high political instability. For this reason, we assign the year
2013 as the start of the war. Consequently, we estimate the counterfactual
over 18 pre-war periods, and we predict the outcome over five post-war
periods. As specified in the Data, a precise and robust fit between actual
and counterfactual outcome over the whole pre-war period is necessary to
guarantee the validity of the counterfactual estimate itself.
3 Results
Using the SCM, we first show how synthetic Ukraine fits Ukraine’s GDP per
capita before the war to provide an unbiased counterfactual after the war,
and we compute causal effects. Second, we assess statistical significance by
placebo tests, and we perform a set of confoundedness as well as sparsity
checks. Third, using analogous analyses, we provide further evidence on the
war’s causal effects for Ukraine’s most affected regions.4
Table 2 shows that synthetic Ukraine is best reconstructed as a weighted
average of four countries, namely, Armenia, Bulgaria, Moldova, and Slovenia
- with Moldova and Armenia yielding the highest weights.
Table 2. Ukraine’s control sample with corresponding weights.
Country Weight Country Weight
Armenia 0.333 Latvia 0
Azerbaijan 0 Lithuania 0
Belarus 0 Moldova 0.452
Bulgaria 0.152 Poland 0
Czech Republic 0 Romania 0
Estonia 0 Slovak Republic 0
Hungary 0 Slovenia 0.063
Kazakhstan 0 Tajikistan 0
Kyrgyz Republic 0
Furthermore, Table 3 displays the results of the estimation, and shows
that synthetic Ukraine accurately reproduces mean values of the covariates
before the war. As a measure of overall goodness of fit, Table 3 reports
the Mean of the Absolute Prediction Errors (MAPE) which amounts to
4We use the statistical software R and, particularly, the Synth package (Abadie et al.,
2011).
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4% relative to the mean value of Ukraine’s per capita GDP in the pre-war
period.
Table 3. Outcome predictor means and weights.
Ukraine
Covariate Weight Real Synthetic Donor pool
Inflation 0.004 36.44 23.04 20.72
GFCF 0.032 20.91 22.89 24.17
TradeDep 0.001 0.23 0.19 0.14
HDI 0.001 0.70 0.68 0.74
Polity 0.001 6.50 6.83 4.78
GDPpc(2000) 0.577 4797.38 4797.03 10650.16
GDPpc(2012) 0.385 8322.17 8538.05 17963.32
MAPE 0.04
Note: All variables are averaged for the 1995-2012 period except for lagged values of
GDP per capita.
Figure 2 displays the trends of per capita GDP of Ukraine and its syn-
thetic counterpart. It clearly shows that both follow a very similar path
until 2012 and deviate considerably afterwards. The ATT - computed as
the post-war average difference between observed and synthetic GDP per
capita - amounts to 15.1%. In particular, yearly differences equal to, re-
spectively, 5.23% ($460.26), 9.18% ($832.96), 19.63% ($1,823.78), 19.80%
($1,893.38), and 21.67% ($2,184.13) in 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017.
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Figure 2. Trends in GDP per capita: Ukraine vs. synthetic Ukraine.
The SCM does not allow for usual large sample inferential techniques.
Instead, it provides a framework for placebo tests. Figure 3 shows the
graphical representation of placebo tests for Ukraine and control countries.
To be conservative, we exclude from the test control countries with MSE
five times higher than the one obtained for Ukraine (as suggested by Abadie
et al., 2010). As a result, we exclude six countries, i.e. Azerbaijan, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Poland, Slovenia, and Tajikistan from the plot, which
leaves 11 remaining control countries.
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Figure 3. Gaps in GDP per capita in Ukraine and placebo gaps. Countries
with poor pre-war fit excluded.
Based on placebo tests reported in Figure 3, we conclude that the ATT
estimated for Ukraine is larger in magnitude than all placebo ATTs, leading
to an empirical p-value of 8% (one over 12) which is the lowest level that
we can reach given the size of the considered control group.
Additionally, we further assess the statistically significance of the ATT
by computing post-/pre-war MSE ratios. Differently from the test above,
this statistic accounts for the goodness of fit of the placebos before the war,
and is therefore computed for all 18 units. Figure 4 shows that Ukraine
presents the second biggest ratio, yielding a statistical significance level of
11% (two over 18). Finally, as discussed in the Empirical strategy, since the
MSE criterion overweights large gaps, the ATT of each unit is also plotted,
for robustness, against its pre-war Mean Prediction Error (MPE), the mean
gap before treatment.5 Figure 5 plots the ATT-MPE test. Since no control
unit lies in the highlighted area showing a more extreme ATT as well as a
smaller MPE than Ukraine (in absolute terms), the ATT-MPE test suggests
5Since this test explicitly accounts for the prediction accuracy of all synthetics in the
pre-war period, we do not exclude control countries with MSE five times higher than the
one obtained for Ukraine.
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Figure 5. Mean prediction error in
post- and pre-war periods (ATT
vs. MPE).
3.1 Robustness and sensitivity
To check whether the estimated synthetic Ukraine is robust against different
linear combinations of country weights, we perform a Leave-One-Out (LOO)
estimation. This means we iteratively build synthetic Ukraine excluding
one control unit at the time among those units with positive weights in the
synthetic Ukraine (i.e. Slovenia, Bulgaria, Armenia, and Moldova). Figure
11 in the Appendix 6.2 shows that the LOO synthetic controls closely match
the original synthetic Ukraine that includes all control countries, verifying
the robustness of the original synthetic. As a result, no country is found to
be pivotal to the results. Further, since each LOO synthetic control is above
our original estimate, our results can be interpreted as a lower-bound for the
war’s causal effects on Ukraine’s GDP per capita. In particular, excluding
Moldova (Armenia), the country receiving the (second) highest weight in the
original estimation, would cause higher estimates by 10% (20%) on average
in the post-war period. Table 4 reports all LOO causal effect estimates on
Ukraine’s per capita GDP in each post-war period and on average over the
post-war period (ATT).
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Table 4. LOO estimation: Ukraine’s per capita GDP losses causal to the
Donbass war in each post-war year, and on average in the post-war period
(ATT).
Year Slovenia Bulgaria Armenia Moldova Original
2013 490.8 649.0 686.6 588.7 460.3
2014 914.9 1083.7 1038.7 866.9 833.0
2015 1932.3 2040.6 2089.1 1982.8 1823.8
2016 1931.0 2103.1 2321.3 2146.8 1893.4
2017 2236.1 2455.7 2553.9 2351.6 2184.1
ATT 1501.0 1666.4 1737.9 1587.4 1438.9
Note: GDP in 2011 international dollars, PPP.
The presence of substantial spillovers would violate the no interference
assumption (SUTVA) and lead to a bias in the synthetic control estimate.
This may be especially the case for Ukraine’s neighboring countries such as
Moldova (see map in Figure 10 in the Appendix 6.1). However, awareness of
the type of potential spillovers allows to evaluate the validity of the counter-
factual estimate and the directions of potential biases (Abadie, 2019). For
instance, if the economic growth of neighboring countries was negatively
affected by the Donbass conflict in the post-war period (perhaps because
they diverted demand and investment from Ukraine) this would imply that
the synthetic control represents a lower bound on the magnitude of the
war’s negative effects on Ukraine’s GDP. We follow Cao and Dowd (2019)
to gauge the potential effects of spillovers on our estimates. The test uses
all 18 pre-war GDP per capita values as predictors, and considers Ukraine’s
neighboring countries of Belarus, Moldova, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and
Slovak Republic as the potentially affected units. Results confirm that our
estimates are a lower bound of the war’s effect, and indicates that account-
ing for spillovers would lead to higher GDP losses of 1.8% in 2015, 15% in
2016, and 20% in 2017.6 The Discussion Section outlines possible channels
through which the Donbass war may (or not) have affected the per capita
GDP of countries in the control group.
Moreover, we perform confoundedness checks obtained by iteratively
estimating synthetic controls on the pre-war period to account for previous
Ukrainian-Russian disputes. This allows to verify if Ukraine’s exposure
to other external shocks also affects its outcome path. In particular, we
analyze two events: the 2009 gas disputes with Russia, and the 2004 Orange
Revolution. For this purpose, we iterate the SCM moving the treatment
6We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this test.
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period T0 + 1 to 2009 and 2004, respectively. In this case, we calculate
treatment effects only until T = 2012 in order to exclude effects of the
Donbass war and obtain ’pure’ effects of these events on Ukrainian economy.
The Orange Revolution is a series of political protests leading to a period
of political instability that could have caused a slowdown in Ukraine’s GDP.
However, estimation results show that the ATT is not statistically significant
at conventional levels, namely, ten over 18 units have a larger ATT (in
magnitude) than Ukraine (p-value=0.55). This is displayed in Figures 12
and 13 in the Appendix 6.2.
Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes in 2009 represented a trade conflict over
gas prices and their terms of export. Since no agreement was reached,
Russia interrupted gas supplies to Ukraine which served as a transit country
for Europe. Counterfactual estimation reveals a gap between observed and
synthetic outcomes in 2009, indicating that Ukraine’s GDP per capita would
have been higher without the shock. This is shown in Figure 15 in the
Appendix 6.2. In particular, gas disputes cause a one-time outcome level
change in 2009 after which trends are parallel again. Placebo tests indicate
that causal effects are significant at 10% level. Yet, these estimates may be
confounded by two factors. First, gas prices increased after 2009, potentially
affecting the GDP of control countries. This would lead to a bias in the
SC due to violation of the no spillover assumption (SUTVA). Second, the
effects of the 2009 financial crisis cannot be disentangled from those of the
gas disputes.
Although the 2009 gap may not be entirely attributable to the gas dis-
putes, we compute the confounding effects of the shock on the causal effects
of the Donbass war. Being fairly constant for 2009-2012, outcome gaps
caused by gas disputes (∆̂gas) are substracted from the per capita GDP val-
ues of synthetic Ukraine in consecutive years, and the Donbass war’s causal
effects are adjusted as shown in Table 57. Clearly, accounting for gas dis-
putes caused the loss to decrease from original yearly average of $1,438.9 to
$1,310.86. These results, also displayed in Figure 14 in the Appendix 6.2,
suggest that the 2009 events led to the overestimation of causal effects of the
conflict by an average of 1.21 percentage points ($128.04). As a result, the
lower-bound for Ukraine’s per capita GDP foregone due to the war amounts
7Causal effects of the gas disputes are computed as ∆̂gas = 1/4
∑2012
t=2009(Y1t − Ŷ Ngas,t),
and the corrected counterfactual outcome accounting for such shock is Ŷ N,new1,t = Ŷ
N
1t −
∆̂gas for t > 2012.
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to 13.89%.8
Table 5. Per capita GDP differences between Ukraine and its synthetic
control including effects of 2009 gas disputes with Russia.
Year GDP Loss GDP New Loss Diff.
t Ŷ N1t Ŷ
N




1,t − Y1t in losses
2013 8799.18 460.26 8647.00 308.08 152.17
2014 9076.43 832.96 8912.73 669.26 163.70
2015 9280.71 1823.78 9146.79 1681.85 141.93
2016 9561.48 1893.38 9473.75 1805.65 87.73
2017 10078.52 2184.13 9983.85 2089.46 94.67
Average 9359.26 1438.90 (15.10%) 9231.21 1310.86 (13.89%) 128.04
Note: GDP in 2011 international dollars, PPP.
3.2 Regional synthetic control estimates
Since the Donbass war is limited to the territory of only two out of 24
Ukrainian regions (see map in Figure 9 in the Appendix 6.1), we estimate
the impact of the war on the respective Gross Regional Product (GRP).
Results from this estimation would also serve as a reliability check for the
causal effects obtained at country level.
Regional SCM estimates are obtained with data from the State Statistics
Service of Ukraine, and the first available period is 2004. Limited data
availability constrains the choice of the variables included. These are exports
of commodities (as a share of GRP), capital investments (as a share of
GRP), unemployment rate, and per capita GRP. A detailed description
of the data is to find in Table C.2 in the Appendix 6.3. The values of
regions’ GRP and capital investment are transformed from the Ukrainian
currency (UAH) into international 2011 dollars using the exchange rates
given in Table C.7 in the Appendix 6.3. The control group includes 22
Ukrainian regions with the exclusion of Kyiv City because its economy
differs considerably from those of the other regions.9 The complete list of
the control units can be found in Table C.3 in the Appendix 6.3.
For the estimation, we use regional panel data from 2004 to 2016. As for
the country-level estimation, the treatment is assigned in 2013 to account for
8These results are robust to an alternative correction strategy, namely, estimate
Ukraine’s SC and ATT after correcting Ukraine’s outcomes for the causal effects of the
disputes.
9Kyiv City is Ukraine’s capital and its biggest, most affluent agglomeration. It accounts
for nearly a quarter of the country’s capital investment and its GRP per capita is roughly
three times higher than Ukraine’s average.
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anticipation effects. We suspect that although armed conflicts did not start
before 2014, there might have been regional tensions and hostilities that
influenced social and economic living conditions of the local population. As
a result, we match on nine pre-war periods to predict four post-war periods.
Tables C.3 and C.6 in the Appendix report the estimated unit and pre-
dictor weights, respectively, while Tables C.4 and C.5 show average values
of covariates for the Donbass regions, their synthetic counterparts, and the
whole control sample mean. It can be inferred that weighted averages ac-
curately reconstruct all the outcome-relevant characteristics of the affected
units.
Finally, Figures 6 and 7 plot the values of GRP per capita for Donetsk
and Luhansk along with their synthetic counterparts. While in both cases
observed and synthetic outcomes follow almost an identical trend until 2012,
observed outcomes severely drop post-war. This estimation shows that, due
to the Donbass war, Donetsk’s and Luhansk’s average GRP for 2013-2016
decreased by 42% ($4,294) and 52% ($3,355), respectively.































































Figure 6. Per capita GRP trends
in Donetsk vs. its synthetic coun-
terpart.

























































Figure 7. Per capita GRP trends
in Luhansk vs. its synthetic coun-
terpart.
Statistical significance of these causal estimates is confirmed by a series
of placebo tests as shown in Figure 8 below, and Figures 16 and 17 in the
Appendix 6.3.
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Figure 8. Gaps in per capita GRP in Donetsk, Luhansk and placebo gaps.
Compared to the country-level estimation, assumptions for the regional
case are weaker, in particular, SUTVA. However, obtaining plausible causal
estimates seems likely because Donetsk and Luhansk are the only regions
directly affected by the fights. Following Cao and Dowd (2019), we test for
spillovers in the potentially affected neighboring regions of Dnipropetrovsk,
Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhya for Donetsk, and Kharkiv for Luhansk (see map
in Figure 9 in the Appendix 6.1) using all 9 pre-war GDP per capita values
as predictors. We find that adjusting our estimates to account for spillovers
would increase the magnitude of the ATT by 13% for Donetsk and 11% for
Luhansk. Thus, similarly to the country-level estimation, the test shows
that our estimates are a lower bound of the war’s causal effects.
4 Discussion
Our results from the counterfactual estimation show that Ukraine’s per
capita GDP experienced a significant decline due to the Donbass war and,
in its absence, would have instead followed a rather stable, slowly increas-
ing trend. Importantly, we estimate that the gap between what actually
happened in the Ukraine’s economy and its counterfactual widens over the
four years after the official start of the war in 2014.
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Although our study does not aim to statistically identify the particular
GDP components that contributed to its decline, we hereby discuss pos-
sible mechanisms underlying the causal impacts of the Donbass war, and
provide external anecdotal and formal evidence that supports our results.
Additionally, we discuss the role of (I) economic sanctions and (II) military
expenditures together with our study’s limitations.
4.1 Mechanisms underlying the GDP decline causal
to the war
There are several explanatory factors for the negative causal effects of the
Donbass war on Ukraine’s GDP per capita. These are, for instance, disrup-
tion to production, trade and employment, agricultural and financial losses,
compression of public expenditures, and a partial military mobilization cou-
pled with growing political instability.
Since its outbreak, the war took a heavy toll on Ukraine’s economy espe-
cially due to trade disruptions and diverted government spending. Between
May and September 2014, the European Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment adjusted its predictions on Ukraine’s GDP loss from seven to nine
percent (Reuters, 2014). In fact, only few months after the war’s beginning,
most of eastern Ukraine’s core industries and infrastructure has been either
shutdown or destroyed. Also, physical losses as well as water and electricity
cuts made large facilities such as coal and power stations inoperable. For
instance, coal mines have flooded because power cuts prevented water ex-
traction, and the fewer transfers of the Donbass’ exports of coal, steel and
other industrial goods became more costly due to the destruction of bridges,
roads and railways. As a result, during the war, the Donbass - previously
Ukraine’s largest industrial center - drastically reduced its contributions to
the country’s economy.
Several institutions and governmental sources reported estimates of the
ongoing economic costs of the Donbass war. On September 2014, the Prime
Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk reported that the Donbass war was costing the
government 6.15 million dollars a day (Wilson, 2015). Donetsk’s politician
and economist Alex Ryabchyn referred to a variety of reasons for such costs
(Kuznetsov, 2014). He reported that (i) several manufacturing industries
depend on raw materials coming from the Donbass, (ii) exports of coal,
steel, and power heavily depend on the Donbass’ output and transportation
infrastructure, and (iii) one third of Ukraine’s market is fostered by trade
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with Russia. In the latter respect, the index of merchandise exports between
Ukraine and Russia has fallen by 80% over 2013-2016 (Hornish, 2019).
Moreover, investors usually shy away in the presence of conflicts, and
the confidence in the overall economy plummets. In the Donbass case, real
foreign direct investment stagnated at about one percent of GDP on average
over 2014-2018 (Åslund, 2019).
Furthermore, Ukraine’s energy sector was also largely damaged by the
failure of the Minsk peace process and the trade blockade against the Don-
bass started in 2015 and culminated in 2017. The latter was operated
first by pro-Ukrainian activists, and later supported by the Ukrainian Na-
tional Security Council, to block the transport of raw materials including,
in particular, anthracite coal from the Donbass to the rest of Ukraine. This
resulted in major production breaks for companies not only in eastern but
also in western Donbass due to the interconnection of their production cycles
(for more details see, e.g. Kostanyan and Remizov, 2017).
As an additional consequence of the blockade, Ukraine scored higher in
terms of internal conflicts fought, and growing political instability which
proxies for the propensity of a government collapse (IEP, 2018). Especially
if coupled with increased internal conflicts, political instability has been
shown to damage a country’s economy by reducing investment, lowering
the rates of productivity growth and, to a smaller extent, of physical and
human capital accumulation (Hussain, 2014).
Yet, important questions remain open, namely, whether the negative
effects of the Donbass war on Ukraine’s economy have been reinforced by
the government’s mismanagement of the conflict and a weak external en-
vironment during the war. The latter includes, for instance, lower global
commodity prices that resulted in a deterioration of Ukraine’s terms of
trade.
On the governmental side, instead, the World Bank reports that struc-
tural imbalances such as an already consolidated fiscal deficit were nega-
tively adjusted in response to the war shock (World Bank, 2017). This
likely resulted in a compression of domestic demand, increased public and
guaranteed debt, and severe currency depreciation which induced deposit
outflows, rising levels of nonperforming loans, and large numbers of bank
failures, further reducing confidence in the economy. In this respect, an
empirical study by Kochnev (2019b) estimates a nonlinear and on average
positive association between Ukraine’s stock market performance during the
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war and investors’ expectations on the prospect of conflict resolution.
In light of all the above, we can expect that not only the Donbass but
also other Ukrainian regions were damaged by the conflict, in which case
our estimated average GDP decline (43% for Donetsk and 52% for Luhansk)
would represent an underestimate of the true causal effects for the Donbass
region. Interestingly, using a difference-in-differences design and luminosity
data to proxy for economic development, Kochnev (2019a) reports similar
estimates, namely, a decrease in economic activity by 38% and 51% in the
Donetsk and Luhansk regions, respectively.
4.2 Economic sanctions and military expenditures
One main limitation to our study is the possible violation of the SCM iden-
tifying Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA). In particular,
SUTVA requires the absence of spillover effects of the Donbass war, the
treatment, on the GDP of countries and regions in the control group. If
SUTVA is violated, the synthetic control built as a linear combination of
untreated, though spilled over outcomes would be a biased estimate of the
counterfactual in the post-war period. We identify two main unaccounted-
for factors that may cause such spillovers, namely economic sanctions and
military expenditures.
Concerning the first, we refer to the economic sanctions imposed on
the Russian Federation by the EU in the aftermath of Crimea’s annexation
in 2014 and the Donbass war. These sanctions may have had an impact
not only on the Russian Federation but also on the EU, especially because
target and sender countries are economically interdependent and have coop-
erative political relations (Kaempfer and Lowenber, 2007; Drezner, 1999).10
In light of this, our concern is that the GDP of countries and regions in
the control group could be impacted, although indirectly, by these sanc-
tions. However, we argue that this is likely a minor issue for at least three
reasons. First, while sanctions affect exports directly, they only indirectly
impact the GDP which is more sensitive to other dynamics such as taxation
and countries’ overall performance (Giumelli, 2017). Second, sanctions’ ef-
fects are shown to be strongest in the very short-run, which indicates that
GDP values after 2015 are most likely unaffected (Dizaji and van Bergeijk,
2013). Third, although sanctions’ costs are difficult to identify and dis-
entangle from countries’ performance, the analysis of export data suggests
10In fact, Russia is EU’s third largest trade partner, and the EU is Russia’s largest one.
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that only few of our control countries experienced changes in exports that
may be attributable to these sanctions. Specifically, a study by Giumelli
(2017) finds that, on the one hand, exports of Germany, Italy, France, the
Netherlands and Poland seem to be especially hit by the sanctions, with the
most severe drop in 2015 compared to 2013. On the other hand, exports of
Slovenia, Luxembourg and Romania were affected the least. This brings us
to the conclusion that the 2014 sanctions may have had only mild, if any,
consequences on the GDP of countries in the control group. Moreover, due
to the ambiguity about the direction of the effect in each country, we cannot
provide an upper or lower bound for the SC estimator as, e.g. indicated in a
similar case by Costalli et al. (2017). Therefore, future research is needed to
shed light on the direction and magnitude of sanctions’ potential spillovers.
Another source of spillover effects might be changes in military spending
in control countries. A strand of literature shows that neighboring states
may perceive conflicts as a threat and, thus, increase military expendi-
tures (Smith, 2014; Collier, 2007) which in turn may impact their economic
growth (Zielinski et al., 2017; Murdoch and Sandler, 2004). Although simi-
lar studies to this commonly assume that indirect spillovers are of negligible
magnitude (Costalli et al., 2017; Horiuchi and Mayerson, 2015), we cannot
ignore that the Donbass war increased the political instability especially
in post-Soviet republics and the Baltic states (Erőss et al., 2016; DeGhett,
2015).
However, also in this case, we believe that changes in military expen-
ditures have only a minor, if any, effect on the results for the following
reasons. First, the war’s outbreak coincided with multilateral agreements
made at the 2014 NATO Summit in which member states were urged to
increase their military burden up to 2% GDP share. As a consequence,
countries lagging behind this goal made the most significant investments in
this sector with both Latvia and Lithuania increasing their military burdens
from 0.9% in 2013 up to 1.7% in 2017. The same holds true for Romania
and Poland which increased their military burdens over the same period
from 1.3% up to 2%, and from 1.8% up to 2%, respectively. Thus, the
NATO agreement largely explains the variability of military spending over
the years 2014-2017 in Eastern Europe. Secondly, in the case of post-Soviet
republics, increased military burden occurs according to bilateral military
agreements with the Russian Federation, external military investments from
Moscow, and modernization programs within the Collective Security Treaty
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Organization (CSTO) which is also led by Russia (Klein, 2019). Third, al-
though military spending may have indirect effects on GDP growth, the
size and the direction of this effect is ambiguous. On the one hand, the lit-
erature suggests that increased military expenditure has positive effects on
economic growth through increased manufacturing output, inciting techno-
logical progress and innovation (Barro and Lee, 1994). On the other hand,
it can be argued that its effect on investment, capital formation and re-
source allocation is adverse, indirectly curbing other sectors of the economy
and inhibiting long-term economic growth (Knight et al., 1996). Despite
the many studies on the topic, there is lack of consensus on the impact of
military burden on countries’ GDP growth (Herrera and Gentilucci, 2013).
As a result, observing no sudden change in the 2014 GDP growth among the
control countries, we conclude that the effect of changes in military spending
on the donor pool’s GDP, if present, is likely negligible. Yet, future research
is needed to investigate its magnitude, significance, and spatial dispersion.
5 Conclusions
The Donbass war has taken a severe toll on Ukraine, claiming over ten
thousand casualties and triggering a severe economic recession. Yet, to the
best of our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence on the overall costs
incurred by Ukraine as a result of the war. Thus, the goal of this paper is
to start filling this gap by estimating Ukraine’s GDP foregone due to the
Donbass war, and discussing mechanisms underlying this causal effect.
Results from the counterfactual estimation by synthetic controls indicate
that the Donbass war led to a considerable decline of Ukraine’s economy.
Namely, we estimate that, due to this war, the country’s per capita GDP de-
creased by 15.1% ($1,438.90) on average over the period 2013-2017. Statis-
tical significance of the causal estimates is shown by multiple placebo tests,
and robustness is checked by leave-one-out estimations, and confoundedness
analyses. In particular, we find that the 2009 gas disputes with Russia and
the financial crisis in the same year may lead to overestimated causal effects.
As a consequence, the estimated lower-bound of Ukraine’s per capita GDP
foregone due to the war amounts to 13.89%.
Additionally, we show that the conflict affected the Donbass more severely
than the other Ukrainian regions. Over the period 2013-2016, the per capita
GRP of the Donbass regions of Donetsk and Luhansk is found to be, on aver-
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age, 47% ($3,825) lower compared to its synthetic counterpart not affected
by the strife. This result is in line with the estimated causal effects at
country-level.
Several interesting issues are still outstanding. First, this paper focuses
on quantifying the economic consequences of the conflict on per capita GDP.
Although these account for a large part of direct and indirect costs of the
war, we do ignore human capital, social, and psychological effects as well as
migration dynamics which start to occur in the longer run. Moreover, given
the ongoing nature of the conflict at the time of writing, the continuation of
this study should be pursued as more data become available. It should be
assessed how the costs evolve over time, in particular, whether the estimated
destructive effects increase in scope as more workforce and investment flee
the state. This knowledge is crucial to mitigate the damaging consequences
of the conflict, and target aid and investment more effectively. These issues
are under investigation by the authors.
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Figure 9. Ukraine’s geographical location in Europe. The darker area in
Ukraine represents the Donbass.
Luhansk
Donetsk
Figure 10. Ukraine’s administrative division map. Darker areas represent
the two Donbass’ regions of Donetsk and Luhansk.
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6.2 Graphs
Figure 11 shows the Leave-One-Out (LOO) estimations: The solid black
line represents Ukraine’s observed GDP per capita, dashed black line is the
original synthetic Ukraine, and gray lines are the LOO synthetic controls
estimated by excluding one control unit at the time among those units
with positive weights in the synthetic Ukraine (Slovenia, Bulgaria, Armenia,
Moldova).


























































Figure 11. Leave-one-out distribution of synthetic controls for Ukraine.













































Figure 12. The 2004 Orange Rev-
olution: per capita GDP trends in
Ukraine vs. synthetic Ukraine.



































































Figure 13. The 2004 Orange Rev-
olution: Gaps in per capita GDP
in Ukraine and placebo gaps.
161

























































Figure 14. The 2009 gas disputes:
Per capita GDP in Ukraine vs.
synthetic Ukraine.


























































Figure 15. The 2009 gas dis-
putes: Gaps in per capita GDP
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Figure 16. Ratio of mean squared prediction error in post- and pre-war
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Figure 17. Mean prediction error in post- and pre-war periods (ATT vs.
MPE) for the Ukrainian regions. No control unit lies in the highlighted area
showing a more extreme ATT as well as a smaller MPE than Luhansk and
Donetsk (in absolute terms).
6.3 Tables
Table C.1. Data description of variables used in the country-level estima-
tion.
Variable Description
Inflation Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)
GFCF Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)
Polity Polity IV Individual Country Regime Trend
HDI Human Development Index
TradeDep Sum of exports and imports with the Russian Federation (% of GDP)
Data source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators; Marshall (2017).
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Table C.2. Data description of variables used in the regional-level estima-
tion.
Variable Description
Export Exports of commodities (% of GRP)
Investment Capital investment by region (% of GRP)
Unemployment Unemployment rate of population (results of a sampling
survey population of economic activity)
GRP Per capita gross regional product
(2011 international dollars, PPP)
Data source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine (http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua).
Table C.3. Donetsk’s and Luhansk’s control sample with corresponding
weights.
Region Donetsk Luhansk Region Donetsk Luhansk
Dnipropetrovsk 0.351 0.135 Poltava 0.513 0.016
Chernivtsi 0 0.005 Zakarpattya 0 0.411
Zaporizhzhya 0.135 0.290 Odesa 0 0.006
Volyn 0 0.005 Zhytomyr 0 0.004
Ivano-Frankivsk 0 0.008 Kyiv 0 0.021
Kirovohrad 0 0.005 Lviv 0 0.006
Mykolayiv 0 0.062 Rivne 0 0.004
Sumy 0 0 Ternopil 0 0
Kharkiv 0 0.005 Kherson 0 0.003
Khmelnytskiy 0 0.004 Cherkasy 0 0.006
Chernihiv 0 0
Table C.4. Donetsk’s per capita GRP predictor means, and Mean Absolute
Prediction Error (MAPE) relative to the mean outcome value pre-war.
Covariate Treated Synthetic Control sample
Export 25.36 18.74 9.61
Unemployment 7.94 7.85 8.50
Investment 18.32 21.78 23.60
GRP 10,091 9,847 6,014
MAPE 0.06
Note: All variables are averaged over the 2004-2012 period.
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Table C.5. Luhansk’s per capita GRP predictor means, and Mean Absolute
Prediction Error (MAPE) relative to the mean outcome value pre-war.
Covariate Treated Synthetic Control sample
Export 22.77 19.29 9.61
Unemployment 6.90 7.89 8.50
Investment 20.79 20.79 23.59
GRP 6,773.60 6,773.70 6,013.95
MAPE 0.02
Note: All variables are averaged over the 2004-2012 period.






Table C.7. Exchange rates between UAH and international 2011 dollars.
Year Rate Year Rate
2004 0.963 2010 0.332
2005 0.773 2011 0.291
2006 0.673 2012 0.26
2007 0.548 2013 0.249
2008 0.426 2014 0.223
2009 0.377 2015 0.161
2016 0.132
Note: Own elaboration based on Ukrainian GDP data obtained from Ukrainian State
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